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This dissertation examines how the structures of compensation for ex-
ecutives and directors are affected by the possibility that managers can influ-
ence the risk of a firm’s cash flows. In chapter 1, I consider a moral hazard
model which shows that a strong pay-for-performance sensitivity in manage-
rial compensation may deteriorate shareholder value when shareholders can-
not monitor managerial risk-seeking activities. Intuitively, while high-powered
managerial compensation provides the manager with incentives to increase the
firm’s value by exerting effort, it also creates managerial incentive to engage in
(unproductive) risk-seeking activities. To test this prediction, I consider a reg-
ulatory change that makes it more difficult for managers to conceal information
about the (speculative) use of derivative instruments. Specifically, I examine
how the structures of compensation for managers and other executives are
affected by the adoption of a new accounting standard, the Statement of Fi-
nancial Accounting Standard No. 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments
vi
and Hedging Activities (“FAS 133”) which mandates the fair value account-
ing for derivative holdings. Consistent with the model prediction, I find that
relative to other firms, derivative users (firms that traded derivatives before
adopting FAS 133) increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO/CFO
compensation.
In Chapter 2, I extend the model by incorporating the realistic features
that shareholders delegate to the (self-interested) board the tasks of monitoring
managers and of setting their compensation contracts. My analysis shows that
while high-powered board compensation induces the board to monitor the firm
and to properly design managerial compensation, it also provides the board
with incentives to misreport managerial risk-seeking activities and to engage
in collusive behavior with the manager at the expense of shareholders. From
these trade-offs, I develop a number of testable hypotheses and take them to
the data. Consistent with the model predictions, I find that firms in which (i)
managerial risk-seeking activities are more likely to occur (e.g., high R&D firms
or banks) and (ii) board monitoring costs are likely to be lower (e.g., firms that
have non-officer blockholders on the board) show weaker pay-for-performance
sensitivity of board compensation and stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity
of CEO compensation.
vii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments v
Abstract vi
List of Tables xi
List of Figures xii
Chapter 1. Managerial Incentives, Moral Hazard
and Risk Management 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.1 Firm project and managerial actions . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.2 Managerial agency problems and contracts . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Model Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1 Observable ∆ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Unobservable ∆ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Empirical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.1 Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 133 . . . . 15
1.4.2 Empirical setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.5.1 Effect of FAS 133 on CEO compensation structure . . . 22
1.5.2 Effect of FAS 133 on the compensation structure for other
executives and directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.5.3 Intensity in the use of derivatives and the effect of FAS
133 on the compensation structure . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5.4 Other compensation measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5.5 Falsification tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.6 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
viii
Chapter 2. CEO Compensation, Board Compensation,
and Managerial Risk-Seeking Activities 50
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2.1 Firm project and managerial actions . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.2.2 Managerial private information and board monitoring . 60
2.2.3 Collusion, communication and contracts . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2.4 Sequence of events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.3 Model analysis (I): Uninformed board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.4 Model analysis (II): Informed board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.4.1 Board’s choices and managerial actions . . . . . . . . . 79
2.4.1.1 Informed board’s choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.4.1.2 Uninformed board’s choices . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.4.2 Optimal mechanism M I∗ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.5 Optimal compensation structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.5.1 Comparative statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.5.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.6 Empirical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.6.1 Data and sample construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.6.2 Determinants of compensation structure . . . . . . . . . 101
2.6.2.1 Managerial risk-seeking ability . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.6.2.2 Board monitoring costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.6.2.3 Variability in the quality of projects . . . . . . . 103
2.6.2.4 Control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
2.6.3 Pay-for-performance compensation measures . . . . . . 106
2.6.4 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.7 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.7.1 CEO and directors pay-for-performance compensation . 110
2.7.1.1 Non-financial firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.7.1.2 Financial firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2.7.2 CEO-directors joint compensation structure . . . . . . . 114
2.7.2.1 Non-financial firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
2.7.2.2 Financial firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
2.8 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
ix
Appendices 135
Appendix A. Proof of Propositions and Lemmas
(Chapter 1) 136
Appendix B. Proof of Propositions and Lemmas
(Chapter 2) 139
Vita 161
x
List of Tables
1.1 Definition of variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.2 Intensity in the use of derivatives and industry clusters . . . . 33
1.3 Summary statistics: Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.4 Summary statistics: Independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.5 The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of CEO compensation:
Pay-for-performance sensitivities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.6 The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of CEO compensation:
Convexities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.7 The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of CFO compensation . 40
1.8 The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of compensation for non-
CEO/CFO executives and outside directors . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.9 The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of compensation for CEO
and CFO: Intensity in the use of derivatives . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.10 Other compensation measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.11 Falsification test: False adoptions in 1996 and 1997 . . . . . . 48
2.1 Definition of variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2.2 Summary statistics: Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
2.3 Summary statistics: CEO-directors joint compensation structure 123
2.4 Summary statistics: Independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . 125
2.5 CEO and directors pay-for-performance compensation and de-
terminants of compensation structure: Non-financial firms . . 127
2.6 CEO and directors pay-for-performance compensation and de-
terminants of compensation structure: Financial firms . . . . . 129
2.7 CEO-directors joint compensation structure: Non-financial firms 131
2.8 CEO-directors joint compensation structure: Financial firms . 133
xi
List of Figures
1.1 CEO Compensation Structure in 1996–2001 . . . . . . . . . . 31
xii
Chapter 1
Managerial Incentives, Moral Hazard
and Risk Management
1.1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), economists have
proposed a number of mechanisms that can alleviate the agency conflicts be-
tween shareholders and managers. Among these mechanisms, managerial com-
pensation has been considered a key instrument to mitigate the managerial
agency conflicts (see Frydman and Jenter 2010 for recent surveys of the litera-
ture). In particular, the literature focuses on the sensitivity of managerial pay
to firm value (i.e., pay-for-performance sensitivity) and suggests that stronger
pay-for-performance sensitivity helps to address the incentive misalignment
between shareholders and managers.1
This paper examines the design of optimal managerial compensation in
a setting in which corporate hedging activities are made by a manager who does
not fully internalize the effect of his actions on shareholder value. My analysis
1While, strictly speaking, monotonicity is not implied by a general model (e.g.,
Ho¨lmstrom 1979), the literature identifies several conditions in which increasing pay-for-
performance emerges as part of the optimal compensation package (e.g., Ho¨lmstrom and Mil-
grom 1987). See also Jensen and Murphy (1990) who suggest that the pay-for-performance
sensitivity of CEO compensation may be too weak in practice.
1
shows that strong pay-for-performance sensitivity may induce the manager to
make suboptimal hedging choices and thus deteriorate shareholder value. More
specifically, the main trade-off in the design of managerial compensation is as
follows: While a strong pay-for-performance sensitivity provides the manager
with incentives to increase the firm’s value by exerting costly effort, it also
creates perverse incentives to engage in (unproductive) risk-seeking activities.
To formally analyze the incentive provision problem, I consider a firm
in which a risk-neutral manager with limited liability performs two hidden
actions: (i) a costly managerial action (e.g., operational choices that require
managerial effort) that enhances the firm’s value without affecting the risk of
its cash flows and (ii) a costless managerial action (e.g., a trade of financial
instruments) that influences the risk of the firm’s cash flows without affecting
the firm’s value.2 In such a setting, I examine the structure of managerial
compensation that provides proper incentives to maximize shareholder value.
My analysis shows that the structure of optimal managerial compen-
sation is fundamentally affected by the possibility of financial speculation.
Specifically, high pay-for-performance compensation is necessary to induce
managerial effort but it also provides incentives to take speculative positions in
financial instruments. Intuitively, while high pay-for-performance compensa-
tion entices the manager to seek substantial profits from financial speculation,
the manager’s limited liability helps mitigate the consequences of substantial
2For simplicity, I assume that financial instruments are fairly valued in the market and
that the manager does not have private information about these instruments.
2
losses from the speculation. Therefore, my analysis predicts that the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of managerial compensation increases as it becomes
more difficult for the manager to conceal information about the (speculative)
use of financial instruments.3
In the second part of the paper I take this prediction to the data. Specif-
ically, I examine how the structure of managerial compensation is affected by a
regulatory change which mandates that firms disclose more information about
their risk exposure to derivative markets. In 1998, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (“FASB”) issued a new accounting standard for trading fi-
nancial derivatives, namely, the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (“FAS
133”). Under this new accounting standard, firms must recognize (unrealized)
gains/losses from changes in the fair value of derivative holdings but they can
offset the gains/losses from qualified hedging instruments by recognizing the
hedged items at fair value.4 Thus, FAS 133 requires that the financial state-
ment disclose comprehensive information about the firm’s risk exposure to
derivative instruments.
To examine the effect of this regulatory change on the structure of man-
agerial compensation, I use a difference-in-differences model. Specifically, I
identify firms that traded derivatives before the adoption of FAS 133 (“users”)
3In contrast, DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) predict that the disclosure of information about
corporate hedging may reduce the managerial incentive to engage in hedging activities.
4FAS 133 offers three categories of hedging instruments which requires different qualifi-
cation standards. Refer to section 1.4.1 for details.
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and investigate whether they tend to increase the pay-for-performance sensi-
tivity of managerial compensation more than other firms (“non-users”) after
the adoption of FAS 133. The premise of this empirical setting is that non-
users are not affected by the change in the accounting standard for derivative
instruments while it becomes harder for the managers of users to hide infor-
mation about their speculative derivatives trading.
This natural experiment setting has several advantages. First, the
adoption of FAS 133 provides an exogenous shock which helps to address
endogeneity problems that typically arise when searching for empirical deter-
minants of the compensation structure since the new accounting standard does
not directly affect the compensation structure.5 Furthermore, since FAS 133
affects only the speculative use of derivatives, this empirical setting helps to
solve the problems of distinguishing speculative trades from hedging activities
in the data.6
Following Gormley et al. (2013), I measure the pay-for-performance
sensitivity of CEO compensation by the increment in the fair value of stock and
option grants for a 1% increase in the stock price.7 To capture the managerial
5Previous studies (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2004) proposed certain cases in which estimates
of the difference-in-differences model are biased. These issues will be discussed in section
1.5.
6To identify the purpose of derivative trades, previous studies focus on certain industries,
e.g., the gold mining industry or the airline industry, in which the relevant data is available.
See, e.g., Tufano (1996), Adam and Fernando (2006) and Rampini et al. (2014) among
others.
7To check the robustness of the results, I also consider some alternative compensation
measures in section 1.5.4.
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incentives to increase the firm’s cash flow risks, I also measure the convexity of
CEO compensation by the increment in the fair value of option grants for a 1%
increase in the stock price volatility. Consistent with the model prediction, I
find that after the adoption of FAS 133, users increase the pay-for-performance
sensitivity and the convexity of CEO compensation more than non-users. All
else being equal, for each 1% increase in the stock price (resp., the stock price
volatility), CEOs of users earn $24,370 (resp., $21,310) more than other CEOs
after the adoption of FAS 133 while the two groups of firms do not show a
significant difference in these CEO compensation measures before the adoption
of FAS 133.
As a robustness check, I examine how the new accounting standard
affects the pay-for-performance sensitivity and the convexity of other execu-
tives’ and directors’ compensation. I find that users increase only the pay-for-
performance sensitivity and the convexity of CFO compensation more than
other firms after the adoption of FAS 133. This result indicates that the new
accounting standard affects the compensation of executives (i.e., CEOs and
CFOs) who actually oversee the use of derivative instruments. I also find that
the effect of FAS 133 on the compensation structure is economically and sta-
tistically stronger in firms which used derivative instruments more intensively
before adopting FAS 133. Finally, I conduct several falsification tests to verify
that the compensation measures of users and nonusers have a common trend
before adopting FAS 133.
This study is related to several branches of the managerial compensa-
5
tion literature. First, my empirical findings offer new evidence on the deter-
minants of managerial compensation. To explain cross-sectional differences in
managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity, previous studies propose a num-
ber of empirical factors that include a firm’s cash flow risks, leverage, growth
opportunities, institutional ownership and the degree of business focus.8 This
paper proposes that the managerial ability to conceal information about corpo-
rate hedging activities is a key determinant of managerial pay-for-performance
sensitivity. I also find empirical evidence that supports this prediction.
Second, my model contributes to the theoretical literature that exam-
ines the design of optimal managerial compensation. While most studies focus
exclusively on the provision of managerial incentives to exert (costly) effort
that increases shareholders value, I also consider the incentives to engage in
risk-seeking activities which increase the firm’s cash-flow risks. An important
exception is He and Xiong (2013) who theoretically show that a strong pay-
for-performance sensitivity of compensation for fund managers may induce
them to deteriorate the fund’s value by seeking tail risks (i.e., unprofitable
and negatively skewed investments). While my model analysis also sheds light
on the risk-taking incentives created by a strong pay-for-performance sensitiv-
ity, it shows that even managerial risk-seeking activities which do not directly
affect the firm’s value nor the marginal productivity of managerial effort can
deteriorate the firm’s value by making the (realized) cash flows of the firm less
8See, e.g., Himmelberg et al. (1999), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Coles et al. (2006), Low
(2009) and Gormley et al. (2013) among many others.
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informative about the manager’s effort choice, therefore reducing the manage-
rial effort incentive provided by the pay-for-performance compensation.
Finally this paper also contributes to the literature on the effectiveness
of fair value accounting standards. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) examine the
effect of fair value accounting on corporate hedging activities within a man-
ager’s career concern setting, and they predict that fair value accounting can
reduce the managerial incentive to hedge firm’s cash flow risks. In contrast,
I analyze this issue within the principal-agent framework and show that fair
value accounting can facilitate corporate hedging activities by making it harder
for managers to misreport speculative trades as hedging activities. Consistent
with my prediction, previous studies (e.g., Zhang 2009) find that the adop-
tion of FAS 133 decreases the cash flow volatility of firms that used derivative
instruments before adopting FAS 133. This paper also contributes to the lit-
erature by providing empirical evidence that fair value accounting allows firms
to increase the sensitivity of managerial compensation to the firm’s value.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model
set-up and Section 1.3 provides the model analysis. Section 1.4 discusses the
empirical setting and data and Section 1.5 reports the results. Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 The Model
I consider an all-equity firm that operates in a risk-neutral economy in
which the market rate of return is normalized to zero.
7
1.2.1 Firm project and managerial actions
The firm’s assets consist in a project that yields a random terminal
cash flow r˜ = {rd, rm, ru}, where rm = ru+rd
2
and 0 < rd < ru. The probability
distribution of r˜ is affected by two managerial actions e and ∆ as follows:
r˜ =

ru with prob. 1
3
+ e+ ∆
rm with prob. 1
3
− 2∆
rd with prob. 1
3
− e+ ∆,
. (1.1)
I refer to e ∈ [0, 1] as “managerial effort” which is privately costly to the
manager
c(e) =
1
2
γme
2. (1.2)
As shown in (1.1), relative to e = 0 which is the minimum effort choice, e > 0
increases the likelihood of ru at the expense of rd and thus increases the firm’s
expected cash flow by θ(ru − rd)e. Furthermore, I refer to ∆ ∈ {∆0,∆s}
(where 0 = ∆0 < ∆s <
1
6
) as the managerial “risk choice” which is costless to
the manager. Relative to ∆0, the risk choice ∆s is a mean-preserving spread
which increases the likelihood of extreme cash flows ru and rd at the expense
of the moderate cash flow rm.9
9The possibility of costless risk-management choices allows me to consider a particularly
relevant case, namely, the case in which a manager can make financial transactions on
behalf of their firms. Net of transaction costs, financial transactions are ex-ante zero NPV
transactions that affect the riskness of a firm’s cash flows risk without altering the firm’s
value. In this sense, the analysis can be interpreted as an analysis of the provision of
managerial and board incentives when a manager can engage in financial speculation.
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1.2.2 Managerial agency problems and contracts
In this setting I consider the managerial agency problems by assuming
that shareholders do not observe the managerial choices of e and ∆. Thus,
shareholders can influence the managerial choices only via the design of man-
agerial compensation. Formally, shareholders write the managerial compen-
sation contract w as a function of the firm’s cash flow r˜. For convenience, I
rewrite the managerial compensation w(r˜) as:
w(r˜) = (wu, wm, wd) , (1.3)
where wi (i = u,m, d) corresponds to the managerial pay for the realized cash
flow ri.
The sequence of events unfolds as follows: At t = 0, shareholders offer
w(r˜) to the manager. At t = 1, the manager chooses e and ∆. At t = 2, the
firm’s cash flow r˜ is realized and contracts are enforced.
S offers w(r˜)
t=0
M chooses (e,∆)
t=1
r˜ realized
t=2
Figure 1. Sequence of events
1.3 Model Analysis
To better understand the economics demonstrated by the model, I first
consider the case in which shareholders (i) observe (and write w upon) the
9
managerial choice of ∆ but (ii) do not observe the managerial choice of e. I
then consider the case in which shareholders do not observe either managerial
choice.
1.3.1 Observable ∆
Consider the case in which shareholders observe the manager’s choice
of ∆ but not the choice of e. This case is equivalent to the case in which
shareholders choose ∆ on their own since the choice of ∆ is costless to the
manager. Therefore, the shareholders’ problem can be written as follows:
max
wm,e∗,∆
(
1
3
+ e∗ + ∆)(ru − wu) + (1
3
− 2∆)(rm − wm) + (1
3
− e∗ + ∆)(rd − wd) (1.4)
subject to
e∗ = argmax
e
(
1
3
+ e+ ∆)wu + (
1
3
− 2∆)wm + (1
3
− e+ ∆)wd − 1
2
γme
2 (1.4.1)
wu, wm, wd ≥ 0 (1.4.2)
Constraint (1.4.1) corresponds to the managerial incentive compatibility con-
straint relative to the choice of e while (1.4.2) ensures that the manager is
subject to limited liability. The use of first order approach is valid in this set-
ting since the manager’s maximization problem in (1.4.1) has a unique global
maximum with respect to e.10 The following lemma, which is immediate from
the first order condition of (1.4.1), states the manager’s effort choice:
Lemma 1.3.1. A manager who receives a compensation contract w(r˜) exerts
10See Grossman and Hart (1983) for the regularity conditions of the first order approach.
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effort
e(w) =
wu − wd
γm
. (1.5)
Lemma 1.3.1 shows that the manager chooses higher effort as (i) the
difference wu−wd increases and (ii) the effort is less costly to the manager (γm
decreases). By (1.5), I can simplify the shareholders’ problem by substituting
e(w) = wu−wd
γm
into e∗ in (1.4). Proposition 1.3.2 summarizes the solution of
the shareholders’ problem:
Proposition 1.3.2. When shareholders observe the manager’s choice of ∆
but not the choice of e, they force the manager to choose ∆ = ∆0 and design
the managerial compensation as follows:
w∗(r˜) =
(
ru − rd
2
− γm
6
, 0, 0
)
Proposition 1.3.2 shows that shareholders do not allow the manager to
choose ∆s, which would decrease shareholder value by increasing the expected
value of managerial compensation without increasing the expected value of the
project. Proposition 1.3.2 also states that the optimal managerial compensa-
tion contract pays only for the realization of r˜ = ru. This result is immediate
from lemma 1.3.1, which states that larger wedge between wu and wd (i.e.,
the managerial pay for ru and rd, respectively) provides the manager with
incentives to exert more effort.
11
1.3.2 Unobservable ∆
In this section, I consider the case in which shareholders do not observe
the managerial choices of effort and risk (i.e., e and ∆). In this case, share-
holders design managerial compensation by taking into account the effect of
compensation contracts on the manager’s choice of e and ∆. Formally, the
shareholders’ problem can be written as:
max
wm,e∗,∆∗
(
1
3
+ e∗ + ∆∗)(ru − wu) + (1
3
− 2∆∗)(rm − wm) + (1
3
− e∗ + ∆∗)(rd − wd)
(1.6)
subject to
(e∗,∆∗) = argmax
e,∆
(
1
3
+ e+ ∆)wu + (
1
3
− 2∆)wm + (1
3
− e+ ∆)wd − 1
2
γme
2
(1.6.1)
wu, wm, wd > 0 (1.6.2)
Constraint (1.6.1) corresponds to the incentive compatibility constraints rela-
tive to the manager’s choice of e and ∆ while (1.6.2) ensures that the manager
is subject to limited liability. The use of the first order approach is still valid in
this setting since the manager’s maximization problem in (1.6.1) has a unique
global maximum with respect to e and ∆. The following lemma describes
the manager’s effort and risk choices which solve the manager’s optimization
problem in (1.6.1):
Lemma 1.3.3. When shareholders do not observe the manager’s choice of e
and ∆, the managerial compensation contract w(r˜) = (wu, wm, wd) induces the
manager to make an effort choice and risk choice as:
e(w) =
wu − wd
γm
. (1.7)
12
and
∆(w) =
{
∆s if wu + wd > 2wm
∆0 otherwise.
(1.8)
Lemma 1.3.3 shows that the manager exerts more effort as (i) the man-
agerial compensation exhibits a higher wedge between wu and wd (i.e., the
managerial pay for ru and rd, respectively) and (ii) exerting effort is less costly
to the manager (i.e., γm is lower). Relative to the manager’s choice of ∆, lemma
1.3.3 states that the manager chooses the risky choice ∆s if the average pay
for ru and rd is higher than the pay for rm (i.e., wu +wd > 2wm). From these
observations, I refer to wu−wd (which captures the size of incentives relative to
managerial effort choice) as a pay-for-performance sensitivity of a managerial
compensation contract w(r˜) = (wu, wm, wd) and refer to wu+wd−2wm (which
captures the incentives relative to the managerial risk choice) as a convexity.
To simplify (1.6), I substitute (1.7) and (1.8) into e∗ and ∆∗, respec-
tively. By solving the problem, I find the optimal compensation contract
characterized as follows:
Proposition 1.3.4. When shareholders do not observe the manager’s choice
of e and ∆, they design the managerial compensation as follows:
w∗(r˜) = (w∗u, w
∗
m, w
∗
d) =
(
ru − rd
2
− γm
2
[
1
3
+ ∆s
]
, 0, 0
)
Proposition 1.3.4 shows that the optimal managerial compensation ex-
hibits a strictly positive convexity, i.e., w∗u +w
∗
d − 2w∗m > 0 and, thus, induces
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the manager to choose ∆s. Intuitively, shareholders face the following trade-
off in the design of managerial compensation: While the managerial pay for
rm (i.e., setting wm > 0) deters the managerial choice of ∆s, it increases the
expected compensation without providing the managerial incentive to exert
effort. Under the assumption that ∆s <
1
6
which is the regularity condition to
construct a valid probability structure, it is too costly for shareholders to dis-
courage managerial choice of ∆s by offering a linear compensation (i.e., setting
wm =
wu
2
).11
To examine how the possibility of (unobservable) managerial risk-seeking
activities affects the compensation structure, I compare the managerial com-
pensation contract characterized in proposition 1.3.2 with the one described
in proposition 1.3.4. While both compensation contracts have the same form
(i.e., rewarding only for ru), they differ on the level of the pay-for-performance
sensitivity (i.e., w∗u−w∗d) and the convexity (i.e., w∗u+w∗d−2w∗m). Specifically:
Proposition 1.3.5. Optimal managerial compensation exhibits lower pay-for-
performance sensitivity and lower convexity when shareholders do not observe
the manager’s choice of ∆.
Proposition 1.3.5 shows that the possibility of managerial risk-seeking
activities decreases the efficiency of managerial pay-for-performance compen-
sation. Intuitively, while strong sensitivity of managerial compensation to the
11This assumption can be relaxed by changing the probability of r˜ at e = 0 and ∆ =
∆0 = 0. As discussed below, however, the key intuition still hold in the relaxed settings.
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firm’s cash flows is necessary to induce managerial effort, the corresponding
convexity of managerial compensation also creates an incentive to increase the
firm’s cash flow risks since the manager who is subject to the limited liability
does not fully internalize the consequence of negative cash flows. This per-
verse incentive reduces the gain that shareholders derive from offering a high
managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. In the next section, I take this pre-
diction into the data and test whether the pay-for-performance sensitivity and
the convexity of managerial compensation increases after a regulatory change
that allows shareholders to have access to the information about managerial
risk-seeking activities.
1.4 Empirical analysis
1.4.1 Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 133
In 1998, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (“FASB”) issued
the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133. Accounting for
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (“FAS 133”).12 Before the en-
actment of FAS 133, the accounting treatment for derivative holdings was
ruled by the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 52 Foreign
Currency Translation and No. 80 Accounting for Futures Contracts. These
standards required firms to report the purpose of derivative transactions and
to use different accounting treatments depending on the purpose. Specifically,
12The effective date of FAS 133 was initially June 15, 1999 but by the request of firms, it
was delayed until June 15, 2000.
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under these standards firms should recognize the (unrealized) gain/loss from
fair value changes in the derivatives held for investment purposes while they
could recognize hedging instruments at the historical costs.
After some corporations reported large and unexpected derivative losses
in 1990s, the Security and Exchange Committee urged the FASB to develop
a new accounting standard which requires that financial statements provide
adequate information about the firm’s use of derivative products.13 In response
to this requests, the FASB issued FAS 133 which eliminates the possibility of
historical cost accounting for derivative instruments. Specifically, FAS 133
states that (i) firms must recognize their derivative holdings at fair value and
(ii) for those qualified as hedging instruments, firms can also recognize the
corresponding hedged items at fair value.14 Thus, FAS 133 ensures that the
financial statement discloses comprehensive information about the purpose of
each derivative holding.
1.4.2 Empirical setting
My model analysis predicts that after adopting FAS 133 firms would
increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity and the convexity of CEO com-
pensation. More specifically, since FAS 133 is effective exclusively to the firms
which use derivative instruments (“users”), I hypothesize that, relative to
other firms, users increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity and the convex-
13See Background information and basic for conclusions of FAS 133 for more details.
14The derivative holdings qualified as cash flow hedge is not subject to the fair value
accounting until the gains/losses from hedged items are realized.
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ity of CEO compensation after adopting FAS 133.15 To test this hypothesis, I
use the difference-in-differences model specified as follows:
yi,t = β0 + β1FAS133t + β2Useri + β3FAS133t × Useri +Xi,tΓ + i,t, (1.9)
where yi,t is a measure of CEO compensation, Xi,t is control variables, FAS133
is an indicator of the fiscal years after the adoption of FAS 133 (i.e., 1 for fiscal
years 1999–2001 and 0 for 1996–1997) and User is an indicator of derivative
users before the adoption of FAS 133 for firm i and year t.16
As controls I include a number of determinants of pay-for-performance
compensation proposed by previous studies (e.g., Yermack 1995, Guay 1999a
and Coles et al. 2006). First I consider the effect of a firm’s past perfor-
mance i.e., past return on firm assets and past stock returns.17 Specifically,
I include lagged return on assets and annual stock returns (ROA and Re-
turn, respectively). Second, I include the KZ index modified by Baker et al.
(2003)and the presence of long-term debt indicator (KZ4 and LTD, respec-
tively) as proxies for the level of a firm’s financial constraints.18 Yermack
15See, e.g., Zhang (2009) for other studies that consider the differentiated effect of FAS
133 on users and non-users.
16The FASB required firms to adopt FAS 133 no later than fiscal year 2001 (originally
2000) but strongly suggested to adoption as early as possible. While many firms adopted
FAS 133 since 2001 (Zhang 2009), I set the post-FAS 133 period as 1999–2001 to consider
the possible early adoptions. The main results are robust to the adjustments of post-FAS
133 period.
17Previous studies suggest contrasting predictions relative to the effect of the past perfor-
mance on the level of pay-for-performance compensation. See, e.g., Core and Guay (2001)
for the details.
18In unreported robustness checks I also consider cash flow shortfalls (i.e., [common and
preferred dividends+cash flow used in investing activities-cash flow from operations]/total
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(1995) reports that to defer the cash payout financially constrained firms tend
to award managers stock options (which, as described below, I use as a measure
of pay-for-performance compensation) in lieu of cash compensation.
Third, I control for tax effects on compensation by including an oper-
ating loss dummy variable Loss. Intuitively, firms that have net operating loss
carryforwards expect higher future tax returns and thus desire to defer the
compensation expense by awarding stock options. Fourth, I consider firm size
(i.e., Ln(asset) and Ln(sale)), R&D intensity (R&D) and the market-to-book
value ratio (MB) to control for the effect of business characteristics on the
compensation structure.
Finally, I control for CEO and board characteristics relative to the
CEO’s influence on the board to capture situations in which CEOs can influ-
ence boards to design CEO pay with cash compensation rather than pay-for-
performance compensation (Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009). Specifically,
I consider the board independence, the CEO’s tenure and the CEO-chairman
duality (i.e., IND, Ln(tenure) and Dual, respectively). I also include a new
CEO indicator (NCEO) to control for the irregular compensation practices for
incoming CEOs (Fee and Hadlock 2003).19 The details of each variable are
available in Table 1.1.
assets) which is also widely used as a proxy for the degree of financial constraints (e.g.,
Yermack 1995).
19As a robustness check, I estimate the regression by excluding the firms that change their
CEOs during the sample period and find that the results are consistent.
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1.4.3 Data
During the period 1996–2001, I first obtain the CEO characteristics
(i.e, compensation, tenure and CEO/Chair duality) from Execucomp, the fi-
nancial information from Compustat and the board characteristics from Risk-
Metrics.20 For the firms that are available in these datasets, I collect the
information about their use of derivatives from 10-K filings in 1996–1997
(i.e., the period before the issuance of FAS 133). Specifically, following Guay
(1999b) and Zhang (2009), I search keywords such as forward contract(s), cur-
rency exchange contract(s), foreign exchange contract(s), future(s) contract(s),
option(s) contract(s), swap(s), hedging instrument(s), hedge instrument(s),
derivative instrument(s); and I read the pages that include keywords to ver-
ify whether the firm actually used derivatives. After excluding financial firms
(SIC 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC 4900–4999), the sample consists of 2905
firm-years of derivative users and 1855 firm-years of non-users.21
Table 1.2 reports the average derivative holdings of users relative to
their book assets in 1996–97 (Panel A) and the industry clusters of users and
non-users (Panel B). Following the previous literature (e.g., Zhang 2009), I
divide derivatives into three categories, namely, “foreign exchange derivatives,”
“interest rate derivatives” and “commodity derivatives” and define intensity
as (fiscal year-end derivative holdings/assets). In the calculation of intensity,
20The FASB requires firms to adopt FAS No. 133 by FY 2001 but strongly suggests earlier
adoption.
21All nominal variables are deflated by the Consumer Price Index.
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I exclude the holdings of “commodity derivatives” since in 10-K filings these
derivative instruments are reported as the amount of commodities rather than
the dollar value. Panel A shows that 341(resp. 275 and 115) firms trade foreign
exchange (resp. interest rate and commodity) derivatives.22 The holdings of
each derivative relative to the book assets decrease when the firm uses other
types of derivatives and, in particular, the average holdings of foreign exchange
or interest rate derivatives correspond to around 15% of assets.
Panel B presents the top five and bottom five industries (based on
the Fama-French 48 industry classification) in terms of the fraction of users
relative to non-users.23 Specifically, “Beer and Liquor,” “Precious Metals,”
“Food Products,” “Aircraft” and “Petroleum and Natural Gas” industries
correspond to the top five (i.e., most likely to include users) while “Defense,”
“Personal Services,” “Entertainment,” “Construction” and “Restaurants, Ho-
tels, Motels” industries correspond to the bottom five. The industry clusters
presented in Panel B show that the use of derivative instruments is affected
by the business characteristics.
Table 1.3 presents summary statistics of CEO compensation in 1996–
1997 (Panel A) and 1998–2001 (Panel B). In both periods derivative users tend
to pay the CEO more than non-users do and, in particular, the gap becomes
22As shown in Panel B, 508 firms traded derivatives in 1996–1997 but the 16 firms which
do not provide holdings of foreign exchange or interest rate derivatives in their 10-K are
excluded in Panel A.
23To take into account the difference in the sample size of users and non-users, I normalize
the fraction of users and non-users by the total number of firms in each group.
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wider after the issuance of FAS 133. With respect to the equity grants, the
value of option grants is larger in users while the value of restricted stock grants
is similar between the two groups of firms. Specifically, after the issuance of
FAS 133, the mean difference in the value of option grants increases from $1.04
mil to $2.06 mil.
To measure the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation,
I calculate the Delta of stock and option grants to the CEO (i.e., the change
in the value of stock and option grants for a 1% increase in the stock price).
As a proxy for the compensation convexity, I also consider the Vega of option
grants to the CEO (i.e., the change in the value of option grants for a 1%
change in the stock return volatility).24 Table 1.3 reports that both Delta
and Vega are greater in users and the mean difference becomes larger after
the issuance of FAS 133. To better illustrate the trend of these compensation
measures, in Figure 1.1 I plot the year-medians of Delta (Panel A) and Vega
(Panel B) of CEO compensation in 1996–2001. Figure 1.1 illustrates that
both compensation measures have increased during the period. Consistent
with Table 1.3, Figure 1.1 shows that the CEO compensation of users exhibits
higher Delta and Vega and also shows that the gaps in both measures become
wider after the issuance of FAS 133.
Table 1.4 summarizes firm characteristics used as proxies for the deter-
minants of compensation structure and, in particular, contrasts the character-
24I construct Delta and Vega measures using the methodology of Gormley et al. (2013).
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istics of users and non-users in 1997. Relative to other firms, users tend to
be larger (i.e., higher Ln(asset) and Ln(sale)) and financially less constrained
(i.e., higher KZ4 ). These firms also have lower growth opportunities (i.e.,
lower MB) and issue more long-term debt (i.e., higher LTD). In terms of the
CEO-board relationship, users are more likely to exhibit the CEO-Chair du-
ality and to form a board with a majority of independent directors. In the
unreported analysis, I confirm that these contrasting features of users and
non-users are observed in the entire sample period (1996–2001).
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Effect of FAS 133 on CEO compensation structure
I estimate the difference-in-differences model in (1.9) to examine how
the structure of CEO compensation is affected by the regulatory change that
mandates firms to disclose information about their (speculative) use of deriva-
tives. Table 1.5 shows that after adopting FAS 133, users increase Delta
of CEO compensation more than non-users.25 Consistent with the summary
statistics in Table 1.3, the estimation without controls (column 1) reports that
users grant higher Delta in the pre-FAS133 period and the mean difference be-
tween two groups increases after adopting the new accounting standard. In
the estimation with controls (column 3), however, it turns out that the mean
25In all reported estimations, the standard errors are adjusted to industry clusters. As a
robustness check, I also use the standard errors adjusted to firm clusters and find similar
statistical inferences.
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difference is statistically significant only in the post-FAS 133 period.26 Specif-
ically, for a 1% increase in the stock price, user firm CEOs earn $24,370 more
than other CEOs after adopting the new accounting standard. The result is
robust to controlling for firm fixed effects (column 5) and industry-year fixed
effects (column 7). To control for the possible effect of CEO turnover on the re-
sult, I also consider a sample excluding firms that experienced a CEO turnover
in 1996–2001 and find the robustness of the result (columns 6 and 8).
Table 1.6 presents the estimation results with respect to the Vega of
CEO compensation. In the estimation with controls (column 3), I find that
users grant more convex CEO compensation than other firms only in the post-
FAS133 period. Specifically, for a 1% increase in the stock price volatility,
user firm CEOs earn $21,310 more than other CEOs after adopting the new
accounting standard. As in Delta regressions, I also check the robustness of
results by performing the estimation with firm fixed effects (column 5) and
industry-year fixed effects (column 7) and by excluding firms that experi-
ence CEO turnovers (columns 6 and 8). Overall the estimation results show
that, relative to other firms, users award their CEO compensation with a
stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity and convexity after adopting the new
accounting standard which makes it more difficult for the CEO to conceal their
(speculative) use of derivatives from shareholders.
26To control for the change in total compensation, I also include ln(salary+bonus) as a
control variable in an unreported estimation and find that the results are robust.
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1.5.2 Effect of FAS 133 on the compensation structure for other
executives and directors
While my model analysis in section 1.3 focuses on the structure of opti-
mal managerial compensation, its key insight can be extended to the design of
compensation for other employees. In particular, I predict that the adoption
of FAS 133 will increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity and the convexity
of CFO compensation rather than other executives’ or directors’ compensation
since, besides the CEO, the CFO manages the use of derivative instruments
in practice.27 To test these predictions, I estimate the difference-in-differences
model in (1.9) with respect to the Delta and Vega of CFO compensation, non-
CEO/CFO executive compensation and outside director compensation.28 This
analysis can be used as placebo tests on the validity of the natural experiment
setting since the differentiated effect of the regulatory change on the com-
pensation for CEO/CFO and other executives (and directors) shows that the
heterogeneous trends of compensation structure between users and non-users
are not driven by (unobservable) characteristics.
Table 1.7 reports the estimation results with respect to the Delta (col-
umn 1-3) and Vega (column 4-6) of CFO compensation. In all estimations, I
include the controls considered in Table 1.5 and 1.6. Columns 1 and 4 show
27For instance, Brown (2001) reports that HDG Inc. delegates the authority of managing
foreign exchange risks to the Foreign Exchange Management Committee chaired by the
CFO.
28Following Jiang et al. (2010), I identify the CFO by searching keywords such as CFO,
chief financial officer, treasurer, controller, finance and vice president-finance in the annual
title of executives (i.e., “titleann” in Execucomp).
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that users increase Delta and Vega more than non-users after adopting FAS
133. Specifically, for each 1% increase in the stock price (resp. the stock price
volatility), CFOs of users earn around $1,900 (resp., $2,400) more than CFOs
of non-users after adopting FAS 133. The results are robust when controlling
for firm fixed (columns 2–3 and 5–6) and industry-year fixed effects (columns
3 and 6).
Table 1.8 presents the estimation results with respect to the compensa-
tion measures of other executives (columns 1–4) and directors (columns 5–8).
After controlling for controls considered in the previous estimations, I cannot
reject the null hypothesis that FAS 133 has an equal effect on the compen-
sation for other executives and directors of the two cohorts. Relative to the
analysis of compensation for the CEO/CFO, the estimators in the analysis of
other executives’ and directors’ compensation may have higher standard er-
rors which can reduce the statistical significance of the estimates. To address
this issue, I exclusively consider the compensation for Chief Operating Officers
(COO) in an unreported analysis and find that the effect of FAS 133 on their
compensation is insignificant. Overall, the estimation results show that the
adoption of FAS 133 increases the pay-for-performance sensitivity and convex-
ity of compensation for CEOs and CFOs who are responsible for the use of
derivative instruments but it may not affect the structure of other executives’
and directors’ compensation.
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1.5.3 Intensity in the use of derivatives and the effect of FAS 133
on the compensation structure
As a robustness check, I investigate whether the adoption of FAS 133
has a stronger impact on the compensation structure of the firms that have
used derivatives more intensively before the issuance of FAS 133. To test
this prediction, I use Intensity, a measure calculated as the average ratio of
“year-end foreign exchange and interest rate derivative holdings/book assets”
in 1996 and 1997, and I create two dummy variables: High and Low, which
indicate users whose Intensity measure is above-median and below-median,
respectively. Then, I estimate the difference-in-differences model in (1.9) by
replacing the independent variable User with High or Low.
Table 1.9 reports the estimation results for CEO compensation mea-
sures (Delta and Vega in columns 1 and 2, respectively) and CFO compen-
sation measures (Delta and Vega in columns 3 and 4, respectively). In all
estimations, I include controls, firm and year fixed effects.29 The results show
that the effect of FAS 133 on the compensation structure is stronger in inten-
sive users (i.e., firms with Hign=1). Columns 1 and 3 show that, relative to
non-users, intensive users increase the dollar gains of CEO (resp. CFO) from
a 1% increase in the stock price by $43,800 (resp. $11,900) after adopting
FAS 133. Consistent with these results, columns 2 and 4 present that relative
to non-users, intensive users increase the dollar gains of CEO (resp. CFO)
from a 1% increase in the stock price volatility by $34,400 (resp. $10,850). On
29The results are robust to other sets of fixed-effects considered in Table 1.5.
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the other hand, coefficient estimates of the interaction term FAS133*Low in
columns 1–4 are statistically and economically much weaker than the corre-
sponding estimates of FAS133*High. These estimation results show that while
both types of users increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity and convexity
of CEO/CFO compensation more than non-users after adopting FAS 133, the
magnitude of changes is much stronger in intensive users.
1.5.4 Other compensation measures
To check the robustness of the results, I estimate the difference-in-
differences model by using alternative pay-for-performance sensitivity mea-
sures as dependent variables. First, I consider the ratio of the value of equity
grants (i.e., option and/or stock grants) to cash compensation (i.e., salary and
bonuses).30 Table 1.10 shows that, relative to other firms, users increase eq-
uity grants to their CEO/CFO rather than cash compensation after adopting
FAS 133 (column 1–4). These results are consistent with the estimation results
in Table 1.5–1.7. Alternately, I also consider the other pay-for-performance
sensitivity measure suggested by Yermack (1995), namely, Ydelta which is de-
fined as the change in the value of option grants per $1,000 increase in equity
value. Table 1.10 shows that, while the effect of FAS 133 on the Ydelta of CEO
compensation is not statistically significant (column 5), its effect on the Ydelta
of CFO compensation is both positive and significant (column 6). Specifically,
30In estimating the regressions, I use the natural logarithm of (1+equity-to-cash compen-
sation ratio) to adjust the right skewness of the ratio.
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the adoption of FAS 133 causes CFO compensation of users to increase more
than that of other firms by $0.195 per $1,000 increase in the market equity
value. Consistent with the estimation results in Table 1.8, Table 1.10 also
shows that FAS 133 has insignificant effects upon the compensation for other
executives (column 7) and directors (column 8).
1.5.5 Falsification tests
While the difference-in-differences model helps to address a number of
endogeneity problems, its estimates can be biased if both users and non-users
followed different trends before adopting FAS 133. To mitigate this concern,
I conduct falsification tests by assuming that the adoption of FAS 133 was
available in earlier years. Specifically, I estimate the difference-in-differences
model in (1.9) by replacing the actual FAS 133 indicator (i.e., 1999–2001) with
other period indicators. In the estimation of these tests, I should deal with
data limitation since some control variables are not available in the period
before 1996.31 Thus, I perform two different sets of tests: (i) I first consider a
short period 1996–1997 and assume that FAS 133 is adopted in 1997, and (ii)
I extend the sample period to 1994–1997 and assume that FAS 133 is adopted
in 1996. For the data limitation, I consider controls only in the first set of
tests.
Table 1.11 reports the results of falsification tests. In all tests, I include
31The information on board structure obtained from RiskMetrics is not available before
1996.
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firm and industry-year fixed effects. In the tests with a shorter period 1996–
1997 (columns 1–4), it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that users
and non-users have homogeneous change in their CEO compensation structure
during this period. This result is robust to the exclusion of controls (columns 1
and 3). In the extended sample period 1994–1997, the falsification tests reject
the null hypothesis (columns 5 and 6). As a robustness check, I also conduct
the falsification tests for CFO compensation with the extended sample and
find that, in contrast to the tests of CEO compensation measures, these tests
reject the null hypothesis (columns 7 and 8). Since the falsification tests in
the extended period do not include the controls, I compare the estimates with
those of the original difference-in-differences models that also control only for
firm and industry-year fixed effects. In the original tests with respect to the
Delta and Vega of CEO compensation, the coefficient estimates (t-statistics)
are 37.79 (2.07) and 29.70 (2.17), respectively; while the corresponding esti-
mates of falsification tests are merely 20.86 and 18.71. Likewise, the coefficient
estimates (t-statistics) of the original tests with respect to the Delta and Vega
of CFO compensation are 8.75 (3.87) and 7.50 (3.62) which are much larger
than the corresponding estimates of falsification tests 1.45 and 1.24. Overall,
the results show that the CEO compensation structures of users and non-
users exhibit similar trend in 1996–1997 but may have different trends in the
extended period 1994–1997. The difference in the trend however grows much
larger after FAS 133 is adopted. On the other hand, the CFO compensation
structures of users and non-users show similar trends in 1994–1997. These
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findings support the validity of estimating the difference-in-differences model.
1.6 Concluding remarks
The paper develops a simple model which illustrates that the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of the optimal managerial compensation is limited
when the manager trades financial assets on behalf of the firm. Consistent
with the prediction of the model, the empirical analysis shows that the pay-
for-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation contracts is affected by
a regulatory change which requires that financial statements disclose compre-
hensive information about the firm’s use of derivative instruments. The paper
suggests an important policy implication on derivatives accounting. By disclos-
ing comprehensive information on the financial speculation, the fair value ac-
counting allows for stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity of the managerial
compensation and therefore aligns the incentive of the manager more closely
with the firm’s value. Hence, the evaluation of the accounting standard should
not be limited to measuring the changes in firm risks. Rather, more studies
should examine whether a regulation enhances the effect of other mechanisms
that mitigate agency conflicts.
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Figure 1.1: CEO Compensation Structure in 1996–2001
(a) Delta in 1996–2001
(b) Vega in 1996–2001
This figure plots Delta (Panel A) and Vega (Panel B) of CEO compensation in 1996–2001. The details
about each compensation variable are available in Table 1.1. In each Panel, I separately plot the
compensation measures of users which traded derivatives before the issuance of FAS 133 (i.e., 1996–1997)
and non-users. The sample consists of 2905 firm years of users and 1855 firm years of non-users. The
financial (sic 6000–6999) and utility firms (sic 4900–4999) are excluded from the sample.
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Table 1.1: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Totali,t Total compensation for the CEO for firm i and year t (tdc1 in Execucomp)
Cashi,t Cash compensation (salary+bonus in Execucomp)
Stocki,t The fair value of restricted stocks granted to the CEO (restrstk in Execucomp)
Optioni,t The fair value of stock options granted to the CEO (blk opt awards val in Excucomp)
Deltai,t The increment in the fair value of stocks and options granted to the CEO for a 1% increase in the stock price (following Gormley et al. 2013)
Vegai,t The increment in the fair value of options granted to the CEO for a 1% increase in the stock price volatility (following Gormley et al. 2013)
Ydeltai,t The increment in the fair value of options granted to the CEO for a $1,000 increase in the market value of equity (following Yermack 1995)
ROAi,t Return on Asset reported in Execucomp
Lossi,t Net operating loss dummy (=1 if oibdpi,t <0)
LTDi,t long term debt dummy (=1 if dltti,t >0)
kz4i,t -1.002*kz cfi,t-39.368*kz divi,t-1.315*kz ci,t+3.139*kz levi,t
kz cfi,t (dpi,t+ibi,t)/ati,t
kz divi,t (dvpi,t+dvci,t)/ati,t
kz ci,t che/ati,t
kz levi,t (dltti,t+dlci,t)/(dltti,t+dlci,t+seqi,t)
Returni,t 1-year stock return
MBi,t (prcc fi,t*cshoi,t+ati,t-ceqi,t-txdbi,t)/ati,t
R&Di,t 3-year moving average of (xrdi,t/ati,t)
INDi,t Board independence dummy (=1 if the board holds a majority of independent directors)
Ln(tenure)i,t The natural log of the CEO’s tenure
NCEOi,t New CEO dummy (=1 for the first year of the CEO)
Duali,t CEO-Chair dummy (=1 if the CEO is the chairman of the board)
This table presents the definition of compensation variables and control variables. For the fair value of equity grants to managers, I use the
corresponding measures provided by Execucomp. For financial and accounting variables, I describe the definition by using the compustat data
items. The independent directors are identified by the classification of Riskmetrics database. To identify the CEO/Chair duality, I search the
chairperson from Riskmetrics and the CEO from Execucomp. In particualr, the appointment and resignation date of CEOs are provided by
Execucomp.
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Table 1.2: Intensity in the use of derivatives and industry clusters
Panel A: Derivative holdings
Intensity
Obs.Foreign exchange (FE) Interest rate (IR) Total
User
FE only 0.14 N/A 0.14 155
IR only N/A 0.14 0.14 102
CM only N/A N/A N/A 33
FE/IR 0.09 0.09 0.18 120
FE/CM 0.09 N/A 0.09 29
IR/CM N/A 0.09 0.09 16
All 0.06 0.09 0.15 37
Panel B: Industry clusters of users and non-users
FF48 Industry User Non-user Ratio Rank
Top 5
4 Beer & Liquor 4 0 0 1
27 Precious Metals 6 0 0 2
2 Food Products 18 3 0.26 3
24 Aircraft 6 1 0.26 4
30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 40 9 0.35 5
Bottom 5
26 Defense 2 3 2.36 37
33 Personal Services 4 6 2.36 38
7 Entertainment 4 7 2.75 39
18 Construction 2 6 4.72 40
43 Restaraunts, Hotels, Motels 4 15 5.90 41
Total 508 323
This table presents the summary statistics about holdings of three types of derivatives (foreign exchange,
interest rate and commodity derivatives) in 1997 and the relation between derivatives holdings and
businesses. The sample consists of 508 users which traded derivatives before the issuance of FAS 133 (i.e.,
1996–1997) and 323 non-users. The financial (sic 6000–6999) and utility firms (sic 4900–4999) are
excluded from the sample. Panel A presents the intensity in the use of derivatives, which is defined as
(fiscal year-end holdings of foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives/book assets) and Panel B reports
top-5 and bottom-5 industries in terms of (fraction of users/fraction of non-users). Industry is classified
by Fama-French 48 industry-code. In Panel A, I exclude 16 users whose derivative holdings are not
available in 10-K filings.
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics: Compensation
Panel A: Before FAS 133 (1996–1997)
Users Non-users Diff.
mean sd median mean sd median mean t
Total 4979.86 8314.22 2700.96 2954.03 5190.14 1546.58 2025.83 5.71
Stock 296.12 1177.44 0 242.12 1153.98 0 54 0.85
Option 2483.13 6319.70 749.66 1440.62 4406.82 350 1042.51 3.68
Delta 60.53 149.77 19.47 36.36 137.54 7.81 24.17 3.11
Vega 54.20 136.15 16.26 29.44 108.96 6.07 24.76 3.79
Obs. 929 523
Panel B: After FAS 133 (1998–2001)
Users Non-users Diff.
mean sd median mean sd median mean t
Total 7210.74 18657.55 3297.85 4408.09 22683.89 1670.69 2802.65 2.40
Stock 462.57 2373.33 0 745.22 18960.75 0 -282.65 -0.34
Option 4530.33 17699.60 1237 2460.55 12109.16 580 2069.78 2.63
Delta 86.62 337.25 25.07 49.23 265.73 10.38 37.39 2.33
Vega 74.89 270.93 21.30 32.87 110.13 7.60 42.02 4.16
Obs. 1976 1332
This table presents the summary statistics about compensation for CEO and outside directors in the period 1996–2001. The sample consists of
2905 firm years of users which traded derivatives before the issuance of FAS 133 (i.e., 1996–1997) and 1855 firm years of non-users. The financial
(sic 6000–6999) and utility firms (sic 4900–4999) are excluded from the sample. Compensation information is obtained from Execucomp database.
Panel A (1996–1997) and Panel B (1998–2001) report the compensation structure of users and non-users. The last two columns in each Panel
presents the mean difference between users and non-users and the unpaired t-statistics (computed for unequal variance and unequal observations)
which tests for the null hypothesis that the mean difference is zero. The details about compensation variables are available in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics: Independent variables
Users Non-users Diff.
mean sd median mean sd median mean t
Ln(asset) 7.64 1.44 7.43 6.31 1.25 6.13 1.33 14.06
Ln(sale) 7.66 1.43 7.53 6.42 1.51 6.44 1.24 11.78
ROA 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.02 1.92
Loss 0.02 0.15 0 0.09 0.29 0 -0.07 -4.09
KZ4 0.20 1.13 0.28 -0.09 1.36 -0.07 0.29 3.19
LTD 0.95 0.22 1 0.82 0.38 1 0.13 5.36
Return 0.17 0.36 0.20 0.15 0.39 0.19 0.02 0.74
MB 1.98 1.15 1.64 2.22 1.44 1.77 -0.24 -2.54
R&D 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.09 0 -0.01 -1.39
INDBRD 0.72 0.45 1 0.58 0.49 1 0.14 4.19
Ln(tenure) 1.85 0.84 1.95 1.92 0.92 1.95 -0.07 -1.10
NCEO 0.06 0.24 0 0.08 0.28 0 -0.02 -1.32
Dual 0.73 0.44 1 0.64 0.48 1 0.10 2.91
Obs. 508 323
This table summarizes the firm characteristics of 508 users and 323 non-users in 1997. I define users as the firms having traded derivatives
before the issuance of FAS 133 (i.e., 1996–1997). The financial (sic 6000–6999) and utility firms (sic 4900–4999) are excluded from the sample. I
obtain financial and accounting information from Compustat database and board structure from RiskMetrics database. The last two columns in
each Panel presents the mean difference between users and non-users and the unpaired t-statistics (computed for unequal variance and unequal
observations) which tests for the null hypothesis that the mean difference is zero. The details about compensation variables are available in Table
1.1.
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Table 1.5: The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of CEO compensation:
Pay-for-performance sensitivities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
User 30.22*** 6.142 -9.446
(3.49) (1.29) (-0.94)
FAS133*User 20.50* 24.37* 34.74** 39.88* 37.53* 45.49* 46.97*
(1.93) (1.86) (2.17) (1.96) (1.75) (1.87) (1.82)
Ln(asset) 41.25*** 41.49*** 23.03 37.82 22.09 40.78
(3.97) (3.92) (1.35) (1.53) (1.15) (1.39)
Ln(sale) -7.310 -7.555 38.86** 37.19** 36.73** 35.72**
(-0.99) (-1.00) (2.65) (2.39) (2.52) (2.21)
ROA -8.131 -8.576 28.87 24.85 30.77 19.39
(-0.37) (-0.40) (0.94) (0.80) (1.03) (0.48)
Loss -23.94* -25.04** -25.03 -20.35 -26.92 -26.50
(-1.98) (-2.11) (-1.14) (-1.12) (-0.98) (-1.32)
KZ4 -3.296 -3.334 -10.95** -8.023 -5.347 0.721
(-0.78) (-0.78) (-2.22) (-1.28) (-0.92) (0.09)
LTD 19.73 19.67 32.26 57.56 46.45* 65.06
(0.74) (0.73) (1.49) (1.42) (1.80) (1.40)
Return 74.79** 74.99** 77.91** 100.1** 80.84** 106.5**
(2.21) (2.21) (2.54) (2.29) (2.37) (2.16)
MB 25.30*** 25.28*** -1.728 -5.381 -6.893 -11.14
(3.94) (3.92) (-0.12) (-0.29) (-0.42) (-0.50)
R&D 171.0* 169.4* 743.3 795.8 724.8 874.2
(1.90) (1.90) (1.64) (1.25) (1.67) (1.24)
INDBRD -7.693 -7.506 3.617 18.73 7.880 18.73
(-1.06) (-1.03) (0.13) (0.57) (0.27) (0.50)
Ln(tenure) 11.73 11.91 -1.632 0.903 1.139 0.351
(1.45) (1.47) (-0.42) (0.13) (0.31) (0.05)
NCEO 42.01** 42.21** 31.97*** 29.78**
(2.33) (2.36) (3.10) (2.46)
Dual 1.104 1.300 2.990 0.998 -1.559 -2.830
(0.14) (0.16) (0.37) (0.15) (-0.24) (-0.36)
Constant 62.14*** -306.4*** -295.8*** 39.79*** -467.6** -586.2** -450.4** -609.1*
(7.74) (-3.24) (-3.26) (6.35) (-2.58) (-2.37) (-2.10) (-1.99)
Industry FE Y Y Y N N N N N
Firm FE N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
Industry-year FE N N N N N N Y Y
N 3878 3878 3878 3878 3878 2868 3878 2868
R-sq 0.034 0.106 0.106 0.005 0.033 0.041 0.065 0.071
***,**, and *: significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 1.5: The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of CEO compensation:
Pay-for-performance sensitivities
(Continued from the previous page)
This table reports the estimates from the difference-in-differences model. The sample covers the period
1996–1997 (before the issuance of FAS133) and 1999–2001 (after the issuance of FAS 133). After excluding
financial (sic 6000–6999) and utility firms (sic 4900–4999), the sample consist of 3878 firm years or 2868
firm years without CEOs appointed during 1997–2001 (columns 6, 8). The dependent variable Delta
(suggested by Gormley et al. 2013) measures the fair value change of stocks and options granted to the
CEO for a 1% increase in the stock price. Independent variables include Users which is an indicator of
firms having traded derivatives before the issuance of FAS 133 (i.e., 1996–1997) and FAS133 which is an
indicator of the years in which FAS133 can be adopted (1999–2001). Other control variables are available
in Table 1.1. Independent variables, except for INDBRD and NCEO, are lagged by one year. I include
industry/year fixed effects in columns 1–4, firm/year fixed effects in 5–6 and firm/industry-year fixed
effects in 7–8. The standard errors are robust to industry clusters. For industry fixed effects and industry
clusters, I consider the Fama-French 48 industrial classification code. In parentheses, t-statistics are
reported.
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Table 1.6: The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of CEO compensation:
Convexities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
User 29.91*** 7.464* -6.165
(3.81) (1.83) (-0.82)
FAS133*User 17.88* 21.31* 27.21** 30.82** 28.57* 34.84* 35.09*
(1.93) (1.91) (2.27) (2.05) (1.80) (1.93) (1.87)
Ln(asset) 32.00*** 32.21*** 16.79 29.80 16.23 31.79
(4.13) (4.07) (1.12) (1.38) (0.95) (1.24)
Ln(sale) -1.230 -1.444 33.97*** 31.37*** 31.62*** 30.34**
(-0.22) (-0.25) (3.08) (2.71) (2.83) (2.53)
ROA -1.149 -1.539 17.80 15.89 17.77 10.03
(-0.10) (-0.14) (0.84) (0.67) (0.81) (0.32)
Loss -19.19** -20.15*** -17.39 -17.99 -18.79 -24.25*
(-2.64) (-2.81) (-1.24) (-1.38) (-1.06) (-1.68)
KZ4 -3.036 -3.069 -9.305** -6.912 -5.208 -0.414
(-1.22) (-1.21) (-2.34) (-1.32) (-1.14) (-0.06)
LTD 12.90 12.84 25.77 41.66 36.55* 47.34
(0.65) (0.64) (1.57) (1.36) (1.80) (1.35)
Return 59.29** 59.47** 63.71** 79.43** 65.99** 83.81**
(2.33) (2.34) (2.60) (2.31) (2.42) (2.16)
MB 17.50*** 17.49*** 1.332 -2.388 -2.109 -6.437
(4.53) (4.51) (0.13) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.41)
R&D 143.0** 141.6** 525.5 603.9 518.2 658.2
(2.05) (2.05) (1.63) (1.25) (1.68) (1.24)
INDBRD -3.406 -3.243 6.378 16.17 9.446 15.22
(-0.58) (-0.55) (0.30) (0.63) (0.42) (0.52)
Ln(tenure) 10.17 10.32 -0.838 0.668 1.587 -0.0700
(1.51) (1.53) (-0.25) (0.11) (0.49) (-0.01)
NCEO 32.89** 33.06** 25.69*** 24.56**
(2.49) (2.52) (2.87) (2.33)
Dual -0.649 -0.478 0.852 -0.461 -2.894 -3.658
(-0.11) (-0.08) (0.14) (-0.08) (-0.55) (-0.54)
Constant 44.29*** -272.6*** -263.4*** 31.83*** -388.5** -475.9** -368.7** -488.8*
(6.19) (-3.82) (-3.88) (6.08) (-2.55) (-2.32) (-2.06) (-1.94)
Industry FE Y Y Y N N N N N
Firm FE N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
Industry-year FE N N N N N N Y Y
N 3878 3878 3878 3878 3878 2868 3878 2868
R-sq 0.035 0.112 0.112 0.005 0.034 0.039 0.066 0.070
***,**, and *: significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 1.6: The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of CEO compensation:
Convexities
(Continued from the previous page)
This table reports the estimates from the difference-in-differences model. The sample covers the period
1996–1997 (before the issuance of FAS133) and 1999–2001 (after the issuance of FAS 133). After excluding
financial (sic 6000–6999) and utility firms (sic 4900–4999), the sample consist of 3878 firm years or 2868
firm years without CEOs appointed during 1997–2001 (columns 6, 8). The dependent variable Vega
(suggested by Gormley et al. 2013) measures the fair value change of options granted to the CEO for a 1%
increase in the stock price volatility. Independent variables include Users which is an indicator of firms
having traded derivatives before the issuance of FAS 133 (i.e., 1996–1997) and FAS133 which is an
indicator of the years in which FAS133 can be adopted (1999–2001). Other control variables are available
in Table 1.1. Independent variables, except for INDBRD and NCEO, are lagged by one year. I include
industry/year fixed effects in columns 1–4, firm/year fixed effects in 5–6 and firm/industry-year fixed
effects in 7–8. The standard errors are robust to industry clusters. For industry fixed effects and industry
clusters, I consider the Fama-French 48 industrial classification code. In parentheses, t-statistics are
reported.
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Table 1.7: The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of CFO compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delta Delta Delta Vega Vega Vega
User -5.030** -4.272**
(-2.10) (-2.18)
FAS133*User 6.916*** 9.232*** 9.305*** 6.715*** 8.039*** 7.880***
(2.97) (3.39) (3.86) (3.18) (3.27) (3.51)
Ln(asset) 10.72*** 8.866 8.722 8.602*** 6.653 6.363
(4.13) (1.52) (1.64) (4.65) (1.45) (1.56)
Ln(sale) -1.407 2.935 3.689 -0.241 3.205 3.650*
(-0.83) (0.99) (1.25) (-0.19) (1.57) (1.77)
ROA -6.988 -2.131 -1.332 -2.804 -1.080 -0.0499
(-0.83) (-0.56) (-0.24) (-0.71) (-0.35) (-0.01)
Loss 0.381 0.929 3.600 -0.337 1.147 3.447
(0.12) (0.24) (0.71) (-0.14) (0.41) (0.95)
KZ4 -0.740 -3.020*** -2.259* -0.755 -2.507*** -1.821**
(-0.56) (-3.42) (-2.00) (-1.02) (-3.06) (-2.05)
LTD -0.0839 1.875 2.881 -0.391 1.096 1.521
(-0.02) (0.31) (0.44) (-0.14) (0.24) (0.31)
Return 13.89*** 16.72*** 17.80*** 10.72*** 12.87*** 13.71***
(3.73) (4.56) (4.22) (3.96) (4.55) (4.28)
MB 5.849*** 3.392*** 2.571* 3.884*** 2.267** 1.688
(4.47) (2.76) (1.85) (4.63) (2.33) (1.49)
R&D 36.23* 122.5** 120.9*** 32.50** 104.0** 103.3***
(1.81) (2.45) (2.97) (2.37) (2.40) (2.83)
INDBRD 1.674 4.470* 5.090* 1.895* 4.447** 5.118**
(1.35) (1.92) (1.91) (1.76) (2.25) (2.24)
Ln(tenure) 2.260 4.013** 4.029** 1.892 3.279** 3.240**
(1.61) (2.37) (2.06) (1.59) (2.51) (2.11)
NCEO 4.071 7.391** 6.346** 3.753 7.006*** 6.169**
(1.12) (2.53) (2.09) (1.26) (2.84) (2.52)
Dual -0.660 -0.697 -0.799 -0.648 -0.707 -0.780
(-0.49) (-0.32) (-0.40) (-0.53) (-0.39) (-0.45)
Constant -82.82*** -97.05*** -100.2*** -71.39*** -80.08*** -80.10***
(-5.51) (-3.17) (-2.99) (-6.43) (-2.94) (-2.86)
Industry FE Y N N Y N N
Firm FE N Y Y N Y Y
Year FE Y Y N Y Y N
Industry-year FE N N Y N N Y
N 2816 2816 2816 2816 2816 2816
R-sq 0.267 0.094 0.165 0.273 0.084 0.163
***,**, and *: significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 1.7: The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of CFO compensation
(Continued from the previous page)
This table reports the estimates from the difference-in-differences model. The sample covers the period
1996–1997 (before the issuance of FAS133) and 1999–2001 (after the issuance of FAS 133). After excluding
financial (sic 6000–6999) and utility firms (sic 4900–4999), the sample consist of 2816 firm years. As in
Gormley et al. (2013), the dependent variables are Delta (columns 1–3) which measures the fair value
change of stocks and options granted to the CEO for a 1% increase in the stock price and Vega (columns
4–6) which measures the fair value change of options granted to the CEO for a 1% increase in the stock
price volatility. Independent variables include Users which is an indicator of firms having traded
derivatives before the issuance of FAS 133 (i.e., 1996–1997) and FAS133 which is an indicator of the years
in which FAS133 can be adopted (1999–2001). Other control variables are available in Table 1.1.
Independent variables, except for INDBRD and NCEO, are lagged by one year. I include industry/year
fixed effects in column 1 and 4, firm/year fixed effects in 2 and 5 and firm/industry-year fixed effects in 3
and 6. The standard errors are robust to industry clusters. For industry fixed effects and industry clusters,
I consider the Fama-French 48 industrial classification code. In parentheses, t-statistics are reported.
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Table 1.8: The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of compensation for non-
CEO/CFO executives and outside directors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delta Delta Vega Vega Delta Delta Vega Vega
FAS133*User 3.078 -0.647 2.402 -0.904 -0.0302 -0.000895 -0.00313 0.0392
(0.44) (-0.06) (0.41) (-0.10) (-0.14) (-0.00) (-0.02) (0.19)
Ln(asset) -10.77 -13.04 -10.33 -11.93 -0.566 -0.583 -0.426 -0.378
(-0.56) (-0.63) (-0.61) (-0.65) (-1.41) (-1.18) (-1.23) (-0.94)
Ln(sale) 15.85** 16.70* 14.07** 14.63* 0.846*** 0.800** 0.627** 0.571**
(2.21) (2.02) (2.23) (2.00) (2.76) (2.25) (2.56) (2.14)
ROA -8.781 -5.410 -8.413 -5.634 1.740** 1.772** 1.360* 1.336**
(-1.04) (-0.68) (-1.14) (-0.86) (2.04) (2.29) (2.02) (2.16)
Loss 1.365 2.127 1.478 2.146 -0.677 -0.424 -0.566 -0.354
(0.30) (0.36) (0.44) (0.46) (-1.05) (-0.66) (-1.27) (-0.78)
KZ4 -9.508* -8.873* -7.488* -7.058 -0.249 -0.253 -0.102 -0.106
(-2.01) (-1.76) (-1.85) (-1.64) (-0.96) (-0.93) (-0.73) (-0.73)
LTD 11.36 13.28 8.678 10.03 -0.0228 0.169 -0.207 -0.104
(1.27) (1.35) (1.29) (1.35) (-0.06) (0.42) (-0.74) (-0.38)
Return 19.06*** 19.58*** 14.85*** 15.27*** 2.219*** 2.275*** 1.564*** 1.581***
(4.54) (3.77) (4.57) (3.74) (4.37) (3.92) (4.61) (4.06)
MB 5.719** 4.541* 5.188*** 4.323*** 0.330** 0.280 0.264*** 0.236***
(2.57) (1.97) (3.59) (2.97) (2.09) (1.67) (4.19) (3.51)
R&D 38.01 42.25 11.84 16.86 13.59 14.17 9.657 10.35
(0.75) (0.99) (0.29) (0.50) (1.19) (1.18) (1.21) (1.23)
INDBRD -2.308 -1.382 -1.988 -1.178 -0.289 -0.266 -0.177 -0.170
(-0.72) (-0.45) (-0.69) (-0.43) (-1.34) (-1.08) (-1.26) (-1.07)
Ln(tenure) 5.184 5.541 3.894 4.337 0.0974 0.100 0.109 0.114
(0.96) (1.02) (0.80) (0.89) (1.02) (0.93) (1.26) (1.26)
NCEO 8.114 8.852 7.113 8.042 -0.165 -0.192 -0.0985 -0.0943
(0.87) (0.86) (0.86) (0.89) (-0.87) (-0.88) (-0.67) (-0.67)
Dual -5.523* -5.536* -4.932* -5.015* -0.384* -0.361* -0.412** -0.380*
(-1.97) (-1.93) (-1.99) (-2.02) (-1.92) (-1.77) (-2.05) (-1.95)
Constant -54.88 -37.06 -40.95 -27.04 -1.762 -1.124 -1.148 -1.005
(-0.69) (-0.42) (-0.58) (-0.35) (-1.25) (-0.69) (-0.87) (-0.67)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y N Y N Y N Y N
Industry-year FE N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 3868 3868 3868 3868 3666 3666 3666 3666
R-sq 0.057 0.129 0.054 0.133 0.127 0.159 0.120 0.153
***,**, and *: significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 1.8: The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of compensation for non-
CEO/CFO executives and outside directors
(Continued from the previous page)
This table reports the estimates from the difference-in-differences model. The sample covers the period
1996–1997 (before the issuance of FAS133) and 1999–2001 (after the issuance of FAS 133). After excluding
financial (sic 6000–6999) and utility firms (sic 4900–4999), the sample consist of 3868 firm years for
non-CEO/CFO executives and 3666 firm years for outside directors. As in Gormley et al. (2013), the
dependent variables are Delta (columns 1–2, 5–6) which measures the fair value change of stocks and
options granted to the CEO for a 1% increase in the stock price and Vega (columns 3–4, 7–8) which
measures the fair value change of options granted to the CEO for a 1% increase in the stock price
volatility. Independent variables include Users which is an indicator of firms having traded derivatives
before the issuance of FAS 133 (i.e., 1996–1997) and FAS133 which is an indicator of the years in which
FAS133 can be adopted (1999–2001). Other control variables are available in Table 1.1. Independent
variables, except for INDBRD and NCEO, are lagged by one year. I include firm fixed effects in all
specifications and year fixed effects (in odd columns) or industry-year fixed effects (in even columns). The
standard errors are robust to industry clusters. For industry fixed effects and industry clusters, I consider
the Fama-French 48 industrial classification code. In parentheses, t-statistics are reported.
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Table 1.9: The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of compensation for CEO
and CFO: Intensity in the use of derivatives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Delta (CEO) Vega (CEO) Delta (CFO) Vega (CFO)
FAS133*Low 36.59 27.78* 7.325** 5.995**
(1.62) (1.69) (2.35) (2.24)
FAS133*High 43.79** 34.44** 11.86*** 10.85***
(2.21) (2.28) (3.50) (3.46)
Ln(asset) 23.06 16.81 8.870 6.658
(1.35) (1.12) (1.52) (1.46)
Ln(sale) 38.93** 34.02*** 3.026 3.304
(2.67) (3.11) (1.02) (1.62)
ROA 28.66 17.60 -2.220 -1.175
(0.93) (0.83) (-0.59) (-0.39)
Loss -24.66 -17.05 1.320 1.566
(-1.14) (-1.23) (0.34) (0.59)
KZ4 -10.90** -9.257** -3.021*** -2.507***
(-2.21) (-2.32) (-3.38) (-3.07)
LTD 32.47 25.96 2.095 1.332
(1.51) (1.58) (0.35) (0.29)
Return 77.90** 63.70** 16.69*** 12.84***
(2.54) (2.60) (4.54) (4.53)
MB -1.783 1.281 3.352*** 2.223**
(-0.12) (0.13) (2.75) (2.31)
R&D 741.6 523.9 124.0** 105.6**
(1.63) (1.62) (2.52) (2.47)
INDBRD 3.608 6.369 4.412* 4.385**
(0.13) (0.29) (1.87) (2.18)
Ln(tenure) -1.434 -0.655 4.100** 3.373**
(-0.36) (-0.20) (2.38) (2.55)
NCEO 32.18*** 25.89*** 7.461** 7.081***
(3.14) (2.89) (2.53) (2.85)
Dual 2.962 0.826 -0.719 -0.730
(0.36) (0.13) (-0.33) (-0.40)
Constant -468.6** -389.4** -97.98*** -81.07***
(-2.60) (-2.57) (-3.24) (-3.02)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
N 3878 3878 2816 2816
R-sq 0.033 0.034 0.095 0.086
***,**, and *: significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
44
Table 1.9: The effect of FAS 133 on the structure of compensation for CEO
and CFO: Intensity in the use of derivatives
(Continued from the previous page)
This table reports the estimates from the difference-in-differences model. The sample covers the period
1996–1997 (before the issuance of FAS133) and 1999–2001 (after the issuance of FAS 133). After excluding
financial (sic 6000–6999) and utility firms (sic 4900–4999), the sample consist of 3878 firm years for CEO
and 2816 firm years for CFO. As in Gormley et al. (2013), the dependent variables are Delta (of CEO in
column 1 and of CFO in column 3) which measures the fair value change of stocks and options granted to
the CEO for a 1% increase in the stock price and Vega (of CEO in column 2 and of CFO in 4) which
measures the fair value change of options granted to the CEO for a 1% increase in the stock price
volatility. Independent variables include High (resp. Low) which is an indicator of firms whose average
holdings of foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives in 1996–97 are more (resp. less) than the median
of derivative holdings during the period and FAS133 which is an indicator of the years in which FAS 133
can be adopted (1999–2001). Other control variables are available in Table 1.1. Independent variables,
except for INDBRD and NCEO, are lagged by one year. I include firm fixed effects in all specifications
and year fixed effects (in odd columns) or industry-year fixed effects (in even columns). The standard
errors are robust to industry clusters. For industry fixed effects and industry clusters, I consider
Fama-French 48 industrial classification code. In parentheses, t-statistics are reported.
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Table 1.10: Other compensation measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Option/Cash Equity/Cash Option/Cash Equity/Cash Ydelta Ydelta Ydelta Ydelta
(CEO) (CEO) (CFO) (CFO) (CEO) (CFO) (Other) (Board)
FAS133*User 0.176** 0.179** 0.140*** 0.127*** 0.291 0.152* 0.0966 0.00185
(2.11) (2.15) (3.70) (3.61) (0.49) (2.01) (0.98) (0.13)
Ln(asset) 0.322*** 0.316*** 0.212*** 0.192** -0.544 -0.0590 -0.142 -0.0424***
(3.76) (3.54) (2.88) (2.60) (-1.16) (-0.42) (-0.83) (-2.90)
Ln(sale) -0.142 -0.125 -0.102 -0.0952 -0.661 -0.157 -0.339* -0.00885
(-1.35) (-1.20) (-1.17) (-1.16) (-0.99) (-0.91) (-1.93) (-0.41)
ROA 0.0700 0.0651 0.0198 0.00990 0.781 -0.122 -0.232 0.0785**
(0.75) (0.55) (0.18) (0.08) (1.44) (-0.84) (-0.69) (2.37)
Loss -0.205 -0.185 -0.0608 -0.0462 -1.253 0.0380 0.158 0.000867
(-1.24) (-1.11) (-0.63) (-0.45) (-1.26) (0.19) (0.72) (0.01)
KZ4 -0.109*** -0.0940** -0.0578** -0.0535** 0.0257 0.0534 0.0499 0.0206***
(-2.73) (-2.19) (-2.47) (-2.11) (0.14) (1.20) (1.39) (2.94)
LTD 0.0533 0.0229 -0.0576 -0.0537 0.959 -0.116 0.210 -0.0408
(0.69) (0.28) (-0.86) (-0.75) (0.99) (-0.48) (0.60) (-1.39)
Return -0.00742 -0.00165 0.0612* 0.0821** 0.705*** 0.100 0.148** 0.0421*
(-0.20) (-0.04) (1.83) (2.47) (2.86) (1.48) (2.34) (1.86)
MB 0.0484 0.0489 0.0709*** 0.0755*** 0.121 0.0149 0.0596*** 0.00322
(1.40) (1.44) (2.89) (3.07) (0.83) (0.43) (3.30) (0.61)
R&D -0.361 -0.174 -0.578 -0.605 6.058 -2.093 2.806 1.335**
(-0.58) (-0.33) (-1.01) (-1.13) (1.03) (-1.06) (1.40) (2.54)
INDBRD -0.0507 -0.0469 0.0320 0.0372 -0.0919 0.165** -0.0681 -0.0109
(-0.72) (-0.69) (0.95) (1.03) (-0.22) (2.60) (-1.05) (-0.53)
Ln(tenure) -0.0419 -0.0433 0.0562** 0.0661** -0.451* 0.0250 0.114* -0.00812
(-1.44) (-1.54) (2.07) (2.67) (-1.78) (0.43) (1.82) (-0.69)
Dual 0.340*** 0.387*** 0.162** 0.175** 1.758*** 0.159 0.216** 0.00603
(4.84) (5.13) (2.26) (2.44) (3.50) (1.11) (2.31) (0.29)
Constant 0.0677 0.0748 0.0331 0.0347 1.036*** 0.0669 0.119* 0.00523
(1.18) (1.34) (0.56) (0.59) (2.97) (0.73) (1.73) (0.31)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 3861 3861 2819 2819 3876 2815 3866 2995
R-sq 0.065 0.066 0.075 0.077 0.032 0.022 0.028 0.035
***,**, and *: significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 1.10: Other compensation measures
(Continued from the previous page)
This table reports the estimates from the difference-in-differences model of which dependent variables are
alternative compensation measures: (i) ln(1+option compensaton-to-cash compensation ratio) of CEO in
column 1 and of CFO in 3, (ii) ln(1+equity compensaton-to-cash compensation ratio) of CEO in column 2
and of CFO in 4, (iii) the change in the value of option grants (to CEO in column 5, CFO in 6,
non-CEO/CEO executives in 7 and outside directors in 8) per $1,000 increase in the market value of
equity. The sample covers the period 1996–1997 (before the issuance of FAS133) and 1999–2001 (after the
issuance of FAS 133). After excluding financial (sic 6000–6999) and utility firms (sic 4900–4999), the
sample consist of 3876 firm years. Independent variables include Users which is an indicator of firms
having traded derivatives before the issuance of FAS 133 (i.e., 1996–1997) and FAS133 which is an
indicator of the years in which FAS133 can be adopted (1999–2001). Other control variables are available
in Table 1.1. Independent variables, except for INDBRD and NCEO, are lagged by one year. I include
firm and year fixed effects. The standard errors are robust to industry clusters. For industry clusters, I
consider Fama-French 48 industrial classification code. In parentheses, t-statistics are reported.
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Table 1.11: Falsification test: False adoptions in 1996 and 1997
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delta Delta Vega Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega
(CEO) (CEO) (CEO) (CEO) (CEO) (CEO) (CFO) (CFO)
FAS133*User 19.84 17.55 19.19 17.13 20.86** 18.71*** 1.452 1.240
(1.02) (1.32) (1.17) (1.46) (2.53) (2.93) (0.92) (0.84)
Ln(asset) 35.00 24.55
(0.48) (0.40)
Ln(sale) 34.58 22.98
(1.20) (0.85)
ROA 173.9** 135.6*
(2.04) (1.78)
Loss -0.303 -3.283
(-0.01) (-0.17)
KZ4 20.98 15.23
(0.97) (0.87)
LTD 172.4 130.7
(1.28) (1.29)
Return 88.39** 72.69**
(2.26) (2.14)
MB 16.17 14.79
(0.80) (0.90)
R&D 1565.1** 1199.0**
(2.14) (2.11)
INDBRD 4.569 4.840
(0.52) (0.59)
Ln(tenure) -9.301 -4.701
(-0.80) (-0.44)
Dual 12.32 11.20
(0.51) (0.56)
Constant 41.41*** -722.6 36.09*** -518.6 30.18*** 25.07*** 8.915*** 7.287***
(5.29) (-1.20) (5.43) (-0.95) (13.93) (14.97) (19.43) (16.87)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1287 1287 1287 1287 3327 3327 2313 2313
R-sq 0.058 0.115 0.066 0.111 0.051 0.057 0.080 0.088
***,**, and *: significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 1.11: Falsification test: False adoptions in 1996 and 1997
(Continued from the previous page)
This table reports the estimates from the difference-in-differences model under the assumption that FAS
133 is adopted in 1996 (columns 1–4) or 1997 (columns 5–8). The sample covers the period 1994–1997
(before the issuance of FAS133). I exclude financial (sic 6000–6999) and utility firms (sic 4900–4999) from
the sample. I consider the period 1996–1997 in columns 1–4 and the period 1994–1997 in 5–8. As in
Gormley et al. (2013), the dependent variables are Delta (of CEO in columns 1,2,5 and of CFO in 7) which
measures the fair value change of stocks and options granted to the CEO for a 1% increase in the stock
price and Vega (of CEO in columns 3,4,6 and of CFO in 8) which measures the fair value change of
options granted to the CEO for a 1% increase in the stock price volatility. Independent variables include
Users which is an indicator of firms having traded derivatives before the issuance of FAS 133 (i.e.,
1996–1997) and FAS133 which is an indicator of the false years in which FAS133 is adopted (i.e., 1997 in
columns 1–4 and 1996–1997 in columns 5–8). Other control variables are available in Table 1.1.
Independent variables, except for INDBRD and NCEO, are lagged by one year. I include firm fixed effects
in all specifications and year fixed effects (in odd columns) or industry-year fixed effects (in even columns).
The standard errors are robust to industry clusters. For industry-year fixed effects and industry clusters, I
consider the Fama-French 48 industrial classification code. In parentheses, t-statistics are reported.
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Chapter 2
CEO Compensation, Board Compensation,
and Managerial Risk-Seeking Activities
2.1 Introduction
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976) financial economists have focused on
agency conflicts between the shareholders and the manager of the corporation
and have analyzed a number of mechanisms that shareholders can employ to
mitigate these conflicts. Among these mechanisms, managerial compensation
and board monitoring have been considered essential to reducing these con-
flicts. Specifically, the standard view in the literature is that the misalignment
of incentives between managers and shareholders can be reduced by either
adequately designing managerial compensation or alternatively by delegating
managerial monitoring to the board of directors.1
While the literature has extensively analyzed the effectiveness of these
two alternate mechanisms in isolation, this paper departs from the literature
by considering the two mechanisms jointly, and in particular, by incorporating
two key features of the relationships between shareholders, boards and man-
agers. First, I consider a setting in which shareholders delegate to the board
1See Frydman and Jenter (2010) and Adams et al. (2010) for surveys of recent research
on managerial compensation and board of directors, respectively.
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the tasks of managerial monitoring and the design of managerial compensa-
tion.2 Second, I model the board’s agency problems in performing these tasks
and solve for the board compensation that maximizes shareholder value.3 By
considering a setting in which managerial and board incentives are endoge-
nously determined, I can investigate a number of empirical issues related to
board and managerial compensation.
In practice, board compensation has recently exhibited wide variation
in its structure across firms. For instance, in 2006 Coca-Cola Co. aban-
doned the use of non-contingent compensation for outside directors and instead
started awarding them performance-based compensation related to earnings-
per-share growth. In the same year, IBM moved in the opposite direction by
abandoning option grants to outside directors and reinstating a non-contingent
annual compensation of $200,000. These contrasting decisions suggest that a
trade-off exists in the use of pay-for-performance board compensation. In this
analysis, I examine this trade-off by considering how a board compensation
structure influences the board’s functions within the corporation which, as es-
tablished by the literature (e.g., Adams et al. 2010), are associated with the
monitoring of managerial activities and the design of managerial pay among
their other duties.
2The importance of the board in monitoring the manager and in setting the managerial
pay is well described in the US Senate report The role of the board of director in Enron’s
collapse which finds that the board of Enron failed to ensure the disclosure of off-the-book
liabilities and approved high-risk accounting and excessive compensation for executives.
3Bebchuk and Fried (2004) highlights the practical importance of board agency conflicts,
particularly, in the design of managerial compensation.
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Intuitively, the main trade-off in the structure of board compensation
is that while high pay-for-performance compensation provides the board with
incentives to properly design managerial compensation, it also diminishes the
board’s incentives to monitor and report unproductive managerial risk-shifting
activities. As I show, these competing incentives related to the board’s two
monitoring functions suggest that the cross-sectional variations in managerial
and board pay-for-performance compensation are not mutually independent
of one another and that further insight can be gained by analyzing them in
tandem.
To formally analyze the double incentive provision problem for man-
agers and boards, I consider a firm that operates a project whose quality is
private information to the manager in charge and whose success depends on
a specific set of managerial actions. These managerial actions fall into two
categories: (i) costly managerial actions (e.g., operational choices that require
managerial effort) which enhance the firm’s value without affecting the risk of
its cash-flows and (ii) costless managerial risk-seeking activities (e.g., financial
speculation or over-investment in risky activities) which increase the risk of
the firm’s cash flows without affecting the firm value.
I model the board as a single agent who can acquire information about
the project’s quality at some cost, and can also observe managerial risk-seeking
activities. Since optimal managerial actions depend on the project’s quality,
it may appear optimal to delegate to the board the authorities to monitor the
manager and to fine tune managerial compensation. This conclusion, however,
52
is not necessarily correct since shareholders, who do not observe the board’s
information, can only rely on the design of board compensation to influence
the board’s behavior. As it turns out, depending on parameters related to the
nature of the managerial and board agency problems, several optimal gover-
nance arrangements are possible. In some of these governance arrangements,
shareholders rely on more intense board monitoring and managerial compensa-
tion is delegated to the board. In other arrangements shareholders choose less
reliance on board monitoring. Each of these arrangements corresponds with
an optimal compensation structure for the board and the manager. There-
fore, the model analysis gives rise to a number of empirical predictions which
link the joint compensation structure to the parameters that characterize the
nature of managerial and board agency problems.
First, my analysis proposes a test that considers how the combined use
of pay-for-performance for boards and managers is affected by the manage-
rial ability to engage in risk-seeking activities. Specifically, in the absence of
agency conflicts regarding risk-seeking activities, the optimal compensation
structure exhibits a high pay-for-performance sensitivity in both managerial
and board compensation. This result aligns with the intuition that high pay-
for-performance board compensation provides the board with incentives to
fine-tune the design of managerial compensation by monitoring the project’s
quality. However, when the manager can easily engage in risk-seeking activi-
ties, awarding high pay-for-performance compensation to both managers and
boards can produce undesirable effects since such a compensation structure
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would prompt the manager to engage in risk-seeking activities while simulta-
neously reducing the board’s incentive to disclose the manager’s engagement
in risk-seeking activities to shareholders. To test this prediction, I examine
whether firms reduce the combined use of high pay-for-performance compen-
sation to both managers and boards as the managerial ability to engage in
risk-seeking activities increases.
Second, this model proposes that the size of the board’s monitoring
costs is a key determinant of the optimal joint compensation structure. Specif-
ically, when monitoring costs are low, boards do not require high pay-for-
performance compensation to tailor managerial compensation by acquiring
information about the project’s quality. Thus, as board monitoring costs de-
crease, shareholders will use reduced pay-for-performance board compensation
while inducing the board to grant high pay-for-performance to the manager.
Finally, the model analysis also suggests that when a firm’s project
exhibits a large variability in quality, it becomes likely that low pay-for-
performance board compensation is optimal. Intuitively, even with low pay-
for-performance compensation, boards find it costly to design managerial com-
pensation without acquiring information about the project’s quality (i.e., to
award low pay-for-performance compensation to the manager in charge of a
high-quality project or vice versa). Therefore, in these conditions the optimal
compensation structure simultaneously grants low pay-for-performance com-
pensation to boards and high pay-for-performance to managers.
To test the empirical predictions provided by the model analysis, I ana-
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lyze S&P 1500 companies in the years 1996–2005 and use R&D firms and banks
as proxies for high managerial risk-shifting ability, outside directors’ ownership
as a proxy for board monitoring costs and business complexity measures (i.e.,
firm size and the number of business segments) as proxies for the project’s
variability in their quality. To empirically measure the combined use of pay-
for-performance compensation for managers and boards, I consider informa-
tion on option grants. Specifically, I classify the sample firm years into four
groups, namely, (high-high, high-low, low-high, low-low), which correspond to
the magnitudes of manager-board pay-for-performance sensitivities. Then, I
estimate the effect of the determinants on the joint compensation structure
using the multinomial logit regressions.
The main empirical findings are as follows. First, after controlling for
common determinants (e.g., Yermack 1995), I find that when the manager has
opportunities to substantially shift the firm’s risks, the combined compensa-
tion structure exhibits high pay-for-performance for managers and low pay-
for-performance for boards. Relative to other firms, R&D firms show around
6% higher odds of awarding options only to managers. Second, firms in which
non-officer blockholders sit on the board are also more likely to award high
pay-for-performance compensation to managers and low pay-for-performance
compensation to boards. Specifically, the presence of blockholders on the
board leads to 5% higher likelihood of awarding stock options to managers
alone. Finally, I also find that business complexity is positively related to the
simultaneous award of high managerial and low board pay-for-performance but
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it is negatively related to awarding high pay-for-performance to both simulta-
neously. With all other factors being equal, an additional business segment is
associated with a 2% increase in the likelihood of awarding option plans only
to the manager.
This study is related to several branches of the corporate governance
literature. First, my model contributes to the theoretical literature on cor-
porate governance that considers the interaction between managerial pay and
boards. Previous studies have shown that managerial pay is affected by the
degree of influence that a manager has on the board (i.e., the board structure)
and they have considered the optimal board structure when managerial pay
is endogenous.4 As shown above, by incorporating board agency conflicts and
the board’s role in the design of managerial pay into the analysis, my study
generates a number of cross-sectional implications between firm characteristics
and the joint nature of managerial and board compensation.
In addition, my empirical findings offer new evidence on the deter-
minants of board compensation.5 Previous empirical studies have found a
substantial variation in board incentives and have reported a number of de-
terminants of board incentive compensation. For instance, Yermack (2004)
shows that, on average, board compensation exhibits a considerable pay-for-
performance sensitivity while Ryan and Wiggins (2004) finds that board com-
4See, e.g., Almazan and Suarez (2003) and Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008).
5See e.g., Ryan and Wiggins (2004), Yermack (2004), Fich and Shivdasani (2005), Adams
and Ferreira (2008), and Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) among others.
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pensation is related to the firm’s internal governance. In this study I propose
and test for other important determinants of board compensation and their
relationship to managerial pay.
Finally this paper also contributes to the literature on managerial com-
pensation and in particular re-examines how the convexity of managerial com-
pensation affects managerial risk-taking behavior.6 While agency theory tends
to predict that convex managerial compensation leads to risk-seeking corporate
policies, the previous empirical studies have led to inconclusive results. My
analysis provides a possible explanation for these inconclusive results. Specifi-
cally, while highly convex managerial compensation may certainly induce man-
agers to engage in risk-seeking activities, these activities only occur when the
board also receives a convex compensation structure and allows these activi-
ties to materialize. Thus, my analysis suggests that empirical studies should
include measures of board compensation convexity when testing the effects of
managerial compensation on risk-seeking corporate behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 solve the model. Section 5 discusses the results of the model
analysis and develops empirical predictions which I take to data in the sec-
ond part of this paper. Section 6 describes the data. Section 7 presents the
empirical results. Finally, section 8 discusses concluding remarks.
6See, e.g., Coles et al. (2006), Chava and Purnanandam (2010), and Hayes et al. (2012)
for the papers that have empirically investigated how managerial compensation affects risk-
taking managerial behavior.
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2.2 The model
I consider an all-equity firm that operates in a risk-neutral economy
where the market rate of return is normalized to zero. The firm is run by a
manager who has no wealth, is protected by limited liability and has a zero
reservation utility. There is also a board of directors (the board, hereafter) that
can monitor the manager and to whom the design of managerial compensation
is delegated. To focus the analysis exclusively on the board’s incentives and
compensation, I model it as a risk-neutral single agent, protected by limited
liability and with zero wealth and zero reservation utility.7
In line with previous literature (e.g., Faure-Grimaud et al. 2003), I
consider a firm organized as a two tier hierarchy: in the first tier (i.e., the
shareholder-board tier) shareholders communicate and contract with the board
and in the second tier (i.e., the board-manager tier), the board subsequently
communicates and contracts with the manager.8 In this setting I solve for the
optimal contracting choices made by the shareholders and the board and then
consider the implications that emanate from them.
7This modelling choice abstracts from issues related to board composition. See Adams
et al. (2010) for a recent literature review on board composition.
8Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003) also examines a two-tier hierarchy with decentralized con-
tracting structure in which the principal contracts exclusively with an intermediary who is
delegated the authority to contract with the agent.
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2.2.1 Firm project and managerial actions
The firm’s assets consist of a project that yields a random terminal cash
flow r˜ = {rd, rm, ru}, where rm = ru+rd
2
and 0 < rd < ru and whose probability
distribution is affected by (i) a project’s productivity type θ ∈ {θl, θh}, where
0 < θl < θh <
1
3
and prob(θ = θh) = p, and (ii) two managerial actions e and
∆ described below.
Specifically, the project’s cash-flow distribution is as follows:
r˜ =

ru with prob. 1
3
+ θe+ ∆
rm with prob. 1
3
− 2∆
rd with prob. 1
3
− θe+ ∆,
. (2.1)
I refer to e ∈ [0, 1] as “managerial effort” which is privately costly to the
manager
c(e) =
1
2
γme
2. (2.2)
As shown in (2.1), relative to e = 0 which is the minimum effort choice, e > 0
increases the likelihood of ru at the expense of rd and thus increases the firm’s
expected cash-flow by θ(ru − rd)e. Furthermore, I refer to ∆ ∈ {∆0,∆s}
(where 0 = ∆0 < ∆s <
1
6
) as the managerial “risk choice” which is costless to
the manager. Relative to ∆0, the risk choice ∆s is a mean-preserving spread
which increases the likelihood of extreme cash flows ru and rd at the expense
of the moderate cash flow rm.9
9The possibility of costless risk-management choices allows me to consider a particularly
relevant case namely the case in which a manager can make financial transactions on behalf
of their firms. Net of transaction costs, financial transactions are ex-ante zero NPV trans-
actions that affect cash-flow risk without altering the its value. In this sense, this analysis
can be interpreted as an analysis of the provision of managerial and board incentives when
a manager can engage in financial speculation.
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2.2.2 Managerial private information and board monitoring
The manager has private information about the project’s type θ and
takes hidden actions e and ∆. I assume that shareholders cannot observe
any of the managerial information, but the board can monitor and obtain
information about the project’s type and the managerial actions. In particular,
in this setting the board monitoring technologies with respect to θ, e and ∆
differ in their required monitoring costs (which reflects the level of difficulty
that the board encounters in monitoring each type of information) and in the
feasibility of producing hard evidence about the acquired information (which
reflects the possibility to translate each type of information into a verifiable
report).
Relative to the board monitoring costs, I assume that the board can-
not observe e at any cost (i.e., the board cannot measure the managerial effort
choice) but it can privately observe the project’s type θ by incurring a private
cost γb and also privately observe the manager’s choice of ∆ at no cost. The
assumption of the board’s ability to observe managerial risk choices is con-
sistent with regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which authorize the
board to review the firm’s risk-management strategy and to discuss it with
management.10
With regard to the production of hard evidence, I assume that the
board produces none when monitoring θ and that, by contrast, produces some
10Ge´czy et al. (2007) finds that management regularly reports to the board about the
firm’s (speculative) derivative transactions.
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publicly observable hard evidence after monitoring the risk choice ∆. This
distinction is consistent with the insight that information about project quality
is likely to be soft and thus unverifiable by third parties, while managerial risk
choices have a quantitative dimension that can be communicated to third
parties in the form of verifiable reports (e.g., financial statements).11
Technically, I assume that θ can only be reported via board announce-
ments θˆb to the shareholders while after observing ∆ = {∆0,∆s} the board
produces verifiable hard evidence ∆ˆ = {∆ˆ0, ∆ˆs} which is however subject to
the following agency conflict. When the manager chooses ∆s, the board may
report otherwise (i.e., the board can either report ∆ˆ0 or ∆ˆs) but when the
manager chooses ∆0, the board truthfully reports it (i.e., the board can only
report ∆ˆ0). In other words, ∆ˆs is always truthful evidence of the manager’s
choice of ∆s while ∆ˆ0 does not necessarily reveal the managerial choice of
∆0.
12
For the future reference I refer to (∆ˆz, θˆz) ∈ {∆0,∆s}×{θ¯, θl, θh} as the
board’s information status relative to ∆ and θ where ∆j (j = 0, s) corresponds
to the case in which the board observes the manager’s risk choice and θi
(i = l, h) to the case in which the board monitors and observes the project’s
11For instance, in the financial statements each of derivative transactions is explicitly
classified into either hedging or speculative investments.
12Since ∆s corresponds to the case in which the manager takes an action that will be
detrimental to shareholder value, the board’s inability to forge the evidence ∆ˆs allows me
to rule out the impractical case in which boards incriminate managers by producing a false
evidence of managerial misbehavior. This modelling choice is typically considered in the
delegation literature (e.g., Tirole 1986) to capture agency conflicts in the production of
information supervisors.
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type θi and θ¯ to the case in which the board does not monitor θ.
In summary, as is common in the delegation literature (e.g., Tirole
1986) I analyze a nested informational structure in which the manager’s infor-
mation set is a finer partition of the board’s information set which in turn is a
finer partition of the information set of shareholders. In the shareholder-board
tier, shareholders do not observe either the board’s information (θˆz, ∆ˆz) or
whether the board forges the evidence ∆ˆ and in the board-manager tier, the
board can monitor to learn θ and ∆ (but not e) while the manager observes
(θˆz, ∆ˆz) i.e., the board’s information status.13
2.2.3 Collusion, communication and contracts
The analysis solves for the design of the optimal managerial and board
compensation in a sequential contracting framework. As discussed below, the
analysis takes into account the aspect that communication is limited to parties
within tiers and thus that some contracts are unfeasible due to limited com-
munication. Within this setting, I consider the design of the optimal board
compensation by shareholders within the shareholder-board tier, and, then, the
subsequent design of optimal managerial compensation by the board within
the board-manager tier.
An important element of the analysis is the possibility that the manager
and the board can collude to obtain additional rents at the expense of the
13Strictly speaking, not all information structure is nested in this analysis since, as shown
below, the manager does not observe the board’s messages sent to shareholders.
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shareholders. As in Tirole (1986) collusion is modelled by assuming that the
board can pre-commit to produce a certain report about the managerial choice
of ∆s before the manager actually chooses ∆.
14 Formally, I denote the board’s
commitment as φ ∈ {t, f}, where φ = t corresponds to truthfully reporting
∆ˆs and φ = f to falsely reporting ∆ˆ0.
15 I assume that shareholders do not
observe φ which, as shown below, implies that the possibility of board-manager
collusion crucially affects the design of the compensation contracts.
In this setting feasible contracts are limited by the availability of infor-
mation and by inability to communicate with parties in different tiers. Specif-
ically, feasible contracts can be written on: (i) the hard information produced
by the board’s report ∆ˆ and (ii) the messages sent by the manager (to the
board) and by the board (to the shareholders) relative to the soft private in-
formation that they may have. In particular, the manager sends to the board
a message θˆm ∈ {θml , θmh } relative to θ while the board sends a message to
shareholders µb = (θˆb, θˆ
m
b ), where θˆb ∈ {θbl , θbh, θ¯b} corresponds to the message
about its information θˆz and θˆmb ∈ {θˆbl , θˆbh} to the message about the manager’s
message θˆm.
16 In line with the delegation literature, I assume that these mes-
14This resembles the framework in Tirole (1986) in which a supervisor and an agent can
collude at the expense of the principal. As in that framework I assume that this commitment
is self-enforceable, i.e, that can be implemented without the assistance of a third-party
enforcing it.
15The board reporting action after managers choose ∆ = ∆0 is by assumption ∆ˆ0, i.e.,
the board cannot forge the report when the manager chooses ∆0.
16By the “generalized revelation principle” (Myerson 1982), the restrictions of the manager
and board message spaces are without loss of generality. The board also observes the
manager’s choice of ∆ and therefore can communicate about it with shareholders. As it
turns out, considering the board’s message about ∆ does not affect the results since the
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sages are observed by the two parties within each tier but cannot be observed
by the party outside a tier.17 In other words, shareholders and the manager
who are not in direct communication with each other do not observe θˆm and
(θˆb, θˆ
m
b ), respectively.
Formally, feasible contractual arrangements in each tier are as follow.18
First, within the board-manager tier the board commits to φ(θˆm) and offers
a managerial compensation contract wm(θˆm, ∆ˆ, r˜) which, for convenience, can
be rewritten as:
wm(θˆm, ∆ˆ, r˜) =
(
um(θˆm, ∆ˆ),mm(v), dm(θˆm, ∆ˆ)
)
, (2.3)
where km(.) (k = u,m, d) corresponds to the managerial pay for the realized
cash flow rk.
Second, within the shareholder-board tier shareholders design the board
compensation contract with limited information about the managerial com-
pensation contract offered by the board. In particular I assume that while
the board offers a menu of contracts to the manager, shareholders can observe
only the specific part of the menu chosen by the manager and cannot observe
other elements in the menu offered to the manager. This assumption, which
managerial compensation which induces the manager’s choice of ∆ cannot be written upon
the board’s message to shareholders.
17Other studies in the delegation literature (e.g., Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m 1998 and Faure-
Grimaud et al. 2003) also consider a setting in which parties can write contracts contingent
on messages sent to each other within a tier but not on messages sent by parties in other
tiers.
18To facilitate the presentation I describe these arrangements in the reverse order of their
actual contracting sequence.
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is consistent with the premise that a party has limited information about con-
tracts made outside its own tier, allows the model to capture in a simple way
the trade-off that shareholders face when they delegate managerial compensa-
tion to the board.19 While by delegating the task to a better informed party
(i.e., the board) shareholders can use the board’s information in the design
of managerial compensation, they cannot take full advantage of the board’s
information since they have only limited access to relevant aspects about the
pay-setting process.
Formally, within the shareholders-board tier shareholders design the
board pay wb as a function of observables (θˆb, θˆ
m
b , ∆ˆ, r˜, σm), where σm cor-
responds to the part of the menu of managerial compensation observed by
shareholders, namely, the managerial choice within the menu of contracts. In
particular, when the board offers the manager [wm(θˆm, ∆ˆ, r˜), φ(θˆm)] and the
manager subsequently chooses (θˆ∗m,∆
∗) ∈ ({θml , θmh }, {∆0,∆s}), shareholders
observe
σm = wm(θˆ
∗
m, ∆ˆ
∗, r˜) = (um(θˆ∗m, ∆ˆ
∗),mm(θˆ∗m, ∆ˆ
∗), dm(θˆ∗m, ∆ˆ
∗)),
where ∆ˆ∗ ∈ {∆ˆ0, ∆ˆs} is the board’s report ∆ˆ that corresponds to φ(θˆ∗m) and
∆∗. Analogously to (2.3), wb can be written as:
wb(θˆb, θˆ
m
b , ∆ˆ, r˜, σm) = {ub(θˆb, θˆmb , ∆ˆ, σm),mb(θˆb, θˆmb , ∆ˆ, σm), db(θˆb, θˆmb , ∆ˆ, σm)},
(2.4)
19This is also in line with the observation made in Bebchuk and Fried (2004) who docu-
ment a number of examples in which boards resort to hard-to-observe (i.e., “camouflage”)
compensation for managers.
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where kb(.) (k = u,m, d) corresponds to the board pay for the realized cash
flow rk. To alleviate the notation, in what follows I will refer to the menus of
contracts wm(θˆm, ∆ˆ, r˜) and wb(θˆb, θˆ
m
b , ∆ˆ, r˜, σm) as wm and wb when no confu-
sion arises.
2.2.4 Sequence of events
The sequence of events unfolds as follows. At t = 0, shareholders offer
wb to the board. At t = 1, the board monitors θ, offers the compensation
contract wm and commits to report φ. At t = 2, the manager chooses e and ∆
and sends a message θˆm to the board. At t = 3, the board reports (θˆb, θˆ
m
b , ∆ˆ)
to the shareholders who, in turn, observe σm. At t = 4, the firm’s cash flows
are realized and contracts are enforced.
S offers wb
t=0
B monitors θ,
B offers (wm, φ) to M
t=1
M chooses (e,∆),
M sends θˆm to B
t=2
B reports (θˆb, θˆ
m
b , ∆ˆ) to S
S observe σm
t=3
r˜ realized
t=4
Figure 1. Sequence of events
The analysis of the model can be simplified by solving for the opti-
mal compensation and actions in two mutually exclusive cases that differ on
whether or not the board monitors and acquires information on θ. Specifi-
cally, in the uninformed board case, the board designs managerial compensa-
tion without monitoring θ while in the informed board case, the board opti-
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mally chooses to monitor θ before designing the managerial compensation.20
While most of the interesting comparative statics arises in the analysis of the
informed board case, the analysis of the uninformed board case provides a
natural benchmark. Thus, in Section 2.3 I first solve for the optimal compen-
sation and actions when the board is uninformed and compare them with the
informed board case analyzed in Section 2.4.
Solving the model requires to obtain the managerial and board com-
pensation and to characterize the associated managerial and board choices
induced by the compensation contracts. Technically, the model features a se-
quence of three optimization problems in which: (i) shareholders solve for the
optimal board compensation w∗b to affect the board’s incentives to design man-
agerial compensation and to monitor θ and ∆; (ii) the board, in turn, solves
for the optimal managerial compensation w∗m and disclosure commitment φ
∗
taking into account how they affect the managerial choices of (θˆm, e,∆); and
(iii) the manager chooses (θˆ∗m, e
∗,∆∗) that maximizes his expected utility.
2.3 Model analysis (I): Uninformed board
The uninformed board case corresponds to the case in which share-
holders set board compensation wUb to induce the board to choose (w
U
m, φ
U)
without learning θ. Formally, solving this model requires to consider a se-
quence of two mechanism design problems, one in each organizational tier.
20This is without loss of generality. Considering the possibility of a mixed monitoring
strategy in which the board incurs γb with probability q ∈ (0, 1) does not change the results.
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In the board-manager tier, the board chooses (wUm, φ
U) to provide incentives
to the manager who is privately informed about θ and will take two hidden
actions (e,∆). In the shareholders-board tier, shareholders design wUb for the
board who can observe the managerial choice of ∆ and communicates with
the manager to receive information about θ. In what follows, I denote the
sequence of optimal mechanisms chosen by shareholders and the board as
MU∗ = {wU∗b , (wU∗m , φU∗)}.
By virtue of the generalized revelation principle (Myerson 1982), MU∗
belongs to the set of truth-telling mechanisms in which: (i) in the board-
manager tier the manager sends a message to the board θˆm ∈ {θml , θmh } which
truthfully reveals θ and (ii) in the shareholders-board tier the board sends a
message to shareholders θˆmb ∈ {θˆbl , θˆbh} which truthfully reveals the manager’s
message θˆm.
21 Thus, the shareholders’ problem can formally stated as follows:
21Without loss of generality I omit the board’s message about its information status
relative to the monitoring decision (i.e., θˆz = θ¯) since shareholders can infer that the board
optimally remains uninformed about θ.
68
max
wb
pVs
(
wb | θˆbh
)
+ (1− p)Vs
(
wb | θˆbl
)
(2.5)
subject to
(θˆh
∗
b , θˆ
l∗
b , w
∗
m, φ
∗) = argmax
θˆhb ,θˆ
l
b,wm,φ
pVb
(
θˆhb , wm, φ | θmh , wb
)
+ (1− p)Vb
(
θˆlb, wm, φ | θml , wb
)
(2.5.1)
subject to
(θˆim, e
i,∆i) = argmax
θˆm,e,∆
Vm(θˆm, e,∆ | θi, wm, φ) for i = h, l
(2.5.1.a)
θˆim = θ
m
i for i = h, l (2.5.1.b)
um(θˆm, ∆ˆ) ≥ mm(θˆm, ∆ˆ) ≥ dm(θˆm, ∆ˆ) ≥ 0, (2.5.1.c)
θˆi
∗
b = θˆ
b
i for i = h, l (2.5.2)
ub(θˆ
m
b , ∆ˆ, σm) ≥ mb(θˆmb , ∆ˆ, σm) ≥ db(θˆmb , ∆ˆ, σm) ≥ 0 (2.5.3)
where, for i = h, l,
Vm
(
θˆm, e,∆ | θi, wm, φ
)
=
(
1
3
+ θie+ ∆
)
um(θˆm, ∆ˆ) +
(
1
3
− 2∆
)
mm(θˆm, ∆ˆ)
+
(
1
3
− θie+ ∆
)
dm(θˆm, ∆ˆ)− γme
2
2
, (2.6)
for ∆ˆ =
{
∆ˆs if ∆ = ∆s and φ(θ
m
i ) = t
∆ˆ0 otherwise,
Vb
(
θˆib, wm, φ | θmi , wb
)
=
(
1
3
+ θie
i + ∆i
)
ub
(
θˆib, ∆ˆ, σm
)
+
(
1
3
− 2∆i
)
mb
(
θˆib, ∆ˆ, σm
)
+
(
1
3
− θiei + ∆i
)
db
(
θˆib, ∆ˆ, σm
)
(2.7)
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and
Vs
(
wb | θˆbi
)
=
(
1
3
+ θie
i + ∆i
)
[ru − ub
(
θˆbi , ∆ˆ, σm
)
− um(θmi , ∆ˆ)]
+
(
1
3
− 2∆i
)
[rm −mb
(
θˆbi , ∆ˆ, σm
)
−mm(θmi , ∆ˆ)]
+
(
1
3
− θiei + ∆i
)
[rd − db
(
θˆbi , ∆ˆ, σm
)
− dm(θmi , ∆ˆ)]. (2.8)
for σm = wm(θ
m
i , ∆ˆ, r˜) and ∆ˆ =
{
∆ˆs if ∆
i = ∆s and φ(θ
m
i ) = t
∆ˆ0 otherwise.
Constraints (2.5.1)-(2.5.1.c) are the board’s incentive compatibility con-
straints relative to its choice of messages, managerial compensation and dis-
closure commitment (θˆhb , θˆ
l
b, wm, φ), respectively. In particular, the board’s
choice of (θˆhb , θˆ
l
b, wm, φ) maximizes its expected compensation taking into ac-
count managerial incentives. Specifically, (2.5.1.a) ensures that the manager’s
choices of message and actions (θˆm, e,∆) are incentive compatible, (2.5.1.b)
imposes truth-telling on managerial messages and (2.5.1.c) states that manage-
rial compensation contracts must be a non-decreasing function of firm output
and subject to managerial limited liability. Constraint (2.5.2) corresponds to
the board’s truth-telling constraints and (2.5.3) states that board compen-
sation contracts must also be a non-decreasing function of firm output and
subject to limited liability.
The following lemma states the optimal compensation of the unin-
formed board:
Lemma 2.3.1. The optimal compensation for uninformed board corresponds
to wU∗b (θˆ
m
b , ∆ˆ, σm, r˜) = (0, 0, 0) for any (θˆ
m
b , ∆ˆ, σm).
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Lemma 2.3.1 states that the uninformed board pay is independent of the
firm’s cash flows r˜. This feature, which greatly simplifies the analysis, implies
that to the extent that shareholders do not want to induce board monitoring on
θ, the board will act as a surrogate of the shareholders and will not be exposed
to any other agency problem. In particular, the board will truthfully report θˆm,
make a commitment φU∗(θˆm) = t and offer the managerial compensation wU∗m
most desired by shareholders.22 Lemma 2.3.1 also implies that the sequence of
mechanism design problems that characterizes the shareholders’ problem can
be rewritten as a simple mechanism design problem.
In particular, this simpler problem can be described as one in which
shareholders (who can observe ∆) designs managerial compensation
w′m(θˆm, r˜) = {u′m(θˆm),m′m(θˆm), d′m(θˆm)}
and commits to impose a risk choice ∆(θˆm) ∈ {∆0,∆s} as a function of the
manager’s message θˆm. Formally, the shareholders’ problem can be rewritten
as:
22While in this solution the board is indifferent in communicating its private
information to shareholders, it is immediate to obtain a scheme in which the
board strictly prefers such communications. For instance, wU∗b (θˆ
m
b , ∆ˆ0, σ
h
m) =
{, 2 , 0} if (θˆmb , ∆ˆ, σm) = (θˆbh, ∆ˆ0, σhm)
{′ , ′ , ′} if (θˆmb , ∆ˆ, σm) = (θˆbl , ∆ˆ0, σlm)
{0, 0, 0} otherwise,
for , ′ ' 0 where σjm (j = h, l) corresponds to the managerial compensation that share-
holders desire to offer to the manager who reports θmj .
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max
w′m,∆
pVs
(
w
′
m,∆ | θmh
)
+ (1− p)Vs
(
w
′
m,∆ | θml
)
(2.9)
subject to
(θˆim, e
i) = argmax
θˆm,e
Vm
(
θˆm, e | θi, w′m
)
for i = h, l (2.9.1)
θˆim = θ
m
i for i = h, l (2.9.2)
u
′
m(θˆm) ≥ m
′
m(θˆm) ≥ d
′
m(θˆm) ≥ 0 (2.9.3)
where, for i=h,l
Vs
(
w
′
m,∆ | θmi
)
=
(
1
3
+ θie
i + ∆(θmi )
)[
ru − u′m(θmi )
]
+
(
1
3
− 2∆(θmi )
)[
rm −m′m(θmi )
]
+
(
1
3
− θiei + ∆(θmi )
)[
rd − d′m(θmi )
]
(2.10)
and for j=h,l
Vm
(
θˆm, e | θi, w′m
)
=
(
1
3
+ θie+ ∆(θˆm)
)
u
′
m(θˆm) +
(
1
3
− 2∆(θˆm)
)
m
′
m(θˆm)
+
(
1
3
− θie+ ∆(θˆm)
)
d
′
m(θˆm)−
γme
2
2
. (2.11)
To solve the problem, consider first the manager’s optimization prob-
lem stated in (2.9.1). Given a menu of managerial compensation w
′
m(θˆm, r˜),
managerial effort depends on the managerial message θˆm since such a message
determines the relation between managerial compensation and the firm’s cash
flows. In particular, managerial effort denoted as e(θˆm | θi, w′m) solves the first
order condition of (2.11) and can be characterized as follows:23
23The use of first order approach is valid in this setting since the manager’s maximization
problem in (2.9.1) has a unique global maximum with respect to e (Grossman and Hart
1983).
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Lemma 2.3.2. A manager who observes θi (i = h, l) and receives a menu of
compensation contracts w′m(θˆm, r˜) exerts effort
e(θˆm | θi, w′m) =
θi
[
u′m
(
θˆm
)
− d′m
(
θˆm
)]
γm
. (2.12)
Lemma 2.3.2 shows that the manager chooses higher effort as (i) the
difference u′m(θˆm) − d′m(θˆm) increases, (ii) the project’s type θ is higher and
(iii) the effort is less costly to the manager (γm decreases). By (2.12), I can
substitute e(θmi | θi, w′m) into ei which corresponds to the optimal managerial
effort choice for θi.
Proposition 2.3.3 summarizes the solution of the shareholders’ problem:
Proposition 2.3.3. In the uninformed board case: (i) the board receives flat
compensation wU∗b = (0, 0, 0) and truthfully reports managerial risk choices,
i.e., φU∗(θˆm) = t and (ii) the manager receives the following compensation
contract:
wU∗m (θˆm, ∆ˆ, r˜) =
{(
ru−rd
2
− γm
6(pθ2h+(1−p)θ2l )
, 0, 0
)
if (θˆm, ∆ˆ) = (θ
m
h , ∆ˆ0), (θ
m
l , ∆ˆ0)
(0, 0, 0) otherwise.
Proposition 2.3.3 shows that shareholders induce the board to prevent
the manager’s choice of ∆s which would decrease shareholder value by increas-
ing the expected value of managerial compensation without increasing the ex-
pected value of the project. Proposition 2.3.3 also shows that the optimal
managerial compensation ignores the information provided in the managerial
message, i.e., it is a pooling contract with respect to θ. While separating com-
pensation contracts (i.e., contracts that depend on the managerial message)
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would induce the manager to choose higher effort when he observes θ = θh,
these contracts should inefficiently compensate the manager who observe θl
when rm or rd is realized. In particular, the manager reveals θ = θl only if the
expected compensation from truthfully reporting θml is as large as the alterna-
tive compensation that corresponds to θmh . Intuitively, for any separating con-
tract that satisfies the manager’s truth-telling constraints, shareholders find it
more beneficial to withdraw the managerial compensation that corresponds to
θml and alternately offer the managerial compensation that corresponds to θ
m
h
as a pooling contract since this alternative contract induces higher managerial
effort while providing the manager with truth-telling incentives.
2.4 Model analysis (II): Informed board
The informed board case considers the case in which shareholders design
board compensation wb to induce board monitoring on θ before the board
chooses (wm, φ). In what follows, I denote the sequence of optimal mechanisms
chosen by shareholders and the board as M I∗ ≡ {wI∗b , (wI∗m , φI∗)}. Three
features of the problem simplify the analysis. First, the board’s mechanism
design problem is simplified since board’s monitoring incorporates θ to the
board’s information set. Thus, if the board does not monitor θ, managerial
disclosures of private information about θ can affect board choices while if
the board monitors, such managerial disclosures will have no effect on board
choices. Second, the search of M I∗ can be limited to the set of truth-telling
mechanisms (on the equilibrium path) in which: (i) the board induces the
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manager to send a message θˆm ∈ {θml , θmh } that thuthfully reveals θ (when the
board is uninformed about θ); (ii) shareholders induce the informed board to
send a message θˆb ∈ {θbl , θbh} which truthfully reveals its information about
θ.24
Therefore, the sequence of optimal mechanisms chosen by shareholders
and the board can be described by the triple
M I∗ =
[
w∗b (θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm, r˜),
(
wI∗m (∆ˆ, r˜), φ
I∗
)
,
(
wo∗m (θˆm, ∆ˆ, r˜), φ
o∗(θˆm)
)]
where:
1. w∗b (θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm, r˜) ≡ {u∗b(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm),m∗b(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm), d∗b(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm)} describes
the optimal board compensation.
2.
(
wI∗m (∆ˆ, r˜), φ
I∗) ≡ ({uI∗m (∆ˆ),mI∗m (∆ˆ), dI∗m (∆ˆ)}, φI∗) describes the optimal
board’s choices (on-the-equilibrium path) when the board monitors θ.
3.
(
wo∗m (θˆm, ∆ˆ, r˜), φ
o∗(θˆm)
) ≡ ({uo∗m(θˆm, ∆ˆ),mo∗m(θˆm, ∆ˆ), do∗m(θˆm, ∆ˆ)}, φo∗(θˆm))
describes the off-equilibrium path board’s choices (i.e., choices taken if
the board does not monitor θ).
Shareholders’ problem consists of a nested sequence of optimization
24Without loss of generality I consider the case in which M I∗ does not induce the unin-
formed board to admit that it is uninformed. On the equilibrium path, M I∗ lead to the
same compensation contracts with the optimal truth-telling mechanisms that induce the
uninformed board to truthfully report about its information status, i.e., report θˆb = θ¯
b and
θˆmb = θˆ
b
i (i = h, l) when it receives θˆm = θ
m
i .
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problems:
max
wb
pVs
(
wb | θbh
)
+ (1− p)Vs
(
wb | θbl
)
(2.13)
subject to
(θˆiib, w
i
m, φ
i) = argmax
θˆb,wm,φ
Vib
(
θˆb, wm, φ | θi, wb
)
for i = h, l (2.13.1)
s.t. (ei,∆i) = argmax
e,∆
Vm(e,∆ | θi, wm, φ) for i = h, l (2.13.1.a)
um(∆ˆ) ≥ mm(∆ˆ) ≥ dm(∆ˆ) ≥ 0, (2.13.1.b)
(θˆhub, θˆ
l
ub, w
o
m, φ
o)
= argmax
θˆhb ,θˆ
l
b,wm,φ
pVub
(
θˆhb , wm, φ | θmh , wb
)
+ (1− p)Vub
(
θˆlb, wm, φ | θml , wb
)
(2.13.2)
s.t. (θˆi
o
m, e
io ,∆i
o
) = argmax
θˆm,e,∆
V om(θˆm, e,∆ | θi, wm, φ) for i = h, l
(2.13.2.a)
θˆi
o
m = θ
m
i for i = h, l (2.13.2.b)
um(θˆm, ∆ˆ) ≥ mm(θˆm, ∆ˆ) ≥ dm(θˆm, ∆ˆ) ≥ 0, (2.13.2.c)
pVib(θˆ
h
ib, w
h
m, φ
h | θh, wb) + (1− p)Vib(θˆlib, wlm, φl | θl, wb)− γb
≥ pVub
(
θˆhub, w
o
m, φ
o | θmh , wb
)
+ (1− p)Vub
(
θˆlub, w
o
m, φ
o | θml , wb
)
(2.13.3)
θˆiib = θ
b
i for i = h, l (2.13.4)
ub(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm) ≥ mb(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm) ≥ db(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm) ≥ 0, (2.13.5)
where
Vm (e,∆ | θi, wm, φ)
=
(
1
3
+ θie+ ∆
)
um(∆ˆ) +
(
1
3
− 2∆
)
mm(∆ˆ) +
(
1
3
− θie+ ∆
)
dm(∆ˆ)− γme
2
2
, (2.14)
for ∆ˆ =
{
∆ˆs if ∆ = ∆s and φ = t
∆ˆ0 otherwise,
V om(θˆm, e,∆ | θi, wm, φ) and Vub
(
θˆib, wm, φ | θmi , wb
)
are defined in (2.6) and (2.7), respec-
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tively,
Vib
(
θˆb, wm, φ | θi, wb
)
=
(
1
3
+ θie
i + ∆i
)
ub
(
θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm
)
+
(
1
3
− 2∆i
)
mb
(
θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm
)
+
(
1
3
− θiei + ∆i
)
db
(
θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm
)
, (2.15)
and
Vs
(
wb | θbi
)
=
(
1
3
+ θie
i + ∆i
)[
ru − ub
(
θbi , ∆ˆ, σm
)
− uim(∆ˆ)
]
+
(
1
3
− 2∆i
)[
rm −mb
(
θbi , ∆ˆ, σm
)
−mim(∆ˆ)
]
+
(
1
3
− θiei + ∆i
)[
rd − db
(
θbi , ∆ˆ, σm
)
− dim(∆ˆ)
]
(2.16)
for σm = {uim(∆ˆ),mim(∆ˆ), dim(∆ˆ)} and ∆ˆ =
{
∆ˆs if ∆
i = ∆s and φ
i = t
∆ˆ0 otherwise.
Constraints (2.13.1)-(2.13.1.b) are incentive compatibility constraints
relative to the informed board’s choices (θˆb, w
I
m, φ
I) and (2.13.2)-(2.13.2.c)
are the incentive compatibility constraints relative to the uninformed board’s
choices (θˆb, w
o
m, φ
o). Notice that the optimization problems of the informed
and uninformed board differ on the reliance on the managerial message θˆm.
Specifically, the informed board only takes into account the effect of its choice
on the managerial actions (e,∆) specified in (2.13.1.a) but does not rely on
the managerial message. In contrast, the uninformed board takes into account
how its choices affect not only managerial actions (e,∆) but also the manage-
rial message θˆm. Furthermore, (2.13.2.a) ensures that the managerial choice
of message and actions (θˆm, e,∆) is incentive compatible and (2.13.2.b) that
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the managerial message is truthful. Constraints (2.13.1.b) and (2.13.2.c) state
that managerial compensation contracts must be a non-decreasing function of
firm output and subject to managerial limited liability. Analogously, (2.13.3)
is the board monitoring incentive compatibility, (2.13.4) is the truth-telling
constraint of the informed board and (2.13.5) limits board compensation con-
tracts to be a non-decreasing function of firm output and subject to limited
liability. The following lemma simplifies the analysis:
Lemma 2.4.1. Without loss of generality, the search of optimal board com-
pensation can be limited to contracts which specify managerial compensation(
σhm, σ
l
m
)
=
(
(uhm,m
h
m, d
h
m), (u
l
m,m
l
m, d
l
m)
)
and the board’s reports
(
∆ˆh, ∆ˆl
)
∈(
{∆ˆ0, ∆ˆs}, {∆ˆ0, ∆ˆs}
)
that lead to non-zero board pay as follows:
wb(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm, r˜) =

(
uhb ,m
h
b , d
h
b
)
if (θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm) = (θ
h
b , ∆ˆ
h, σhm)(
ulb,m
l
b, d
l
b
)
if (θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm) = (θ
l
b, ∆ˆ
l, σlm)
(0, 0, 0) otherwise,
Lemma 2.4.1 implies that the search of optimal board compensation
can be limited to contracts that award non-zero pay only to when the board’s
message θˆib is in line with the board’s choices (∆ˆ
i, σim), for i = h, l. As an
example, consider a case in which lemma 2.4.1 limits non-zero board com-
pensations to situations in which ∆ˆh = ∆ˆs, ∆ˆ
l = ∆ˆ0, σ
h
m = (100, 0, 0) and
σlm = (50, 0, 0). In this case the board would be compensated only when:
(i) it reports to shareholders θˆb = θ
b
h, provides evidence ∆ˆ = ∆ˆs and awards
managerial compensation σhm = (100, 0, 0); or (ii) it reports θˆb = θ
b
l , provides
evidence ∆ˆ = ∆ˆ0 and awards managerial compensation σ
l
m = (50, 0, 0).
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By virtue of lemma 2.4.1, I limit the search of the optimal mechanism
M I∗ to those mechanisms that include board compensation contracts of the
form described in lemma 2.4.1. More specifically, I proceed by first charac-
terizing the informed board choices (wim, φ
i) for i = h, l and the uninformed
board choices (wom, φ
o) and then solving for the optimal board compensation
wI∗b among those that induce the board to become informed i.e., to monitor θ.
2.4.1 Board’s choices and managerial actions
2.4.1.1 Informed board’s choices
Consider the informed board’s choice of (wIm, φ
I) and the associated
managerial choices (e,∆). Lemma 2.4.1 shows that when the board sends a
message to shareholders θˆh (resp. θˆl), the board must report to shareholders
∆ˆh (resp. ∆ˆl) and award managerial compensation σhm (resp. σ
l
m) in order to
receive a non-zero pay. Thus, I can search the informed board’s optimal choice
of wIm within the following forms of contracts:
Lemma 2.4.2. An informed board that reports to shareholders θˆb = θ
b
j for
j ∈ {h, l} offers the manager:
wIm(∆ˆ, r˜) =
{
σjm = (u
j
m,m
j
m, d
j
m) if ∆ˆ = ∆ˆ
j
(0, 0, 0) otherwise,
where (θbj , ∆ˆ
j, σjm) is the board’s choice that makes board compensation non-
zero as stated in Lemma 2.4.1.
Now consider the informed board’s choice of φI . The disclosure com-
mitment φI affects the managerial choice of ∆ which in turn affects the board’s
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report ∆ˆ. Since, as shown in lemma 2.4.1, the board receives non-zero com-
pensation only when ∆ˆ is consistent with θˆb, the board’s decision on φ
I is
affected by its message choice θˆb. Thus, I define φ
I
j (j = h, l) as the informed
board’s optimal disclosure commitment when it chooses θˆb = θ
b
j . To solve for
φIj , I consider the two mutually exclusive cases in which ∆ˆ
j = ∆ˆs (i.e., the
board should report to shareholders ∆ˆs to receive non-zero pay) or ∆ˆ
j = ∆ˆ0
(i.e., the board should report ∆ˆ0 to receive non-zero pay).
If ∆ˆj = ∆ˆs, the board induces the manager to choose ∆s since ∆0
makes it impossible for the board to report ∆ˆs. To induce ∆s, the board
commits to a truthful report φIj = t (i.e., to report ∆ˆ0 only when the manager
indeed chooses ∆0) and offers the managerial compensation as characterized
in lemma 2.4.2, i.e., the manager receives non-zero compensation only when
he chooses ∆s.
If ∆ˆj = ∆ˆ0, lemma 2.4.2 implies that the board offers managerial com-
pensation wIm(∆ˆ0, r˜) = (u
j
m,m
j
m, d
j
m) and w
I
m(∆ˆs, r˜) = (0, 0, 0). While the
board can report ∆ˆ0 for any managerial choice of ∆ ∈ {∆0,∆s}, it still needs to
design managerial compensation to induce the manager to choose the desirable
alternative of ∆. In particular, when ujm +d
j
m ≤ 2mjm, the risky choice ∆s vis-
-vis ∆0 decreases the expected value of managerial compensation w
I
m(∆ˆ0, r˜).
Furthermore, since the board cannot falsely report ∆ˆs, the manager chooses
∆0 for any φ
I
j . Alternatively, if u
j
m + d
j
m > 2m
j
m, the manager prefers ∆s and
will chooses it when the board commits to falsely reporting ∆ˆ0, i.e., φj = f .
Therefore, φIj can be used by the board to affect the managerial choice ∆.
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Specifically, if the board compensation wb(θ
b
j , ∆ˆ
j, σjm, r˜) = (u
j
b,m
j
b, d
j
b) satisfies
ujb+d
j
b > 2m
j
b, the board also prefers the managerial choice of ∆s and therefore
commits to a false report φIj = f . Otherwise, the board induces the manager
to choose ∆0 by committing to a truthful report φ
I
j = t. The following lemma
characterize the optimal disclosure commitment:
Proposition 2.4.3. When the informed board sends message to shareholders
θˆb = θ
b
j (j = h, l), its optimal disclosure commitment
φIj =

t if (i) ∆ˆj = ∆ˆs or (ii) ∆ˆ
j = ∆ˆ0, C
j
m > 0 and C
j
b ≤ 0
f if ∆ˆj = ∆ˆ0, C
j
m > 0 and C
j
b > 0
∈ {t, f} otherwise
where Cjm ≡ ujm + djm − 2mjm for managerial compensation wIm(∆ˆj, r˜) =
(ujm,m
j
m, d
j
m) and C
j
b ≡ ujb+djb−2mjb for board compensation wb(θbj , ∆ˆj, σjm, r˜) =
(ujb,m
j
b, d
j
b), respectively.
Proposition 2.4.3 shows that the board does not truthfully report about
the manager’s choice of ∆s when ∆ˆ
j = ∆ˆ0 and both C
j
m and C
j
b are strictly
positive. Notice that Cjm (resp. C
j
b ) measures the convexity of managerial com-
pensation (ujm,m
j
m, d
j
m) (resp. board compensation (u
j
b,m
j
b, d
j
b)) since, when
Cjm > 0 (resp. C
j
b > 0), the risky choice ∆s increases the expected value of
(ujm,m
j
m, d
j
m) (resp. (u
j
m,m
j
m, d
j
m)) relative to the risk-free choice ∆0. Thus,
proposition 2.4.3 captures the insight that a simultaneous award of convex
compensation to the board and the manager can foster their collusive behav-
ior at the expense of shareholders. Specifically, such a compensation structure
induces the manager to choose ∆s while providing incentives to the board to
81
falsely report to shareholders ∆ˆ0. Proposition 2.4.3 also suggests the following
corollary with respect to the manager’s optimal risk choice ∆j.
Corollary 2.4.4. When the informed board sends a message to shareholders
θˆb = θ
b
j (j = h, l), it induces the manager to choose ∆
j = ∆0 if and only if (i)
∆ˆj = ∆0 and (ii) C
j
m ≤ 0 or Cjb ≤ 0.
Now consider the manager’s effort choice induced by the informed
board. When the board learns θ = θi (i = h, l) and reports to sharehold-
ers θbj , it induces the managerial effort choice e
i,j which solves the first order
condition of (2.13.1.a) and can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 2.4.5. When the board learns θ = θi and reports to sharehold-
ers θbj, the corresponding managerial compensation σ
j
m induces the managerial
effort
ei,j =
θi(u
j
m − djm)
γm
. (2.17)
From corollary 2.4.4 and proposition 2.4.5 it follows that the informed
board’s expected compensation that corresponds to the project’s type θi and
the message choice θbj can be written as
V i,jb (wb) =
(
1
3
+ θie
i,j + ∆j
)
ujb +
(
1
3
− 2∆j
)
mjb +
(
1
3
− θhei,j + ∆j
)
djb.
(2.18)
2.4.1.2 Uninformed board’s choices
To complete the analysis of the informed board actions it is necessary
to describe what choice would be made by a board that remains uninformed. I
82
refer to these off-equilibrium path choices as (wom, φ
o). As in the choice of the
informed board, the uninformed board’s choice of wom crucially hinges on the
form of board compensation contracts stated in lemma 2.4.1. That is, when
the board sends a message to shareholders θˆh (resp. θˆl), the board should
report to shareholders ∆ˆh (resp. ∆ˆl) and award managerial compensation σhm
(resp. σlm) in order to receive a non-zero pay. Furthermore, in contrast to the
informed board, the uninformed board chooses (wom, φ
o) to induce the manager
to send a message θˆm that truthfully reveals managerial private information
about θ and after receiving θˆm the uninformed board subsequently sends a
message to shareholders θˆb. To facilitate the presentation, I define (θˆ
h
ub, θˆ
l
ub) ∈
({θbh, θbl }, {θbh, θbl }) as the uninformed board’s message choice when it receives
a managerial message θˆm = θ
m
h and θ
m
l , respectively.
25
In what follows, I solve the shareholders’ problem by assuming that
the uninformed board’s optimal message choice does not depend on the man-
agerial message, i.e., θˆhub = θˆ
l
ub ≡ θˆub and after solving the problem, check
the conditions in which this assumption indeed holds.26 Lemma 2.4.1 implies
that under this assumption the uninformed board receives non-zero pay only
when
(
θˆub, ∆ˆ, w
o
m(θ
i
m, ∆ˆ, r˜)
)
=
(
θbh, ∆ˆ
h, σhm
)
or
(
θbl , ∆ˆ
l, σlm
)
for i = h, l and
therefore the search of optimal wom can be limited to the following forms of
25For instance, (θˆhub, θˆ
l
ub) = (θ
b
h, θ
b
l ) refers to the case in which the board reports to
shareholders θbh (resp. θ
b
l ) when it receives managerial message θˆm = θ
m
h (resp. θ
m
l ).
26As it turns out, this assumption holds in relaxed conditions, and furthermore, the
optimal mechanisms obtained under this assumption illustrate the main insights without
loss of generality.
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contracts:
Lemma 2.4.6. An uninformed board that reports to shareholders θˆub = θ
b
j for
j ∈ {h, l} offers the manager:
wom(θˆm, ∆ˆ, r˜) =
{
σjm = (u
j
m,m
j
m, d
j
m) if (θˆm, ∆ˆ) = (θ
m
h , ∆ˆ
j) or (θml , ∆ˆ
j)
(0, 0, 0) otherwise,
where (θbh, ∆ˆ
h, σhm) and (θ
b
l , ∆ˆ
l, σlm) are the board’s choices that make the board
compensation non-zero as stated in Lemma 2.4.1.
With respect to the uninformed board’s disclosure commitment φo(θˆm),
in contrast to the informed board, the uninformed board chooses φo(θˆm) taking
into account its effect not only on the managerial choice of ∆ but also on the
managerial message choice θˆm. In particular, the optimal φ
o should induce the
manager’s truthful report about θ.27 Moreover, since the project’s type θ does
not affect the managerial choice of ∆, the optimal φo needs not be contingent
upon θˆm and can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 2.4.7. When the uninformed board reports to shareholders θˆub =
θbj for j ∈ {h, l}, its optimal disclosure commitment is as follows:
φo(θˆmh ) = φ
o(θˆml ) =

t if (i) ∆ˆj = ∆ˆs or
(ii) ∆ˆj = ∆ˆ0, C
j
m > 0 and C
j
b ≤ 0
f if ∆ˆj = ∆ˆ0, C
j
m > 0 and C
j
b > 0
∈ {t, f} otherwise
27As stated in lemma 2.4.6, the optimal wom chosen by the uninformed board is not
contingent on θˆm.
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where Cjm ≡ ujm+djm−2mjm corresponds to the convexity of managerial compen-
sation wom(θˆ
m
h , ∆ˆ
j, r˜) = wom(θˆ
m
l , ∆ˆ
j, r˜) = (ujm,m
j
m, d
j
m) and C
j
b ≡ ujb + djb− 2mjb
to the convexity of board compensation wb(θ
b
j , ∆ˆ
j, σjm, r˜) = (u
j
b,m
j
b, d
j
b), respec-
tively.
Proposition 2.4.7 is analogous to the informed board’s optimal commit-
ment stated in proposition 2.4.3. As before, the uninformed board commits
to the manager to falsely reporting ∆ˆ when both managerial compensation
and board compensation are convex (i.e., Cjm > 0 and C
j
b > 0 for j = h, l)
and shareholders induce the board to report ∆ˆ0. The following corollary is
immediate:
Corollary 2.4.8. When the informed board sends a message to shareholders
θˆub = θ
b
j (j = h, l), it induces the manager to choose ∆
j = ∆0 if and only if
(i) ∆ˆj = ∆0 and (ii) C
j
m ≤ 0 or Cjb ≤ 0.
Finally, consider the managerial effort choice induced by the unin-
formed board. The uninformed board offers the manager (wom, φ
o) which is
not contingent upon the managerial message θˆm and, thus, which induces the
manager to truthfully report about θ = θi (i = h, l), i.e., θˆm = θ
m
i . Therefore,
when the uninformed board receives θˆm = θ
m
i and subsequently reports to
shareholders θˆiub = θ
b
j (j = h, l), the corresponding managerial compensation
σjm induces the managerial effort choice as follows:
Proposition 2.4.9. When the uninformed board receives θmi for i ∈ {h, l}
and subsequently reports to shareholders θbj for j ∈ {h, l}, the corresponding
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managerial compensation σjm induces the managerial effort
ei,j =
θi(u
j
m − djm)
γm
. (2.19)
Corollary 2.4.8 and proposition 2.4.9 imply that when the uninformed
board receives θˆm = θ
m
i (i = h, l) and reports to shareholders θˆm = θ
b
j (j =
h, l), the managerial actions (e,∆) induced by the uninformed board equals the
managerial actions induced by the informed board who learns θi and reports
to shareholders θbj , and thus, the uninformed board’s expected compensation
corresponds to V i,jb defined in (2.18).
2.4.2 Optimal mechanism M I∗
The shareholders’ problem can be simplified by using the board’s op-
timal choices and the associated managerial actions characterized in section
2.4.1.1 and 2.4.1.2. First, I can rewrite the board’s truth-telling constraint
(2.13.4) as follows:
V h,hb (wb) ≥ V h,lb (wb) (2.20)
V l,lb (wb) ≥ V l,hb (wb), (2.21)
where V i,jb defined in (2.18). Second, the board’s expected compensation from
reporting θˆub = θ
j
b (j ∈ {h, l}) without monitoring θ is pV h,jb (wb) + (1 −
p)V l,jb (wb) while its expected compensation from monitoring and truthfully re-
porting θ is pV h,hb (wb)+(1−p)V l,lb (wb). Thus, the board’s monitoring incentive
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compatibility condition (2.13.3) can be rewritten as:
pV h,hb (wb) + (1− p)V l,lb (wb)− γb ≥ pV h,hb (wb) + (1− p)V l,hb (wb) (2.22)
pV h,hb (wb) + (1− p)V l,lb (wb)− γb ≥ pV h,lb (wb) + (1− p)V l,lb (wb). (2.23)
Notice that (2.20) and (2.21) are necessary conditions for (2.23) and
(2.22), respectively. In other words, any board compensation that induces the
board to monitor θ will always induce the board to truthfully reveal θ after
monitoring. Using the board compensation arrangements specified in lemma
2.4.1 and the associated managerial actions (e,∆) characterized in corollary
2.4.4 and proposition 2.4.5, the shareholders’ problem can be written as:
max
σhb ,σ
l
b,σ
h
m,
σlm,∆ˆ
h,∆ˆl
p
[(
1
3
+ eh,h + ∆h
)
uhs +
(
1
3
− 2∆h
)
mhs +
(
1
3
− el,l + ∆h
)
dhs
]
+ (1− p)
[(
1
3
+ el,l + ∆l
)
uls +
(
1
3
− 2∆l
)
mls +
(
1
3
− el,l + ∆l
)
dls
]
(2.24)
subject to(
1
3
+ el,l + ∆h
)
ulb +
(
1
3
− 2∆l
)
mlb +
(
1
3
− el,l + ∆l
)
dlb −
γb
1− p
≥
(
1
3
+ el,h + ∆l
)
uhb +
(
1
3
− 2∆h
)
mhb +
(
1
3
− el,h + ∆h
)
dhb (2.25)(
1
3
+ eh,h + ∆h
)
uhb +
(
1
3
− 2∆h
)
mhb +
(
1
3
− eh,h + ∆h
)
dhb −
γb
p
≥
(
1
3
+ eh,l + ∆l
)
ulb +
(
1
3
− 2∆l
)
mlb +
(
1
3
− eh,l + ∆l
)
dlb (2.26)
uib ≥ mib ≥ dib ≥ 0 for i = h, l (2.27)
uim ≥ mim ≥ dim ≥ 0 for i = h, l (2.28)
where
1. σim = (u
i
m,m
i
m, d
i
m): managerial compensation that shareholders induce
87
the board to offer when the board sends a message θˆb = θ
b
i for i = h, l.
2. ∆ˆi: the alternative of ∆ˆ that shareholders induce the board to report
when the board reports θˆb = θ
b
i for i = h, l.
3. σib = (u
i
b,m
i
b, d
i
b): board compensation when the board chooses
(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm) = (θ
b
i , ∆ˆ
i, σim) for i = h, l.
4. ei,j =
θ2i (u
j
m−djm)
γm
: the managerial choice of e when the project type is
θ = θi and the board reports θˆb = θ
b
j for i, j = h, l.
5. ∆i =

∆0 if (i) ∆ˆ
i = ∆0 and u
i
m + d
i
m − 2mim < 0
or (ii)∆ˆi = ∆0 and u
i
b + d
i
b − 2mib < 0
∆s otherwise
corresponds to the managerial choice of ∆ induced by the board when
the board reports θˆb = θ
b
i for i = h, l.
Constraints (2.25) and (2.26) are derived from the board’s monitoring
incentive compatibility constraints (2.22) and (2.23), respectively. Constraints
(2.27) and (2.28) ensure that both managerial and board compensation are
non-decreasing function of firm’s cash flows and subject to the limited liability.
The optimal board and managerial compensation that solve the shareholders’
problem is characterized as follows:
Proposition 2.4.10. The optimal board and managerial compensation con-
tracts are formed as
[
σl
∗
b , σ
l∗
m
]
=
[(
f l
∗
b , f
l∗
b , f
l∗
b
)
,
(
ul
∗
m, 0, 0
)]
. Furthermore, de-
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pending on parameter values, three cases can arise with respect to
[
σh
∗
b , σ
h∗
m
]
:
Case 1: [σh
∗
b , σ
h∗
m ] = [(u
h∗
b , 0, 0), (u
h∗
m , 0, 0)]
Case 2: [σh
∗
b , σ
h∗
m ] = [(u
h∗
b ,
uh
∗
b
2
, 0), (uh
∗
m , 0, 0)]
Case 3: [σh
∗
b , σ
h∗
m ] = [(u
h∗
b , 0, 0), (u
h∗
m ,
uh
∗
m
2
, 0)].
Proposition 2.4.10 shows three key features of the optimal board and
managerial compensation. First, the optimal board compensation σh
∗
b and σ
l∗
b
exhibit contrasting forms: while σh
∗
b corresponds to a performance-based pay,
i.e., an increasing function of the firm’s cash flows, σl
∗
b corresponds to a fixed
wage. These contrasting forms of contracts provide the board’s incentives to
monitor θ. Specifically, relative to the project with θ = θl, the project with
θ = θh is more likely to yield r
u and less likely to yield rd. Therefore, in the
absence of the constraint (2.27), the optimal board compensation that induces
the board’s monitoring on θ consists of σhb which compensates only for the
realization of ru and σlb which compensates only for r
d. While (2.27) ensures
that σl
∗
b corresponds to a fixed wage rather than a decreasing function of the
firm’s cash flows, the constraint does not change the main insight that the
optimal board compensation awards the board with higher performance-based
compensation when the board reports θˆb = θ
b
h.
Second, proposition 2.4.10 shows that the optimal managerial compen-
sation σh
∗
m and σ
l∗
m feature a performance-based pay structure. Intuitively,
shareholders induce the board to offer the minimum managerial compensation
which induces certain managerial choices of (e,∆). As shown in proposition
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2.4.5, to induce the managerial effort, optimal managerial compensation σi
∗
m
(i = h, l) should feature that ui
∗
m − di∗m > 0.
Finally, proposition 2.4.10 states that depending on the parameter val-
ues, the optimal board and managerial compensation that corresponds to the
board’s message θbh, i.e.,
[
σh
∗
b , σ
h∗
m
]
has different forms. Intuitively, the optimal
form of
[
σh
∗
b , σ
h∗
m
]
is related to the optimal managerial risk choice ∆h
∗
. While
the convex compensation σh
∗
b = (u
h∗
b , 0, 0) and σ
h∗
m = (u
h∗
m , 0, 0) provide board
incentives to monitor θ and managerial incentives to put effort, respectively,
the simultaneous award of convex compensation induces the managerial choice
of ∆s. Specifically, corollary 2.4.4 states that to induce the managerial choice
∆h
∗
= ∆0, either σ
h∗
m or σ
h∗
b should feature a (weakly) negative convexity, i.e.,
uh
∗
m + d
h∗
m − 2mh∗m ≤ 0 or uh∗b + dh∗b − 2mh∗b ≤ 0. Since the compensation for rm
does not affect the managerial effort choice or the board’s monitoring on θ, the
optimal compensation structure that induces the managerial choice ∆h
∗
= ∆0
should compensate the board or the manager for rm just enough to make σ
h∗
b
or σh
∗
m , but not both, exhibit zero convexity.
It is noteworthy that by contrast
[
σl
∗
b , σ
l∗
m
]
exhibits a fixed wage and
convex compensation, respectively, since the fixed wage induces the board to
monitor and truthfully reveal the managerial choice of ∆s. From these ob-
servations, the following corollary which characterizes the optimal managerial
risk choice
(
∆h
∗
,∆l
∗)
is immediate.
Corollary 2.4.11. The optimal managerial risk choice
(
∆h
∗
,∆l
∗)
= (∆s,∆0)
in case 1 and (∆0,∆0) in other cases.
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For the future reference, I refer to case 1 as speculation case since the
manager optimally chooses ∆s when the board reports θ
h
b , case 2 as disci-
plinary board case since non-convex board compensation σh
∗
b = (u
h∗
b , u
h∗
b /2, 0)
provides the board with incentives to induce the managerial choice ∆h = ∆0
and case 3 as contracting board case since in this case the board plays a mean-
ingful role only in the design of managerial compensation (i.e., monitoring
θ) and managerial choice ∆h = ∆0 is induced by the non-convex managerial
compensation σh
∗
m = (u
h∗
m , u
h∗
m /2, 0).
Proposition 2.4.10 also implies that the full description of the optimal
compensation structure requires to find two managerial compensation compo-
nents
(
uh
∗
m , u
l∗
m
)
and two board compensation components
(
uh
∗
b , f
l∗
b
)
. For sim-
plicity, I denote by
[(
uh
∗
m,s, u
l∗
m,s
)
,
(
uh
∗
b,s, f
l∗
b,s
)]
the optimal compensation com-
ponents in the speculation case,
[(
uh
∗
m,d, u
l∗
m,d
)
,
(
uh
∗
b,d, f
l∗
b,d
)]
in the disciplinary
board case and by
[(
uh
∗
m,d, u
l∗
m,d
)
,
(
uh
∗
b,c, f
l∗
b,c
)]
in the contracting board case. The
following proposition characterizes the optimal compensation components in
each case.
Proposition 2.4.12. The optimal compensation structure in each case can be
described by the following compensation components.
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1. speculation case:[
ul
∗
m,s, u
h∗
b,s, f
l∗
b,s
]
=[
ru − rd
2
− γm
6θ2l
,
γbγm
p(1− p)(θ2h − θ2l )uh∗m,s
,
(
1
3
+
θ2l u
h∗
m,s
γm
+ ∆s
)
uh
∗
b,s +
γb
1− p
]
,
where uh
∗
m,s solves
pθ2h(r
u − rd)
γm
− p
[(
1
3
+ ∆s
)
+
2θ2hu
h∗
m,s
γm
]
+
(
1
3
+ ∆s
)
γbγm
p(1− p)(θ2h − θ2l )(uh∗m,s)2
= 0
2. disciplinary board case:[
ul
∗
m,d, u
h∗
b,d, f
l∗
b,d
]
=[
ru − rd
2
− γm
6θ2l
,
γbγm
p(1− p)(θ2h − θ2l )uh∗m,d
,
(
1
2
+
θ2l u
h∗
m,d
γm
)
uh
∗
b,d +
γb
1− p
]
,
where uh
∗
m,d solves
pθ2h(r
u − rd)
γm
− p
[
1
3
+
2θ2hu
h∗
m,d
γm
]
+
γbγm
2p(1− p)(θ2h − θ2l )(uh∗m,d)2
= 0
3. contracting board case:[
ul
∗
m,c, u
h∗
b,c, f
l∗
b,c
]
=[
ru − rd
2
− γm
6θ2l
,
γbγm
p(1− p)(θ2h − θ2l )uh∗m,c
,
(
1
3
+
θ2l u
h∗
m,c
γm
)
uh
∗
b,c +
γb
1− p
]
,
where uh
∗
m,c solves
pθ2h(r
u − rd)
γm
− p
[
1
2
+
2θ2hu
h∗
m,c
γm
]
+
γbγm
3p(1− p)(θ2h − θ2l )(uh∗m,c)2
= 0.
Proposition 2.4.12 shows that there are common features of the optimal
managerial and board compensation structure that appear in all three cases.
First, for any given parameter values, ul
∗
m is the same in all three cases. Second,
the board and managerial compensation (uh
∗
b , u
h∗
m ) exhibit substitutability, i.e.,
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the increase in uh
∗
m leads to the decrease in u
h∗
b . Finally, awarding higher u
h∗
b
to the board also increases the board’s fixed wage f l
∗
b .
On the other hand, proposition 2.4.12 also shows that for given param-
eter values, the three cases differ in the size of optimal compensation compo-
nents uh
∗
b , f
l∗
b and u
h∗
m . In particular, the following proposition compares the
size of the compensation components in each case.
Proposition 2.4.13. For any parameter values,
1. Board compensation feature uh
∗
b,c > u
h∗
b,s > u
h∗
b,d and f
l∗
b,d > f
l∗
b,s > f
l∗
b,c
2. Managerial compensation feature uh
∗
m,d > u
h∗
m,s > u
h∗
m,c > u
l∗
m,d(= u
l∗
m,s =
ul
∗
m,c).
Proposition 2.4.13 states that the performance-based managerial com-
pensation uh
∗
m is the highest in the disciplinary board case and the lowest in
the contracting board case. In contrast, the performance-based board com-
pensation uh
∗
b is the highest in the contracting board case and the lowest in
the disciplinary board case. This result is intuitive. As implied by proposition
2.4.10, shareholders must award non-convex compensation to the manager or
the board in order to induce the managerial choice of ∆h = ∆0. Compensa-
tion for rm, however, creates inefficiencies since it does not affect the board’s
incentive to monitor θ or the managerial incentive to put effort. In the dis-
ciplinary board case, the non-convexity of board compensation σh
∗
b limits the
size of uh
∗
b,d but instead shareholders can induce higher managerial effort than
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in the other two cases since the managerial risk choice is controlled by the
board. On the other hand, in the contracting board case the non-convexity of
managerial compensation σh
∗
m,c limits the size of u
h∗
m,c.
Proposition 2.4.13 also shows that fixed wage to the board f l
∗
b is the
highest in the disciplinary board case and the lowest in the contracting board
case. In the disciplinary board case, the expected value of board compensation
σh
∗
b is greater than the corresponding board compensation of other cases since
it compensates for rm and thus shareholders need to award higher fixed wage
in order to induce the board to monitor and truthfully report about θ. Finally,
proposition 2.4.13 states that in all three cases, the managerial compensation
features uh
∗
m > u
l∗
m, i.e., the manager receives higher performance-based com-
pensation when the board reports θˆb = θ
b
h than when it reports θ
b
l . Intuitively,
shareholders delegate the managerial compensation to the board in order to
use the board’s private information about θ and to induce higher managerial
effort when θ = θh.
So far, I have characterized the possible forms of optimal compensation
contracts. In section 2.5, I search the optimal managerial and board com-
pensation by comparing shareholder values in uninformed board case and the
three cases that arises in informed board case and then analyze how the key
parameters affect the compensation structure.
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2.5 Optimal compensation structure
Shareholder value in each case can be written as follows:
Uninformed board case:
V0 +
Vθ
γm
(
ru − rd
2
− γm
6Vθ
)2
, (2.29)
Speculation case:
V0 −
(
1
3
+ ∆s
)
2γb
Dθuh
∗
m,s
+
pθ2h(u
h∗
m,s)
2
γm
−
(
Vθ
γmDθ
+ 1
)
γb +
(1− p)θ2l
γm
(
ru − rd
2
− γm
6θ2l
)2
,
(2.30)
Disciplinary board case:
V0 − γb
Dθuh
∗
m,d
+
pθ2h(u
h∗
m,d)
2
γm
−
(
Vθ
γmDθ
+ 1
)
γb +
(1− p)θ2l
γm
(
ru − rd
2
− γm
6θ2l
)2
, (2.31)
Contracting board case:
V0 − 2γb
3Dθuh
∗
m,c
+
pθ2h(u
h∗
m,c)
2
γm
−
(
Vθ
γmDθ
+ 1
)
γb +
(1− p)θ2l
γm
(
ru − rd
2
− γm
6θ2l
)2
, (2.32)
where (uh
∗
m,s, u
h∗
m,c, u
h∗
m,c) are as in proposition 2.4.12, V0 =
1
3
(ru + rm + rd),
Dθ ≡ p(1−p)(θ
2
h−θ2l )
γm
and Vθ ≡ (pθ2h + (1 − p)θ2l ). The globally optimal mecha-
nism corresponds to the case in which shareholders value is maximized. In the
rest of this section, I first perform comparative statics with respect to some key
parameters and then I discuss the results, and in particular, develop testable
hypotheses relative to the optimal managerial and board compensation struc-
ture.
2.5.1 Comparative statics
For comparative statics, I consider four key parameters, namely, (i) ∆s
which measures the effect of managerial risk-seeking activities on the firm’s
cash flow risks, (ii) γb which measures the board monitoring costs, (iii) Dθ
which measures the variability in the project quality θ and (iv) Dr ≡ ru − rd
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which measures the size of value enhancement by managerial effort. The fol-
lowing proposition shows that each of key parameters (∆s, γb, Dθ, Dr) mono-
tonically affects the shareholder value in the uninformed board case relative to
the informed board case.
Proposition 2.5.1. Other things equal, (i) higher ∆s, (ii) higher γb (iii) lower
Dθ and (iv) lower Dr make shareholder value larger in uninformed board case
relative to informed board case.
Proposition 2.5.1 is intuitive. When managerial risk choice substan-
tially affects the firm’s cash flow risks (i.e., ∆s is larger), shareholders are
willing to make the board compensation flat as in the uninformed board case
in order to the board monitoring on managerial risk choice. On the other hand,
when the board monitoring on θ is too costly (i.e., γb is too high), shareholders
do not afford to induce the board to monitor θ before designing the managerial
compensation. Finally, when the variability in project quality (Dθ) and the
firm value enhancement by managerial effort (i.e., Dr) are sufficiently small,
shareholders’ benefit from incorporating the board information on θ into the
design of managerial compensation cannot offset the costs that shareholders
incur to induce the board monitoring.
In the rest of this section, I focus on the three cases in which the board
monitors θ since the key implications on the joint compensation structure arise
in these cases.28 In contrast to the disciplinary board case and the contract-
28This also reflects the realistic feature that the board takes the full responsibility for the
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ing board case, the speculation case is subject to two inefficiencies emerging
from the manager’s choice of ∆s. The risky choice increases the manager’s
expected compensation without creating incentive for managerial effort and it
also increases the expected board’s compensation without affecting the board’s
incentive to monitor θ. Intuitively, these inefficiencies increase in the size of
∆s. Thus,
Proposition 2.5.2. For each parameter values, there exists ∆¯s > 0 such that
speculation case becomes equilibrium if and only if ∆s ≤ ∆¯s.
On the other hand, the inefficiencies that arise in the other two cases
are associated with the non-convexity of board compensation or managerial
compensation. Specifically, in the disciplinary board case, the board compen-
sation σh
∗
b pays for r
m without providing the board with incentive to mon-
itor θ but instead the corresponding managerial compensation σh
∗
m awards
higher performance-based compensation and, thus, induces higher manage-
rial effort choice. In the contracting board case, by contrast, the managerial
compensation σh
∗
m needs to be non-convex and, thus, awards relatively lower
performance-based compensation which leads to lower managerial effort choice.
The following proposition shows how these inefficiencies that emerge from the
three informed board cases are affected by the key parameters in this analysis:
Proposition 2.5.3. For each parameter values, there exists γ¯b ≥ 0, D¯θ ≥ 0
and D¯r ≥ 0 such that the globally optimal mechanism belongs to the disci-
design of managerial compensation in practice.
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plinary board case when, other things equal, (i) γb < γ¯b, (ii) Dθ > D¯θ and (iii)
ru − rd > D¯r is higher.
In the disciplinary board regime, awarding performance-based compen-
sation to the board is costly and therefore shareholders can induce the board
to monitor θ only when the monitoring cost γb is sufficiently low. On the other
hand, when the variability in the project quality is large (i.e., Dθ is higher),
the board requires lower level of performance-based compensation to moni-
tor θ. When the board does not monitor θ before choosing the managerial
compensation, it may receive performance-based compensation for unproduc-
tive projects or fixed wage for productive projects. The larger variability in
the project quality, however, significantly reduce the expected value of board
compensation misaligned with the project type and thus induces the board
to monitor the type even at lower level of performance-based compensation.
Finally, when Dr is high, the managerial effort increases the firm value more
efficiently and thus the optimal compensation structure belongs to disciplinary
board case in which the managerial compensation features the highest level of
performance-based compensation.
2.5.2 Discussion
The previous analysis provides a number of insights relative to the
optimal managerial and board compensation. First, it shows that in the in-
formed board case (i.e., when board are active monitors), managerial and board
compensation are closely aligned. Specifically, high pay-for-performance com-
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pensation is awarded to both managers and boards in firms with high-quality
projects (i.e., θ = θh) and low-pay-for-performance compensation is awarded
when the project quality is low (i.e., θ = θl).
The analysis also shows that when managers are able to engage in in-
tense risk-seeking, the potential collusion of managers and boards affects the
optimal board-manager compensation structure. Consistent with this insight,
proposition 2.5.2 suggests that in firms with high managerial risk-seeking abil-
ity, the optimal compensation structure either strengthens the board’s incen-
tives to monitor managerial risk-seeking by awarding lower performance-based
board compensation (i.e., the disciplinary board case) or reduces the manager’s
incentive to engage in risk-seeking activities by awarding lower managerial
pay-for-performance compensation (i.e., the contracting board case). Further-
more, proposition 2.5.3 states the conditions in which the optimal compen-
sation structure reduces managerial risk-seeking incentives by inducing the
board to monitor managerial activities rather than by lowering managerial
performance-based compensation. Specifically, when the board has lower mon-
itoring costs (i.e., lower γb) or faces a larger variability in project quality (i.e.,
higher Dθ), the board’s monitoring incentives can still be provided by low
pay-for-performance board compensation.
From these insights, three empirical hypotheses can be derived concern-
ing the structure of the managerial and board compensation. In particular,
controlling for all other factors, firms are more likely to award their managers
higher pay-for-performance compensation while simultaneously awarding their
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boards lower pay-for-performance compensation when: (i) managers can en-
gage in risk-seeking activities more easily, (ii) boards can monitor managers
at a lower cost and (iii) boards face a larger variability in project quality.
2.6 Empirical analysis
2.6.1 Data and sample construction
For the period 1996–2005 I collect information on CEO and board char-
acteristics.29 In particular, I gather information on CEO compensation, tenure
and duality (i.e., whether or not the CEO also serves as the chairman of the
board) from Execucomp. Regarding boards, I collect information about their
compensation from Execucomp and about board structure (i.e., whether or
not their directors are classified as independent) from RiskMetrics.30 Follow-
ing previous studies (e.g., Yermack 2004 and Ryan and Wiggins 2004) the
empirical analysis exclusively considers outside directors’ compensation which
is consistent with the previously described implications and consistent with
the fact that outside directors are in practice responsible for managerial mon-
itoring.31
I obtain financial information and data on the number of business seg-
29From 2006 on Execucomp fails to provide information on board compensation.
30RiskMetrics classifies directors into three categories, namely, insiders, linked directors
and outsiders. Following Ryan and Wiggins (2004) and Linck et al. (2008), I define an
independent board as a board which has a majority of outside directors.
31For instance, the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges require the listed firms to form audit
committees (which are in charge of overseeing risk-management policies) and compensation
committees (which are in charge of designing managerial compensation) entirely with outside
directors.
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ments from Compustat. After excluding utilities (SIC 4900–4999), the sample
consists of 6496 non-financial firm years and 1003 financial firm years (SIC
6000–6999). Furthermore, as described below, for some of my tests I collect
information on outside directors’ blockholding ownership from the database
provided by Dlugosz et al. (2006) which corrects the errors contained in Com-
pact Disclosure during the period 1996–2001. The use of this corrected board
ownership data makes it possible to investigate the effect of directors’ block-
holding ownership on CEO and directors compensation but this data requires
a restricted sample period. To minimize this data limitation, in the following
analysis I compare: (i) results from the extended sample period (1996–2005)
without considering directors’ blockholding ownership and (ii) results from the
shorter sample period (1996–2001) including the corrected information on di-
rectors’ blockholding ownership.32 Variables are reported in real terms (i.e.,
adjusted for inflation using 2000 as a base year).
2.6.2 Determinants of compensation structure
2.6.2.1 Managerial risk-seeking ability
I use R&D expenditures as a proxy for managerial risk-seeking abil-
ity. Since R&D investments tend to generate uncertain future cash flows and
create information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (e.g., Hall
32Among the firm-years that exist in Execucomp, RiskMetrics and Compustat during
1996–2001, 498 non-financial firm-years and 91 financial firm-years are not available in
the blockholding ownership database. After excluding these firm-years, the shorter sample
consists of 3323 firm-years of 925 non-financial firms and 509 firm-years of 144 financial
firms.
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and Lerner 2010), I postulate that R&D investments provide managers with
opportunities to engage in risk-seeking activities. Specifically, for firm i and
year t, I construct a dummy variable, R&D 4yr i,t, which equals 1 for firm-years
which have continuously recognized R&D expenses from t− 3 to t and equals
0 otherwise.33
Since a key implication of my model is that managerial risk-seeking
ability affects a firm’s optimal compensation structure, I perform a second set
of tests that compare the compensation practices of firms in the banking sector
with firms outside banking.34 These tests are built on the insight of previous
studies (e.g., Laeven and Levine 2009) which suggest that in the banking sec-
tor it is hard to disentangle productive risky investments (e.g., profitable risky
loans) from unproductive managerial risk-seeking activities (e.g., pure finan-
cial speculation). In other words since bank managers can easily engage in
risk-seeking activities, the shareholders find it optimal to resort to a joint
compensation structure in which managerial or board pay-for-performance
compensation is reduced. In what follows, I define banking firms following
the Fama-French 48 industry classification codes (i.e., the classification code
equals 44).35
33In (unreported) robustness checks I consider a number of variations on the R&D expen-
diture proxy (i.e., different periods or R&D levels) and find similar results.
34While most studies on compensation exclude financial firms, I find it useful to include
them in my empirical analysis in order to examine the effect of managerial risk-seeking
abilities on the compensation structure. Nevertheless, to avoid potential distortions that
arise from including financial firms, I present separate results for the sample of non-financial
and financial firms below.
35In the Fama-French 48 classification code 44 includes some non-banking financial firms
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2.6.2.2 Board monitoring costs
I postulate that the presence of at least one blockholder on the board
is akin to a situation of low board-monitoring costs (and thus intense man-
agerial monitoring). Specifically, since blockholding directors are exposed to
financial losses in the case of bad firm performance, I expect that, as with
low board-monitoring costs, the presence of blockholding directors leads to in-
tense managerial monitoring even when no explicit pay-for-performance board
compensation is used.
Following the literature (e.g., Dlugosz et al. 2006 and Villalonga and
Amit 2006), I define blockholders as shareholders who own at least 5% of
outstanding shares, and for firm i and year t, I construct a dummy variable
DIRBLK i,t which equals 1 for firm-years which have at least one non-officer
blockholder in the board and equals 0 otherwise.
2.6.2.3 Variability in the quality of projects
I consider two proxies for variability in project quality: the number of
business segments and the firm’s size. In the model, a larger variability in
project quality refers to the case in which the board faces a higher ex-ante
uncertainty relative to the optimal level of managerial pay-for-performance
compensation. The link between larger variability in project quality and multi-
segment (or larger) firms follows since these firms tend to operate in complex
(in SIC 6199) and code 47 includes a few investment banks (in SIC 6211). Excluding these
firms, however, does not significantly affect the results.
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business environments which make board monitoring particularly useful in
the design of adequate managerial compensation.36 Empirically the proxies
considered in this analysis are Segments i,t and ln(sale)i,t which correspond to
the number of segments and the natural log of sales for firm i and year t,
respectively.37
2.6.2.4 Control variables
As controls I include a number of determinants of pay-for-performance
compensation proposed by previous studies (e.g., Yermack 1995, Guay 1999a
and Coles et al. 2006). First I consider the effect of a firm’s past performance
(i.e., past return on firm assets and past stock returns).38 Specifically, I include
lagged return on assets and annual stock returns (i.e., ROAi,t−1 and Return i,t−1
for firm i and year t).39 Second, I include the KZ index modified by Baker
et al. (2003), the market-to-book value ratio, and the presence of long-term
debt indicator (i.e., KZ4 i,t, MB i,t and LTD i,t, respectively) as proxies for the
level of a firm’s financial constraints.40 Yermack (1995) reports that to defer
36In line with this insight, Fama and Jensen (1983) proposes board monitoring as a key
governance mechanism for firms that operate in highly complex environments.
37Relative to other studies (e.g., Core and Guay 2001) which have considered the rela-
tionship between the firm size and the compensation structure, my model analysis predicts
that the firm size has contrasting effects on CEO and directors compensation structures.
38Previous studies suggest contrasting predictions relative to the effect of the past perfor-
mance on the level of pay-for-performance compensation. See, e.g., Core and Guay (2001)
for the details.
39I consider both one-year and two-year lagged annual stock returns but excluding two-
year lagged stock returns does not change the results.
40In unreported robustness checks I also consider cash flow shortfalls (i.e., [common and
preferred dividends+cash flow used in investing activities-cash flow from operations]/total
assets) which is also widely used as a proxy for the degree of financial constraints (e.g.,
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the cash payout financially constrained firms tend to award managers stock
options (which, as described below, I use as a measure for pay-for-performance
compensation) in lieu of cash compensation.
Third, I control for tax effects on compensation by including an oper-
ating loss dummy variable Loss i,t. Intuitively, firms that have net operating
loss carryforwards expect higher future tax returns and thus desire to defer
the compensation expense by awarding stock options. Fourth, I control for
a firm’s past stock return volatilities, namely Vol i,t, since, as suggested by
Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008), firms that have experienced high stock
return volatilities may not be willing to grant high pay-for-performance com-
pensation that provides additional risk-taking incentives.41
In addition, I consider CEO and board characteristics relative to the
CEO’s influence on the board in order to capture situations in which CEOs
can influence boards to design CEO pay with cash compensation rather than
pay-for-performance compensation (Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009). To
control for the effects of CEO-board relationship on compensation, I include
the board independence indicator, the logarithm of the CEO’s tenure and
the CEO-chairman duality indicator (i.e., IND i,t, Ln(tenure)i,t and Dual i,t,
respectively).42 Finally, I consider a new CEO indicator NCEO i,t to control for
Yermack 1995).
41In the analysis of the joint compensation structure for the CEO and directors, it is
particularly important to control for the stock return volatilities which affect a firm’s stock
option valuation and thus may generate a mechanical relationship between CEO and direc-
tors pay-for-performance compensation measures.
42To mitigate the endogeneity of board indpendence, I also consider only the post-SOX
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the possible effects related to changes in compensation practices for incoming
CEOs.43 The details of each variable are available in Table 2.1.
2.6.3 Pay-for-performance compensation measures
I use stock option grants as the pay-for-performance compensation mea-
sures and main dependent variables in the analysis (e.g., Yermack 1995, Guay
1999a and Coles et al. 2006). Specifically, for each firm i and year t, I calcu-
late the option-to-total compensation ratio CEO r i,t (resp. BRD r i,t) in order
to measure the extent to which CEOs’ (resp. directors’) pay is linked to the
firms’ performance. In addition, I consider a dummy variable CEO pi,t (resp.
BRD pi,t) which indicates whether or not a stock option plan is awarded to
the CEO (resp. directors). More formally,
CEO r i,t (BRD r i,t) ≡ Fair value of option grants to CEO (directors)
Total compensation to CEO (directors)
,
CEO pi,t
(
BRD pi,t
) ≡ {1 if stock options are awarded to CEO (directors)
0 otherwise.
Furthermore I consider three measures of the joint compensation struc-
ture of the CEO and directors (i.e., the association between the magnitudes
of CEO and director pay-for-performance compensation for each firm-year).
Specifically, for firm i and year t, three categorical variables CEOBRD r i,t,
period (2002-2005) in which almost all firms have independent board structures and find
consistent results.
43See Fee and Hadlock (2003) for evidence of these effects.
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CEOBRD pi,t and CEOBRD indr i,t classify firm-years into the following four
categories:
(1) LL: firm-years in which both the CEO and directors are awarded low pay-
for-performance compensation
(2) LH : firm-years in which the CEO is awarded low pay-for-performance and
directors are awarded high pay-for-performance
(3) HL: firm-years in which the CEO is awarded high pay-for-performance and
directors are awarded low pay-for-performance
(4) HH : firm-years in which both the CEO and directors are awarded high
pay-for-performance compensation.
More specifically, CEOBRD r i,t classifies firm-years by comparing their
option-to-total compensation ratios (i.e., CEO ri,t and BRD ri,t) with the cor-
responding median for each year. In addition, to control for industry character-
istics, CEOBRD indr i,t classifies firm-years by comparing the option-to-total
compensation ratios with the corresponding industry-year medians. Finally,
CEOBRD pi,t classifies firm-years by the presence of option award plans for
the CEO and directors.44
44A formal definition of each variable is available in Table 2.1.
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2.6.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics of CEO and board compensation
in non-financial firms (Panel A) and financial firms (Panel B). In non-financial
firms the average directors compensation is $0.21 million and the average CEO
compensation is $5.46 million. While CEO pay is substantially larger than
director pay, both CEOs and directors receive stock options as the main form of
equity-based compensation. In particular, directors (resp. CEOs) receive stock
options in approximately 72% (resp. 80%) of firm-years and on average the
value of options granted accounts for 45% (resp. 39%) of total pay for directors
(resp. CEOs).45 Panel A also shows that R&D firms (i.e., R&D 4yr i,t = 1)
grant stock options more intensively to both CEOs and directors. On average
the value of options granted accounts for nearly 49% (resp. 43%) of directors
(resp. CEO) pay in R&D firms relative to 40% (resp. 34%) in other firms.
A comparison between Panel A (non-financial firms) and Panel B (fi-
nancial firms) shows that the level of directors pay is similar in both types
of firms but CEO pay is much higher in financial firms. In addition financial
firms award directors fewer stock options than non-financial firms. Within the
sample outside directors receive stock options in only 60% of financial firm-
years and on average the value of options granted accounts for 36% of the total
directors pay. Among financial firms, banks grant even fewer option awards
to outside directors. Banks grant stock options in only 54% of firm-years and
45These results are in line with previous studies about directors compensation (e.g., Ryan
and Wiggins 2004 and Yermack 2004).
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the value of options granted constitutes only 31% of directors’ total pay.
Table 2.3 describes the measures of the joint compensation structure in
non-financial firms (Panel A) and financial firms (Panel B). Panel A shows that
in non-financial firms the magnitudes of CEO and director pay-for-performance
compensation are positively correlated. In 60% of non-financial firm-years
both the CEO’s and directors’ option-to-total compensation ratios are simul-
taneously below or above the corresponding industry-year medians (i.e., CEO-
BRD indr i,t = LL or HH). Panel A also indicates that R&D firms are more
likely to award high pay-for-performance compensation either simultaneously
to both the CEO and directors or to the CEO alone. In particular, R&D firms
exhibit a 5% (resp. 2%) higher probability that both the CEO’s and direc-
tors’ (resp. only the CEO’s) option-to-total compensation ratios are above the
industry-year median.
A comparison between Panel A (non-financial firms) and Panel B (fi-
nancial firms) shows that financial firms tend to grant high pay-for-performance
to the CEO and low pay-for-performance to directors rather than simultane-
ously awarding high pay-for-performance to both. Specifically, financial firms
(resp. non-financial firms) award stock options only to the CEO (i.e., CEO-
BRD pi,t = HL) in 31% (resp. 21%) of firm-years. Among financial firms,
banks are more likely to award high pay-for-performance to the CEO and low
pay-for-performance to directors. In particular, banks award stock options to
the CEO alone in 38% of firm-years.
Table 2.4 summarizes the proxies for determinants of the compensa-
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tion structure in non-financial firms (Panel A) and financial firms (Panel B).
Panel A shows that R&D firms are less likely to have non-officer blockhold-
ing directors and tend to have more business segments and smaller firm size.
Specifically, R&D firms have at least one non-officer blockholding director in
6% of firm-years while other firms have such a director in 11% of firm years.
R&D firms also show more operating loss, more growth opportunities and
higher stock return volatilities. Regarding the measures of the board-manager
relationship, R&D firms are more likely to have independent boards. In 80%
of firm-years, R&D firms maintain the board with a majority of independent
directors while other firms do so in only 69% of firm-years..
Relative to non-financial firms (Panel A), financial firms (Panel B) tend
to have a larger firm size, more reliance on long-run debt and fewer growth
opportunities. In terms of the board-manager relationship, financial firms
are more likely to have the CEO-Chair duality and independent boards. In
addition Panel B shows that banks are more financially constrained and have
fewer growth opportunities than other financial firms. Banks are also more
likely to have independent boards. In 88% of firm-years banks maintain their
boards with a majority of outside directors.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 CEO and directors pay-for-performance compensation
I start by individually estimating the regressions of CEO and directors
compensation on the determinants of compensation structure (i.e., manage-
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rial risk-seeking abilities, board monitoring costs and the variability in project
quality).46 According to the model CEO and directors compensation struc-
tures are jointly determined and thus running each regression of CEO and
directors compensation potentially suffers from simultaneity bias. However,
the estimates from each regression provide descriptive information about the
effects of the determinants of compensation structures and also can be com-
pared to previous studies which examine CEO and directors compensation
independently.47
2.7.1.1 Non-financial firms
Table 2.5 presents the regression results for non-financial firms. Specif-
ically, the regressions reported in columns 1–4 differ in their sample periods
and dependent variables. More specifically, columns 1 and 2 present the results
from the extended sample period (i.e., 1996–2005 without directors’ blockhold-
ing ownership) and columns 3 and 4 report the results from the shorter sample
(i.e., 1996–2001 including directors’ blockholding ownership). Furthermore,
the dependent variables are (CEO p and BRD p) in columns 1 and 3 while
(CEO r and BRD r) in 2 and 4.
The results show that lower magnitudes of pay-for-performance com-
pensation tend to be awarded to directors in R&D firms, in firms with at least
46To adjust the standard errors for the correlation between managerial and board pay-for-
performance measures in each firm-year, I use the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).
47See, e.g., Yermack 1995, Guay 1999a and Coles et al. 2006 for research on CEO com-
pensation and Yermack (2004) and Ryan and Wiggins (2004) for studies on directors com-
pensation.
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one non-officer blockholding director, in more diversified firms and in larger
firms. Specifically, column 3 reports that, all else being equal, the probability
of awarding stock option grants to directors are about 5% (resp. 6.2%) lower
in R&D firms (resp. firms that have non-officer blockholders in the board).
Furthermore, each additional segment (resp. 1% increase in sales) is asso-
ciated with 1.5% (resp. 2.9%) lower odds of awarding options to directors.
These results suggest that, as predicted by the model analysis, lower magni-
tudes of pay-for-performance compensation for directors are associated with
higher managerial risk-seeking ability, lower board monitoring costs and larger
variability in (potential) project quality.
Table 2.5 also shows that R&D firms, more diversified firms and larger
firms tend to award higher pay-for-performance compensation to the CEO
while firms with at least one non-officer blockholding director tend to grant
lower pay-for-performance compensation to the CEO. In particular, column 4
shows that, all else being equal, the CEO’s option-to-total compensation ratio
is around 4.8% higher in R&D firms and 3.7% lower in firms which have at least
one non-officer blockholding director. Column 4 also reports that a 1% increase
in sales is associated with a 3.1% higher option-to-total compensation ratio.
The effect of the number of segments on this ratio is positive but statistically
insignificant.48 These results imply that higher managerial risk-seeking ability
and larger variability in project quality are associated with higher pay-for-
48As shown in column 3 of Table 2.5, the positive relationship between the number of
segments and the odds of awarding the CEO stock option grants is statistically significant.
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performance compensation for CEOs.
2.7.1.2 Financial firms
Table 2.6 reports the results for financial firms. As in Table 2.5, columns
1 and 2 present the results from the extended sample period (1996–2005 with-
out directors’ blockholding ownership) and by contrast columns 3 and 4 report
the results from the shorter sample (i.e., 1996–2001 including directors’ block-
holding ownership). The dependent variables are (CEO p and BRD p) in the
regressions reported in columns 1 and 3 and (CEO r and BRD r) in columns
2 and 4. To compare the compensation structure of banks with other financial
firms I include the bank indicator and exclude the industry-fixed effects.49
Table 2.6 shows that banking firms award lower pay-for-performance
compensation to outside directors. In particular, column 3 reports that banks
show a nearly 16% lower probability of awarding stock options to directors.
Consistent with the results from non-financial firms, firms with non-officer
blockholding directors or that have larger sales tend to award lower pay-for-
performance compensation to directors. Column 3 shows that the firms with
at least one non-officer blockholding director have a 21.3% lower probability
of awarding stock options to directors and a 1% increase in sales lowers this
probability by 5.4%.
49I also exclude R&D 4yr i,t−1 and Segmentsi,t−1 which have very small variation within
financial firms but considering the two variables does not substantially change the coefficient
estimates of other variables.
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In contrast, banks and other firms do not exhibit a significant difference
in the level of pay-for-performance compensation for CEOs. Furthermore, the
relationship between the presence of non-officer blockholding directors and
the magnitude of CEO pay-for-performance compensation is also statistically
insignificant. In line with the result from non-financial firms, however, larger
firms tend to award higher pay-for-performance compensation to the CEO.
Overall, the findings suggest that banks in which CEOs can easily engage in
risk-seeking activities tend to grant lower pay-for-performance compensation
to directors.
2.7.2 CEO-directors joint compensation structure
I now consider the determinants of the joint compensation structure and
more specifically the determinants of the association between the magnitudes
of the CEO’s and the directors’ pay-for-performance compensation. To do
so I estimate a multinomial logit model with CEOBRD r, CEOBRD p and
CEOBRD indr as dependent variables. As before, I consider separate models
for non-financial and financial firms.
2.7.2.1 Non-financial firms
Table 2.7 presents the results for non-financial firms. Rather than re-
porting coefficient estimates, Table 2.7 reports average partial effects which
better illustrate the economic magnitude as well as the statistical signifi-
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cance.50 Panel A reports the results from the extended sample period (i.e.,
1996–2005 without directors’ blockholding ownership) and Panel B reports
the results from the shorter sample period (i.e., 1996–2001 including directors’
blockholding ownership, DIRBLK i,t). Standard errors are adjusted for clus-
ters within an industry and include all control variables considered in Table
2.5.
Panel B shows three main results. First, R&D firms are more likely
to offer high pay-for-performance compensation to CEOs and low pay-for-
performance compensation to directors. In Panel B, R&D firms show 7.3%
higher odds that the CEO’s (resp. directors’) option-to-total compensation ra-
tio is above (resp. below) the industry-year median (i.e., CEOBRD indr=HL).
Consistent with these findings, R&D firms show a 6.6% higher probability of
awarding options only to the CEO (i.e., CEOBRD p=HL).
Second, Panel B shows that firms which have non-officer blockholding
directors are less likely to award high pay-for-performance compensation to
the CEO and to the directors simultaneously. Instead, these firms award high
pay-for-performance to the CEO and low pay-for-performance to directors.
Specifically, these firms show a nearly 8% higher probability that the CEO’s
(resp. directors’) option-to-total compensation ratio is above (resp. below)
year median (i.e., CEOBRD r=HL) and a 12.2% lower probability that both
the CEO’s and the directors’ option-to-total compensation ratios are above the
50Partial effects of control variables are unreported but available from the author upon
request.
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year medians (i.e., CEOBRD r=HH ). Consistently, the probability of award-
ing options to CEOs and directors simultaneously (i.e., CEOBRD p=HH ) are
7.5 % lower in these firms.
Finally, Panel B also reports that larger or more diversified firms also
tend to award higher pay-for-performance CEO compensation and lower pay-
for-performance director compensation. Specifically each additional segment
(resp. 1% increase in sales) is associated with 1.8% (resp. 3.2%) higher odds
that both the CEOs’ and the directors’ option-to-total compensation ratios
are simultaneously above the industry-medians (i.e., CEOBRD indr=HL).
In general, these findings are in line with my model analysis which
predicts that the disciplinary board case is more likely to occur in firms in
which (i) managerial risk-seeking activities are more likely to occur (ii) board
monitoring costs are likely to be lower and (iii) projects can exhibit a large
variability in quality. In the disciplinary board case, consistent with the re-
ported evidence, directors are awarded low pay-for-performance compensation
while CEOs receive simultaneous high pay-for-performance compensation.
2.7.2.2 Financial firms
Table 2.8 reports the results for financial firms which, as shown in Sec-
tion 2.7.1.2, compare the effects on banks with other financial firms.51 Panels
A and B report the results from the extended sample period (i.e., 1996–2005
51As before, I exclude R&D 4yr i,t−1 and Segmentsi,t−1 from independent variables.
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without directors’ blockholding ownership) and from the shorter sample pe-
riod (i.e., 1996–2001 including directors’ blockholding ownership), respectively.
Standard errors are adjusted for clusters within an industry only in Panel A
but are unadjusted in Panel B because of the insufficient number of observa-
tions.
Relative to other financial firms, banks show a 17% higher probability of
awarding stock options to the CEO alone (i.e., CEOBRD p=HL) and a 14.1%
lower probability of awarding options to the CEO and directors simultaneously
(i.e., CEOBRD p=HH ). However, this difference between banks and other
firms is not significantly observed in other joint compensation measures.52
In line with the results from non-financial firms, larger firms and firms
with non-officer blockholding directors are less likely to award high pay-for-
performance compensation to both the CEO and the directors but rather they
award high pay-for-performance compensation to the CEO and low pay-for-
performance compensation to directors simultaneously. Specifically, the pres-
ence of non-officer blockholding directors (resp. 1% increase in sales) is as-
sociated with 21.3% (resp. 5.1%) higher odds of awarding stock options to
the CEO alone and 21.8% (resp. 4.2%) lower odds of awarding options to
the CEO and directors simultaneously. Overall, these results confirm previous
findings that higher managerial risk-seeking ability, lower board monitoring
costs and larger variability in project quality lead to the simultaneous award of
52Banks show higher odds that CEOBRD indr=HH but, as displayed in Table 2.3, the
median of directors’ option-to-total compensation ratio in the banking sector is fairly low.
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high pay-for-performance compensation to CEOs and low pay-for-performance
compensation to directors.
2.8 Concluding remarks
This paper considers the optimal managerial and board compensation
in a setting in which both managers and boards are subject to agency prob-
lems and shareholders delegate to boards the task of designing managerial
compensation and the task of monitoring managerial risk-seeking activities.
The model shows that while high pay-for-performance board compensation
provides incentives for the board to properly design managerial compensation,
it also diminishes the board’s incentive to discourage non-productive manage-
rial risk-shifting activities. This analysis implies that the optimal board com-
pensation structure is determined by the trade-off between the magnitudes of
these two countervailing effects. The analysis also derives implications for the
optimal joint compensation structure for managers and boards.
The analysis suggests that the three determinants that shape the opti-
mal compensation structure for managers and boards are (i) managerial risk-
seeking ability, (ii) the magnitude of board monitoring costs and (iii) the
variability in (potential) project quality. The analysis predicts that, all else
being equal, high pay-for-performance compensation for managers and low
pay-for-performance compensation for boards are awarded by firms in which
the managerial risk-seeking ability is higher, the board monitoring costs are
lower and the projects exhibit lower variability in quality.
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In the second part of the study I take these predictions into the data.
Empirically, I find that high managerial pay-for-performance compensation
tends to be awarded jointly with low board pay-for-performance in (i) R&D
firms or banks in which managers can easily engage in risk-seeking activities
(ii) firms in which the board contains non-officer blockholders who are likely
to provide high-intensity monitoring and (iii) larger or more diversified firms
which feature a wider variability in project quality.
The analysis of the joint compensation structure for managers and
boards provides some novel findings and suggests several avenues for future
research. However, the study abstracts from issues related to the dynamics
of board composition and other governance mechanisms which can affect the
relationship between CEO and board compensation. Fascinating but challeng-
ing tasks to include board dynamics and to examine the joint compensation
structure in the presence of a richer set of governance mechanisms are left for
future research.
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Table 2.1: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
CEO(BRD) totali,t Total compensation to the CEO (outside director) in firm i and year t
CEO(BRD) optioni,t Black-Scholes value of option grants to the CEO (outside director)
CEO(BRD) pi,t Indicator (1,0) of option grants to the CEO (outside director)
CEO(BRD) ri,t CEO optioni,t/CEO totali,t (BRD optioni,t/BRD totali,t)
CEO(BRD) stki,t Dollar amount of stock grants to the CEO (outside director)
CEO(BRD) stkpi,t Indicator (1,0) of stock grants to the CEO (outside director)
CEO(BRD) stkri,t CEO stk/CEO total (BRD stk/BRD total)
ROAi,t Return on Asset reported in Execucomp
Lossi,t Net operating loss dummy (=1 if oibdpi,t ¡ 0)
LTDi,t long term debt dummy (=1 if dltti,t¿0)
kz4i,t -1.002*kz cfi,t-39.368*kz divi,t-1.315*kz ci,t+3.139*kz levi,t
kz cfi,t (dpi,t+ibi,t)/ati,t
kz divi,t (dvpi,t+dvci,t)/ati,t
kz ci,t che/ati,t
kz levi,t (dltti,t+dlci,t)/(dltti,t+dlci,t+seqi,t)
Return 1-year stock return
MB (prcc fi,t*cshoi,t+ati,t-ceqi,t-txdbi,t)/ati,t
R&D 3-year moving average of (xrdi,t/ati,t)
Vol Stock return volatility reported in Execucomp
IND Board independence dummy (=1 if the board holds a majority of independent directors)
Tenure the CEO’s tenure
NCEO New CEO dummy (=1 for the first year of the CEO)
Dual CEO-Chair dummy (=1 if the CEO is the chairman of the board)
CEO mt (BRD t) the year-median of CEO ri,t (BRD ri,t)
CEO indmt (BRD indmt) the Fama-French 48 industry-year median of CEO ri,t (BRD ri,t)
CEOBRD ri,t

LL if CEO r i,t ≤ CEO mt and BRD r i,t ≤ BRD mt
LH if CEO r i,t ≤ CEO mt and BRD r i,t > BRD mt
HL if CEO r i,t > CEO mt and BRD r i,t ≤ BRD mt
HH otherwise.
CEOBRD pi,t

LL if CEO pi,t = BRD pi,t = 0
LH if CEO pi,t = 0 and BRD pi,t = 1
HL if CEO pi,t = 1 and BRD pi,t = 0
HH otherwise,
CEOBRD indri,t

LL if CEO ri,t ≤ CEO indmt and BRD ri,t ≤ BRD indmt
LH if CEO ri,t ≤ CEO indmt and BRD ri,t > BRD indmt
HL if CEO ri,t > CEO indmt and BRD ri,t ≤ BRD indmt
HH otherwise,
This table presents the definition of compensation variables and control variables. For the fair value of
equity grants to managers, I use the corresponding measures provided by Execucomp. To value the equity
grants to outside directors, I follow Ryan and Wiggins (2004). For financial and accounting variables, I
describe the definition by using the compustat data items. The independent directors are identified by teh
classification of Riskmetrics database. For each firm year, I identify the chairperson from Riskmetrics
database while find the CEO from Execucomp. In particualr, the appointment and resignation date of
CEOs are provided by Execucomp.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics: Compensation
Panel A: Non-financial firms
All firms R&D firms Other firms Diff.
mean sd median mean sd median mean sd median mean t
CEO total 5459.28 13924.72 2817.74 5907.44 17190.07 3082.68 4966.35 9040.80 2550.79 941.09 2.99
CEO option 2900.99 10232.15 962.32 3353.52 12244.21 1219.14 2403.26 7383.16 691.56 950.26 4.10
CEO p 0.80 0.40 1 0.84 0.37 1 0.76 0.42 1 0.07 7.91
CEO r 0.39 0.29 0.38 0.43 0.29 0.44 0.34 0.27 0.32 0.09 14.43
CEO stk 621.75 8260.83 0 637.58 11226.93 0 604.33 2163.79 0 33.25 0.18
CEO stkp 0.27 0.44 0 0.24 0.43 0 0.31 0.46 0 -0.06 -6.21
CEO stkr 0.07 0.15 0 0.06 0.14 0 0.08 0.15 0 -0.02 -5.55
BRD total 206.66 574.38 96.75 267.87 740.97 108.77 139.34 283.43 83.84 128.53 10.05
BRD option 155.11 575.87 36.84 214.42 743.76 45.32 89.87 282.69 27.37 124.55 9.71
BRD p 0.72 0.45 1 0.74 0.44 1 0.69 0.46 1 0.05 4.87
BRD r 0.45 0.36 0.47 0.49 0.37 0.53 0.40 0.34 0.40 0.08 10.12
BRD stk 19.68 51.94 0 21.44 60.21 0 17.75 40.89 0 3.68 3.11
BRD stkp 0.40 0.49 0 0.41 0.49 0 0.40 0.49 0 0.01 0.95
BRD stkr 0.16 0.24 0 0.16 0.24 0 0.16 0.24 0 0.00 0.60
Obs. 7442 3898 3544
Panel B: Financial firms
All firms Banks Other firms Diff.
mean sd median mean sd median mean sd median mean t
CEO total 7428.81 11135.43 4035.32 7314.28 13436.57 3385.14 7552.12 7958.75 4878.86 -237.84 -0.34
CEO option 3360.48 8535.52 1302.05 3541.59 10935.49 1116.86 3165.49 4755.60 1622.97 376.11 0.71
CEO p 0.83 0.37 1 0.86 0.35 1 0.80 0.40 1 0.06 2.46
CEO r 0.36 0.26 0.34 0.35 0.25 0.33 0.36 0.27 0.36 -0.01 -0.31
CEO stk 1014.61 2826.64 0 948.14 2847.14 0 1086.17 2805.59 0 -138.04 -0.77
CEO stkp 0.39 0.49 0 0.39 0.49 0 0.38 0.49 0 0.01 0.31
CEO stkr 0.10 0.17 0 0.10 0.16 0 0.11 0.17 0 -0.01 -0.73
BRD total 223.56 2248.00 91.08 111.02 177.88 64.81 344.72 3231.56 125.10 -233.70 -1.59
BRD option 158.84 2247.40 21.96 57.08 171.02 10.75 268.39 3231.89 46.05 -211.31 -1.44
BRD p 0.60 0.49 1 0.54 0.50 1 0.67 0.47 1 -0.13 -4.31
BRD r 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.31 0.33 0.26 0.42 0.36 0.44 -0.12 -5.47
BRD stk 32.32 85.12 0 21.81 61.57 0 43.63 103.61 0 -21.82 -4.02
BRD stkp 0.43 0.49 0 0.38 0.49 0 0.48 0.50 0 -0.11 -3.39
BRD stkr 0.20 0.28 0 0.16 0.25 0 0.24 0.30 0 -0.07 -4.18
Obs. 1003 520 483
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics: Compensation
(Continued from the previous page)
This table presents the summary statistics about compensation for CEO and outside directors between 1997 and 2005. The sample consists of
7442 non-financial firm years and 1003 financial firm years. The utilities (sic 4900–4999) are excluded from the sample. Compensation
information is obtained from Execucomp database. Panel A reports the compensation of non-financial firms and also separately presents the
compensation of R&D firms and other non-financial firms. Financial firms are defined as the firms whose standard industrical classsification is
between 6000 and 6999. R&D firms are defined as the firms which recognize the R&D expenditure for the past four consecutive years. The last
two columns in Panel A presents the mean difference between long R&D firms and other non-financial firms and the unpaired t-statistics
(computed for unequal variance and unequal observations) which tests for the null hypothesis that the mean difference is zero. Panel B reports
the compensation of financial firms and also separately presents the compensation of banks and non-bank financial firms. Banks are defined as
the firms whose Fama-French 48 industrial classification code is 44. As in Panel A, the last two columns of Panel B presents the mean difference
between banks and other financial firms and the corresponding t-statistics. The details about compensation variables are available in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics: CEO-directors joint compensation structure
Panel A: Non-financial firms
All firms R&D firms Other firms Diff.
mean sd median mean sd median mean sd median mean t
CEOBRD r=LL 0.27 0.45 0 0.22 0.42 0 0.33 0.47 0 -0.11 -10.27
CEOBRD r=LH 0.17 0.38 0 0.16 0.37 0 0.19 0.39 0 -0.03 -3.13
CEOBRD r=HL 0.22 0.42 0 0.23 0.42 0 0.21 0.41 0 0.02 2.20
CEOBRD r=HH 0.33 0.47 0 0.39 0.49 0 0.27 0.45 0 0.11 10.38
CEOBRD p=LL 0.07 0.26 0 0.05 0.22 0 0.10 0.30 0 -0.05 -8.46
CEOBRD p=LH 0.12 0.33 0 0.11 0.32 0 0.14 0.34 0 -0.02 -2.80
CEOBRD p=HL 0.21 0.41 0 0.21 0.41 0 0.21 0.41 0 0.00 0.08
CEOBRD p=HH 0.59 0.49 1 0.63 0.48 1 0.56 0.50 1 0.07 6.36
CEOBRD indr=LL 0.30 0.46 0 0.28 0.45 0 0.33 0.47 0 -0.05 -4.85
CEOBRD indr=LH 0.17 0.38 0 0.16 0.37 0 0.19 0.39 0 -0.02 -2.37
CEOBRD indr=HL 0.23 0.42 0 0.24 0.43 0 0.22 0.41 0 0.02 2.54
CEOBRD indr=HH 0.29 0.45 0 0.31 0.46 0 0.27 0.44 0 0.05 4.56
Obs. 7442 3898 3544
Panel B: Financial firms
All firms Banks Other firms Diff.
mean sd median mean sd median mean sd median mean t
CEOBRD r=LL 0.29 0.45 0 0.34 0.48 0 0.23 0.42 0 0.11 3.88
CEOBRD r=LH 0.17 0.38 0 0.14 0.34 0 0.21 0.41 0 -0.07 -3.04
CEOBRD r=HL 0.30 0.46 0 0.32 0.47 0 0.27 0.44 0 0.05 1.88
CEOBRD r=HH 0.24 0.43 0 0.20 0.40 0 0.29 0.45 0 -0.09 -3.39
CEOBRD p=LL 0.09 0.28 0 0.08 0.27 0 0.10 0.30 0 -0.02 -1.14
CEOBRD p=LH 0.08 0.27 0 0.06 0.24 0 0.10 0.30 0 -0.04 -2.20
CEOBRD p=HL 0.31 0.46 0 0.38 0.49 0 0.23 0.42 0 0.15 5.32
CEOBRD p=HH 0.52 0.50 1 0.48 0.50 0 0.57 0.50 1 -0.09 -3.00
CEOBRD indr=LL 0.24 0.43 0 0.26 0.44 0 0.23 0.42 0 0.03 1.18
CEOBRD indr=LH 0.21 0.40 0 0.20 0.40 0 0.22 0.41 0 -0.02 -0.67
CEOBRD indr=HL 0.24 0.43 0 0.25 0.43 0 0.23 0.42 0 0.02 0.83
CEOBRD indr=HH 0.31 0.46 0 0.29 0.46 0 0.33 0.47 0 -0.04 -1.26
Obs. 1003 520 483
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics: CEO-directors joint compensation structure
(Continued from the previous page)
This table presents the summary statistics about categorical variables constrctured by compensation for CEO and outside directors. The details
about categorical compensation variables are available in Table 2.1. The sample consists of 7442 non-financial firm years and 1003 financial firm
years between 1997 and 2002. Compensation information is obtained from Execucomp database. Panel A reports the summary statistics about
categorical variables of non-financial firms and also separately presents the summary statistics of R&D firms and other non-financial firms.
Financial firms are defined as the firms whose standard industrical classsification is between 6000 and 6999. R&D firms are defined as the firms
which recognize the R&D expenditure for the past four consecutive years. The last two columns in Panel A presents the mean difference between
long R&D firms and other non-financial firms and the corresponding t-statistics (computed for unequal variance and unequal observations) of the
null hypothesis that the mean difference is zero. Panel B reports the compensation of financial firms and also separately presents the
compensation of banks and non-bank financial firms. Banks are defined as the firms whose Fama-French 48 industrial classification code is 44. As
in Panel A, the last two columns of Panel B presents the mean difference between banks and other financial firms and the corresponding
t-statistics.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics: Independent variables
Panel A: Non-financial firms
All firms R&D firms Other firms Diff.
mean sd median Obs. mean sd median Obs. mean sd median Obs. mean t
DIRBLK 0.08 0.27 0 3731 0.06 0.23 0 2002 0.11 0.31 0 1729 -0.05 -5.86
Segments 1.72 1.04 1 6496 1.83 1.13 1 3494 1.60 0.90 1 3002 0.22 8.89
ln(sale) 7.40 1.50 7.29 7442 7.26 1.62 7.16 3898 7.54 1.36 7.41 3544 -0.28 -8.20
ROA 0.04 0.14 0.05 7442 0.03 0.17 0.05 3898 0.05 0.08 0.05 3544 -0.02 -7.09
Loss 0.04 0.20 0 7442 0.06 0.25 0 3898 0.01 0.12 0 3544 0.05 11.20
KZ4 0.22 1.17 0.28 7442 0.05 1.14 0.04 3898 0.41 1.17 0.53 3544 -0.37 -13.69
LTD 0.87 0.34 1 7442 0.84 0.37 1 3898 0.90 0.29 1 3544 -0.06 -8.42
Return 0.04 0.46 0.08 7442 0.03 0.49 0.08 3898 0.06 0.43 0.09 3544 -0.03 -2.52
MB 2.17 1.61 1.66 7442 2.43 1.86 1.83 3898 1.88 1.22 1.51 3544 0.56 15.41
R&D 0.03 0.06 0.01 7442 0.06 0.07 0.04 3898 0.00 0.01 0.00 3544 0.06 58.74
Vol 0.44 0.19 0.39 7442 0.47 0.21 0.41 3898 0.41 0.16 0.38 3544 0.06 12.42
Ln(tenure) 1.77 0.87 1.79 7442 1.71 0.87 1.61 3898 1.82 0.87 1.79 3544 -0.11 -5.44
NCEO 0.08 0.27 0 7442 0.09 0.28 0 3898 0.08 0.27 0 3544 0.01 1.73
Dual 0.66 0.47 1 7442 0.67 0.47 1 3898 0.65 0.48 1 3544 0.02 1.64
IND 0.75 0.43 1 7442 0.80 0.40 1 3898 0.69 0.46 1 3544 0.12 11.66
Panel B: Financial firms
All firms Banks Other firms Diff.
mean sd median Obs. mean sd median Obs. mean sd median Obs. mean t
DIRBLK 0.08 0.27 0 509 0.09 0.29 0 278 0.06 0.23 0 231 0.04 1.61
ln(sale) 7.84 1.52 7.66 1003 7.72 1.56 7.52 520 7.98 1.46 7.79 483 -0.26 -2.76
ROA 0.03 0.05 0.01 1003 0.01 0.01 0.01 520 0.04 0.07 0.03 483 -0.03 -8.86
Loss 0.01 0.12 0 1003 0.00 0.00 0 520 0.03 0.17 0 483 -0.03 -3.93
KZ4 1.08 1.14 1.28 1003 1.80 0.64 1.91 520 0.31 1.06 0.38 483 1.48 26.63
LTD 0.93 0.26 1 1003 0.97 0.16 1 520 0.88 0.32 1 483 0.09 5.58
Return 0.10 0.36 0.12 1003 0.10 0.36 0.11 520 0.11 0.37 0.14 483 -0.02 -0.82
MB 1.45 1.08 1.13 1003 1.18 0.50 1.11 520 1.73 1.41 1.19 483 -0.55 -8.20
R&D 0.00 0.02 0.00 1003 0.00 0.00 0.00 520 0.00 0.02 0.00 483 0.00 -4.08
Vol 0.34 0.14 0.30 1003 0.30 0.12 0.28 502 0.37 0.15 0.34 483 -0.07 -7.94
Ln(tenure) 1.81 0.88 1.95 1003 1.84 0.85 1.95 520 1.77 0.90 1.79 483 0.07 1.19
NCEO 0.07 0.26 0 1003 0.07 0.25 0 520 0.08 0.27 0 483 -0.02 -0.93
Dual 0.70 0.46 1 1003 0.75 0.43 1 520 0.65 0.48 1 483 0.10 3.46
IND 0.79 0.41 1 1003 0.88 0.33 1 520 0.70 0.46 1 483 0.18 7.03
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics: Independent variables
(Continued from the previous page)
This table presents the summary statistics about the firm characteristics of the sample, which consists of 7442 non-financial firm years and 1003
financial firm years between 1996 and 2004. Among them, 6496 non-financial firm years are available in segments database while 3731
non-financial and 509 financial firm years are available in blockholding ownership database which covers between 1996 and 2001. The utilities (sic
4900–4999) are excluded from the sample. I obtain financial and accounting information from Compustat database, board structure from
Riskmetrics database, blockholding ownership from the data provided by Dlugosz et al. (2006), and business segment information from the
Compustat segment database. Panel A reports the characteristics of non-financial firms and also separately presents the characteristics of R&D
firms and other non-financial firms. Financial firms are defined as the firms whose standard industrical classsification is between 6000 and 6999.
R&D firms are defined as the firms which recognize the R&D expenditure for the past four consecutive years. The last two columns in Panel A
presents the mean difference between R&D firms and other firms and the unpaired t-statistics (computed for unequal variance and unequal
observations) which tests for the null hypothesis that the mean difference is zero. Panel B reports the characteristics of financial firms and also
separately presents the characteristics of banks and non-bank financial firms. Banks are defined as the firms whose Fama-French 48 industrial
classification code is 44. As in Panel A, the last two columns of Panel B presents the mean difference between banks and other financial firms and
the corresponding t-statistics. The details about all variables are available in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.5: CEO and directors pay-for-performance compensation and deter-
minants of compensation structure: Non-financial firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO p BRD p CEO r BRD r CEO p BRD p CEO r BRD r
R&D 4yr (t-1) 0.0511*** -0.0312** 0.0477*** 0.0179 0.0282 -0.0501** 0.0478*** 0.0194
(3.52) (-1.98) (4.85) (1.60) (1.51) (-2.32) (3.54) (1.29)
DIRBLK -0.0298 -0.0617** -0.0372** -0.0363*
(-1.29) (-2.30) (-2.23) (-1.96)
Segments -0.00814 -0.0173*** -0.0108*** -0.0245*** 0.0136** -0.0152* 0.00548 -0.0174***
(-1.49) (-2.93) (-2.92) (-5.81) (1.98) (-1.91) (1.10) (-3.14)
ln(Sale) (t-1) 0.0140*** -0.0280*** 0.0301*** -0.0249*** 0.00831 -0.0285*** 0.0311*** -0.0186***
(3.22) (-5.94) (10.24) (-7.41) (1.47) (-4.36) (7.62) (-4.11)
ROA (t-1) 0.0622 0.0594 0.0931*** 0.111*** 0.0152 0.102 0.106*** 0.147***
(1.47) (1.30) (3.26) (3.39) (0.27) (1.56) (2.59) (3.22)
Loss (t-1) 0.0258 0.00296 0.00527 0.0194 -0.0340 0.0162 -0.00512 0.0476
(0.91) (0.10) (0.27) (0.88) (-0.87) (0.36) (-0.18) (1.51)
KZ4 (t-1) -0.00462 0.0211*** -0.000695 0.0136*** -0.00302 0.0346*** 0.00466 0.0215***
(-0.89) (3.75) (-0.20) (3.39) (-0.46) (4.51) (0.97) (4.04)
LTD (t-1) 0.0617*** -0.0361** 0.00907 -0.0450*** 0.0566** -0.0751*** -0.00902 -0.0832***
(3.74) (-2.02) (0.81) (-3.53) (2.47) (-2.83) (-0.55) (-4.52)
Return (t-1) -0.0300** -0.0137 -0.0134* 0.0216** 0.000762 0.00152 0.00212 0.0365***
(-2.51) (-1.06) (-1.65) (2.33) (0.05) (0.09) (0.20) (3.12)
Return (t) 0.0201* -0.00148 -0.00299 -0.00526 0.0302** -0.0125 0.000970 -0.00938
(1.83) (-0.12) (-0.40) (-0.62) (2.34) (-0.84) (0.10) (-0.90)
MB (t-1) 0.00908** 0.0191*** 0.0307*** 0.0382*** 0.0110** 0.0143*** 0.0320*** 0.0339***
(2.45) (4.77) (12.28) (13.37) (2.42) (2.73) (9.76) (9.30)
Vol (t-1) 0.0408 0.261*** 0.335*** 0.439*** 0.103** 0.300*** 0.386*** 0.537***
(1.12) (6.60) (13.52) (15.54) (2.04) (5.14) (10.59) (13.25)
IND (t-1) 0.0830*** 0.0703*** 0.0338*** 0.00531 0.0786*** 0.104*** 0.0294*** 0.0167
(7.20) (5.63) (4.34) (0.60) (5.39) (6.18) (2.79) (1.43)
Tenure (t-1) -0.0499*** -0.0282*** -0.0229*** 0.00953* -0.0363*** -0.0212** -0.0185*** 0.0184**
(-7.09) (-3.71) (-4.81) (1.76) (-4.05) (-2.04) (-2.86) (2.55)
NCEO (t) 0.0173 -0.0532** 0.0720*** -0.00133 0.0390 -0.0209 0.0806*** 0.0269
(0.83) (-2.36) (5.12) (-0.08) (1.53) (-0.71) (4.38) (1.31)
Dual (t-1) 0.0131 0.00486 0.0138* -0.0152* -0.000423 0.000390 0.00814 -0.0164
(1.19) (0.41) (1.87) (-1.79) (-0.03) (0.02) (0.79) (-1.42)
Constant 0.341*** 0.803*** -0.202*** 0.416*** 0.228** 0.700*** -0.323*** 0.224***
(4.84) (10.53) (-4.24) (7.65) (2.37) (6.43) (-4.75) (2.96)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y
N 6496 6496 3323 3323
R-sq 0.075 0.133 0.208 0.330 0.082 0.158 0.230 0.374
***,**, and *: significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2.5: CEO and directors pay-for-performance compensation and deter-
minants of compensation structure: Non-financial firms
(Continued from the previous page)
This table reports the coefficient estimates from seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in a sample of 6496
(or 3323 with DIRBLK) non-financial firm years. In model (1) and (3), the dependent variables are CEO p
and BRD p, which are indicators for the firm years awarding stock option grants to the CEO and outside
directors, respectively. In model (2) and (4), the dependent variables are CEO r and BRD r, which refer to
(the value of stock options granted to the CEO/total compensation for CEO) and (the value of stock
options granted to outside directors/total compensation for outside directors), respectively. The
independent variables include R&D 4yr=1 if the firm has continuously recognized R&D expenditure for
the past 4 years, 0 otherwise; DIRBLK=1 if a blockholder (who owns more than 5% of the outstanding
common shares) sits on the board as an outside director, 0 otherwise; Segments= the number of business
segments; and ln(Sale)= the natural logarithm of sales. The details about other control variables are
available in Table 2.1. Independent variables, except for NCEO, are lagged by one year. All specifications
include the year dummy and the industry dummy variables (created by Fama-Frech 48 industrial
classification code). The standard errors computed in SUR is robust for correlation between equations. In
parentheses, t-statistics are reported.
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Table 2.6: CEO and directors pay-for-performance compensation and deter-
minants of compensation structure: Financial firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO p BRD p CEO r BRD r CEO p BRD p CEO r BRD r
Bank 0.0507 -0.0820* 0.0316 -0.0458 0.0228 -0.164*** 0.0406 -0.0573
(1.57) (-1.95) (1.48) (-1.64) (0.58) (-2.92) (1.30) (-1.50)
DIRBLK 0.0121 -0.213*** 0.00553 -0.0519
(0.23) (-2.85) (0.13) (-1.02)
ln(Sale) (t-1) 0.0194** -0.0278*** 0.0288*** -0.0289*** 0.00825 -0.0544*** 0.0286*** -0.0384***
(2.38) (-2.63) (5.35) (-4.12) (0.75) (-3.45) (3.27) (-3.58)
ROA (t-1) -0.844*** 0.0913 -0.456** 0.452* -0.630 -0.490 -0.639* -0.133
(-2.97) (0.25) (-2.43) (1.84) (-1.31) (-0.71) (-1.68) (-0.28)
Loss (t-1) -0.137 0.0323 -0.0687 -0.103 0.0528 0.0276 -0.119 -0.113
(-1.35) (0.25) (-1.03) (-1.18) (0.31) (0.11) (-0.89) (-0.69)
KZ4 (t-1) -0.0418** 0.00839 -0.0269** 0.00649 -0.0295 0.0119 -0.0382** -0.0213
(-2.48) (0.38) (-2.42) (0.45) (-1.39) (0.39) (-2.27) (-1.03)
LTD (t-1) -0.0197 -0.173*** -0.00725 -0.116*** -0.0550 -0.212*** 0.0108 -0.138**
(-0.41) (-2.76) (-0.23) (-2.80) (-0.97) (-2.61) (0.24) (-2.50)
Return (t-1) 0.0481 0.0532 0.0540** 0.102*** 0.0344 0.105 0.0677* 0.161***
(1.19) (1.01) (2.03) (2.94) (0.69) (1.48) (1.71) (3.32)
Return (t) 0.0681* 0.0497 0.00942 0.0262 0.0774* 0.0733 0.0228 0.0500
(1.89) (1.06) (0.40) (0.84) (1.88) (1.25) (0.70) (1.25)
MB (t-1) -0.0313** 0.0186 0.00253 0.0293** -0.0484** 0.0247 -0.00786 0.0264
(-2.17) (0.99) (0.27) (2.36) (-2.48) (0.89) (-0.51) (1.39)
Vol (t-1) -0.128 0.573*** 0.324*** 0.679*** -0.210 0.834*** 0.410*** 0.924***
(-1.34) (4.63) (5.16) (8.28) (-1.51) (4.20) (3.72) (6.84)
IND (t-1) 0.0618** -0.000135 0.0599*** -0.0345 0.0385 0.0521 0.0535* 0.0110
(2.03) (-0.00) (2.98) (-1.32) (1.11) (1.05) (1.95) (0.33)
Tenure (t-1) -0.0226 -0.00882 -0.00200 0.0233 -0.0195 -0.0555* 0.0165 0.00440
(-1.32) (-0.40) (-0.18) (1.58) (-0.95) (-1.91) (1.02) (0.22)
NCEO(t) 0.0290 -0.0948 0.0479 -0.000456 -0.0563 -0.162* 0.0358 -0.0382
(0.54) (-1.35) (1.34) (-0.01) (-0.86) (-1.73) (0.69) (-0.60)
Dual (t-1) 0.0628** -0.00133 0.0404** -0.0339 0.0738** 0.0484 0.0577** 0.00453
(2.25) (-0.04) (2.20) (-1.41) (2.18) (1.00) (2.15) (0.14)
cons 0.701*** 0.714*** -0.0692 0.382*** 0.820*** 0.943*** -0.137 0.421***
(6.91) (5.41) (-1.03) (4.37) (6.48) (5.22) (-1.36) (3.42)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
N 1003 1003 509 509
R-sq 0.094 0.104 0.169 0.220 0.105 0.177 0.117 0.255
***,**, and *: significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2.6: CEO and directors pay-for-performance compensation and deter-
minants of compensation structure: Financial firms
(Continued from the previous page)
This table reports the coefficient estimates from seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) for financial firms.
The analyses reported in panel A consider both non-financial and financial firms while in panel B, only
financial firms are considered. In model (1) and (3) of both panels, the dependent variables are CEO p
and BRD p, which are indicators for the firm years awarding stock option grants to the CEO and outside
directors, respectively. In model (2) and (4), the dependent variables are CEO r and BRD r, which refer to
(the value of stock options granted to the CEO/total compensation for CEO) and (the value of stock
options granted to outside directors/total compensation for outside directors), respectively. The
independent variables include Bank=1 if Fama-French 48 industrial code is 44, 0 otherwise; DIRBLK=1 if
a blockholder (who owns more than 5% of the outstanding common shares) sits on the board as an outside
director, 0 otherwise; and ln(Sale)= the natural logarithm of sales. To fully exploit the observations,
DIRBLK is considered only in model (3) and (4) of each panel. The details about other control variables
are available in Table 2.1. Independent variables are lagged by one year. All specifications include the year
dummy and the industry dummy variables (created by Fama-Frech 48 industrial classification code). The
standard errors computed in SUR is robust for correlation between equations. In parentheses, t-statistics
are reported.
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Table 2.7: CEO-directors joint compensation structure: Non-financial firms
Panel A: All firms
CEOBRD r CEOBRD p CEOBRD indr
LL LH HL HH LL LH HL HH LL LH HL HH
R&D 4yr (t-1) -0.0412** -0.00547 0.0420 0.00474 -0.0276*** -0.0142 0.0568** -0.0150 -0.0780*** -0.0270 0.0560* 0.0490
(-2.15) (-0.30) (1.36) (0.11) (-2.61) (-1.22) (2.14) (-0.47) (-3.02) (-1.47) (1.79) (1.05)
Segments (t-1) 0.0177** -0.00142 0.00999 -0.0263** 0.00382 0.00399 0.00800 -0.0158 0.0212* -0.0118 0.00856 -0.0180
(2.04) (-0.17) (1.15) (-2.34) (0.63) (0.60) (1.00) (-1.63) (1.67) (-1.30) (0.90) (-1.54)
ln(sales) (t-1) -0.0166* -0.0325*** 0.0479*** 0.00122 -0.0000288 -0.0150** 0.0259*** -0.0108 -0.0115 -0.0361*** 0.0425*** 0.00512
(-1.65) (-4.76) (6.12) (0.10) (-0.01) (-2.47) (3.21) (-0.92) (-1.19) (-5.05) (5.37) (0.47)
Controls Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y
N 6496 6496 6496
Panel B: Firms with DIRBLK
CEOBRD r CEOBRD p CEOBRD indr
LL LH HL HH LL LH HL HH LL LH HL HH
R&D 4yr (t-1) -0.0699** 0.0195 0.0457 0.00477 -0.0189 -0.00323 0.0657* -0.0436 -0.0965*** -0.0143 0.0732** 0.0377
(-2.30) (0.78) (1.22) (0.13) (-1.39) (-0.17) (1.90) (-1.35) (-2.87) (-0.48) (2.06) (0.97)
DIRBLK (t-1) 0.00667 0.0354 0.0802*** -0.122*** 0.00663 0.0182 0.0505 -0.0754* -0.00447 0.0176 0.0437 -0.0569**
(0.32) (1.36) (3.21) (-4.28) (0.53) (0.93) (1.17) (-1.72) (-0.16) (0.58) (1.57) (-2.07)
Segments (t-1) 0.00315 -0.0113 0.0141 -0.00595 -0.00950** -0.00519 0.0183** -0.00361 -0.00300 -0.00990 0.0189** -0.00603
(0.29) (-1.48) (1.55) (-0.53) (-2.33) (-0.71) (1.96) (-0.30) (-0.22) (-1.16) (2.19) (-0.54)
ln(sales) (t-1) -0.0217** -0.0298*** 0.0520*** -0.000493 -0.00603 -0.00450 0.0324*** -0.0219* -0.0286*** -0.0318*** 0.0513*** 0.00904
(-1.98) (-2.88) (5.23) (-0.04) (-1.53) (-0.54) (3.56) (-1.89) (-2.72) (-2.92) (4.52) (0.74)
Controls Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y
N 3323 3323 3323
***,**, and *: significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2.7: CEO-directors joint compensation structure: Non-financial firms
(Continued from the previous page)
Each panel of this table presents the average partial effect estimates of three multinomial logit regressions for non-financial firms. Panels A and B
report the results from the extended sample period (i.e., 1996–2005 without directors’ blockholding ownership) and from the shorter sample
period (i.e., 1996–2001 but including directors’ blockholding ownership), respectively. To highlight the economic significance, this table presents
values for the average partial effects, not the standard multinomial logit coefficients. In each panel, dependent variables are categorical
compensation variables: CEOBRD r in the first four columns, CEOBRD p in the next four columns, and CEOBRD indr in the last four
columns. All independent variables reported in Table 2.5 are considered but this table presents only partial effects of R&D 4yr, DIRBLK,
Segments and ln(Sales). The details about dependent and independent variables are available in Table 2.1. All specifications include one-year
lagged independent variables and also control for the year dummy and the industry dummy variables (created by the Fama-Frech 48 industrial
classification code). The standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level. In parentheses, t-statistics are reported.
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Table 2.8: CEO-directors joint compensation structure: Financial firms
Panel A: All firms
CEOBRD r CEOBRD p CEOBRD indr
LL LH HL HH LL LH HL HH LL LH HL HH
Bank 0.0212 -0.0374** 0.0517 -0.0355** -0.0479** -0.00400 0.129*** -0.0767 -0.0477* 0.0382 -0.0287 0.0381
(0.36) (-2.51) (1.26) (-2.08) (-2.27) (-0.21) (2.90) (-1.46) (-1.68) (0.84) (-0.94) (1.09)
ln(sales) (t-1) 0.000811 -0.0473** 0.0504*** -0.00390 -0.00554 -0.0146* 0.0339*** -0.0138*** -0.00363 -0.0346*** 0.0306* 0.00759
(0.04) (-2.33) (4.26) (-0.31) (-0.48) (-1.66) (25.86) (-4.02) (-1.06) (-3.52) (1.93) (0.70)
Controls Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
N 1003 1003 1003
Panel B: Firms with DIRBLK
CEOBRD r CEOBRD p CEOBRD indr
LL LH HL HH LL LH HL HH LL LH HL HH
Bank 0.0652 -0.0961** -0.00772 0.0386 -0.000988 -0.0285 0.170*** -0.141** -0.0166 0.00794 -0.0882 0.0968*
(1.10) (-2.52) (-0.13) (0.75) (-0.03) (-1.12) (2.79) (-2.30) (-0.29) (0.17) (-1.59) (1.75)
DIRBLK (t-1) -0.198** 0.0803* 0.203*** -0.0856 -0.0113 0.0172 0.213*** -0.218*** -0.0376 0.0465 0.146** -0.155*
(-2.39) (1.73) (2.90) (-1.11) (-0.28) (0.46) (3.19) (-2.73) (-0.53) (0.80) (2.32) (-1.82)
ln(sales) (t-1) -0.00969 -0.0443*** 0.0662*** -0.0122 0.00363 -0.0121 0.0508*** -0.0423*** 0.00776 -0.0603*** 0.0485*** 0.00402
(-0.65) (-3.54) (4.33) (-0.83) (0.44) (-1.34) (3.36) (-2.61) (0.54) (-4.25) (3.47) (0.26)
Controls Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
N 509 509 509
***,**, and *: significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2.8: CEO-directors joint compensation structure: Financial firms
(Continued from the previous page)
Each panel of this table presents the average partial effect estimates of three multinomial logit regressions for financial firms. Panels A and B
report the results from the extended sample period (i.e., 1996–2005 without directors’ blockholding ownership) and from the shorter sample
period (i.e., 1996–2001 but including directors’ blockholding ownership), respectively. To highlight the economic significance, this table presents
values for the average partial effects, not the standard multinomial logit coefficients. In each panel, dependent variables are categorical
compensation variables: CEOBRD r in the first four columns, CEOBRD p in the next four columns, and CEOBRD indr in the last four
columns. All independent variables reported in Table 2.6 are considered but this table presents only partial effects of Bank, DIRBLK, and
ln(Sales). The details about dependent and independent variables are available in Table 2.1. All specifications include one-year lagged
independent variables and also control for the year dummy. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level in Panel A but
not in panel B since the number of observations is not sufficient. In parentheses, t-statistics are reported.
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Appendix A
Proof of Propositions and Lemmas
(Chapter 1)
Proof of Lemma 1.3.1: The first order condition of maximizing (1
3
+e+∆)wu+
(1
3
− 2∆)wm + (13 − e+ ∆)wd − 12γme2 with respect to e is
wu − wd − γme = 0,
which proves the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.2: It is trivial that w∗m = w
∗
d = 0. The first order
condition with respect to wu is
ru − rd
γm
− 1
3
− 2w
∗
u
γm
= 0, (A.1)
which proves the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 1.3.3: The managerial effort choice in (1.7) is proved in
lemma 1.3.1. The managerial risk-choice is also immediate from maximiz-
ing (1
3
+ e+ ∆)wu + (
1
3
− 2∆)wm + (13 − e+ ∆)wd − 12γme2 with respect to ∆.
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Proof of Proposition 1.3.4: To facilitate the notation, I denote the optimal
managerial pay when shareholders induce the managerial choice of ∆s as
ws(r˜) = (wsu, w
s
m, w
s
d) and the optimal managerial pay when shareholders in-
duce the managerial choice of ∆0 as w
0(r˜) = (w0u, w
0
m, w
0
d). From lemma 1.3.3,
it is obvious that (i) wsm = w
s
d = 0 and that (ii) w
0
m =
w0u
2
and w0d = 0. Solving
the shareholders maximization problem, I find that wsu =
ru−rd
2
− γm(16 + ∆s2 )
and w0u =
ru−rd
2
− γm
4
. To find the optimal managerial compensation, I com-
pare the shareholders’ indirect utility functions by plugging wsu and w
0
u into
the shareholder value function in (1.6). Specifically, the shareholders’ indirect
utility function when ∆∗ = ∆s is
V s =
1
3
(ru + rm + rd) +
wsu
γm
(ru − rd)− (1
3
+
wsu
γm + ∆s
)ws0 (A.2)
while the indirect utility function when ∆∗ = ∆0 is
V 0 =
1
3
(ru + rm + rd) +
w0u
γm
(ru − rd)− (1
2
+
w0u
γm
)w0u (A.3)
Therefore, V s − V 0 = ( 1
12
− ∆s
2
)(ru − rd − γm( 512 + ∆s2 )). Note that V s > V 0
if w0u > 0. Thus, shareholders induce the managerial choice of ∆s by offering
ws(r˜).
Proof of Proposition 1.3.5: This is immediate from Proposition 1.3.2 and
Proposition 1.3.4.
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Appendix B
Proof of Propositions and Lemmas
(Chapter 2)
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1: This is straightforward since the zero board compen-
sation induces the board to truthfully report the manager’s choice of ∆ and
to remain uninformed about θ.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.2: The first order condition of maximizing Vm(θˆm, e; θi, w
′
m)
with respect to e is
θi(um(θˆm)− dm(θˆm)− γme = 0,
which proves the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3: Since zero compensation induces the board to
truthfully reports to shareholders about the message received from the man-
ager θˆm and to produce truthful evidence of the manager’s choice of ∆, this
case is equivalent to the case in which shareholders directly communicate and
contract with the manager by observing the manager’s choice of ∆ but not
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the productivity θ. In what follows, I first show that the optimal manage-
rial compensation contract features a pooling contract with respect to θˆm and
then characterize the optimal contractual arrangements. For simplicity, I de-
fine σjm ≡ w′m(θmj ) = (ujm,mjm, djm) for j = h, l. Suppose that σhm 6= σlm. Since
shareholders observe the manager’s choice of ∆, they can require the man-
ager to make a certain choice of ∆j ∈ {∆0,∆s} when the manager reports
to shareholders θjm. Without loss of generality, I consider the case in which
uhm − dhm > ulm − dlm (i.e., shareholders induce higher managerial effort when
the manager reports θmh ) and shareholders require ∆
h = ∆0. Lemma 2.3.2
suggests that for θ = θi (i = h, l), the manager who reports θ
m
j selects the
effort level as ei,j =
θi(u
j
m−djm)
γm
. Thus, when the manager observes θ = θl, his
expected utility from reporting θhm is
V l,hm =
1
3
(uhm +m
h
m + d
h
m) +
θ2l (u
h
m − dhm)2
2γm
(B.1)
and, thus, the manager truthfully reports θml if and only if
V l,lm =
1
3
(ulm +m
l
m + d
l
m) +
θ2l (u
l
m − dlm)2
2γm
+ ∆l(ulm + d
l
m− 2mlm) ≥ V l,hm (B.2)
Note that (B.2) is binding. When shareholders offer the manager a menu of
separating contracts, shareholder value can be written as:
V seps = V0 +
θ2h(u
h
m − dhm)
γm
p(ru − rd) + θ
2
l (u
l
m − dlm)
γm
(1− p)(ru − rd)
− p
[
1
3
(uhm +m
h
m + d
h
m) +
θ2h(u
h
m − dhm)2
γm
]
− (1− p)
[
1
3
(ulm +m
l
m + d
l
m) +
θ2l (u
l
m − dlm)2
γm
+ ∆l(ulm + d
l
m − 2mlm)
]
(B.3)
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Alternately, by offering a pooling contract {uhm,mhm, dhm}, shareholders obtain
the expected pay-off:
V hs = V0 +
θ2h(u
h
m − dhm)
γm
p(ru − rd) + θ
2
l (u
h
m − dhm)
γm
(1− p)(ru − rd)
− p
[
1
3
(uhm +m
h
m + d
h
m) +
θ2h(u
h
m − dhm)2
γm
]
− (1− p)
[
1
3
(uhm +m
h
m + d
h
m) +
θ2l (u
h
m − dhm)2
γm
]
(B.4)
Since (B.2) is binding, (B.4) can be rewritten as
V hs = V0 +
θ2h(u
h
m − dhm)
γm
p(ru − rd) + θ
2
l (u
h
m − dhm)
γm
(1− p)(ru − rd)
− p
[
1
3
(uhm +m
h
m + d
h
m) +
θ2h(u
h
m − dhm)2
γm
]
− (1− p)
[
1
3
(uhm +m
h
m + d
h
m) +
θ2l (u
l
m − dlm)2
2γm
+ ∆l(ulm + d
l
m − 2mlm)
]
− (1− p)θ
2
l (u
h
m − dhm)2
2γm
(B.5)
By subtracting (B.3) from (B.5),
V hs − V seps =
(1− p)(λh − λl)
γm
[
(ru − rd)− λ
h + λl
2
]
, (B.6)
where λh = θ2l (u
h
m − dhm) and λl = θ2l (ulm − dlm)
Shareholders never offer a compensation such that λh > ru−rd. Since λh > λl,
V hs > V
sep
s , which implies that shareholders would rather offer {uhm,mhm, dhm}
as a pooling contract than offer a menu of separating contracts. To find the op-
timal pooling contract, I solve for the managerial compensation {uhm,mhm, dhm}
that maximizes (B.4). Obviously, mhm = d
h
m = 0. The first order condition
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with respect to uhm is
(pθ2h + (1− p)θ2l )(ru − rd)
γm
− 1
3
− 2(pθ
2
h + (1− p)θ2l )uhm
γm
= 0, (B.7)
which proves the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.1: The lemma is proved by showing that for any board
compensation wb(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm, r˜) that induces the board to truthfully reports its
private information about θ, there exists a corresponding board compensation
that has a form characterized in the lemma and induces the same board’s
choices and the associated managerial actions. For an arbitrary truth-telling
mechanism wb(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm, r˜), set ∆ˆ
h ∈ {∆ˆ0, ∆ˆs} and σhm = wm(∆ˆh) (resp. ∆ˆl
and σlm = wm(∆ˆ
l)) are the board’s choices of ∆ˆ and σm when the board
reports θbh (reps. θ
b
l ). Consider an alternative board compensation contract
w
′
b(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm, r˜) such that
w
′
b(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm, r˜) =

wb(θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm, r˜) if (θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm, r˜) = (θ
b
h, ∆ˆ
h, σhm, r˜)
or (θˆb, ∆ˆ, σm, r˜) = (θ
b
l , ∆ˆ
l, σlm, r˜)
(0, 0, 0) otherwise.
Then, the informed board’s optimal choices induced by w
′
b and the associated
managerial choices equal to the corresponding choices induced by wb. The
uninformed board’s expected compensation from w
′
b is lower than that from
wb and, thus, w
′
b satisfies the board’s monitoring incentive compatibility con-
straints. This proves the lemma.
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Proof of Lemma 2.4.2 and Lemma 2.4.6: omitted since they are similar to the
proof of lemma 2.4.1.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.3 and Proposition 2.4.7: omitted since they are fully
discussed in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.5 and Proposition 2.4.9: refer to the proof of lemma
2.3.2
Proof of Proposition 2.4.10: To prove proposition 2.4.10, I first prove the
following lemma which characterizes the optimal form of managerial compen-
sation:
Lemma B.0.1. In the informed board case, the optimal managerial compen-
sation features either σjm = (u
j
m, 0, 0) or (u
j
m,
ujm
2
, 0) for j = h, l.
Proof of Lemma B.0.1: Consider a case in which shareholders induce the in-
formed board to offer the manager σjm = {ujm,mjm, djm} such that ujm + djm >
2mjm and m
j
m, d
j
m > 0 when they receive the board’s message θ
b
j (j = h, l).
As implied by propositions 2.4.5 and 2.4.9, when the manager observes θ = θi
(i = h, l), σjm induces managerial effort e
i,j = θi(u
j
m−djm)
γm
. Corollaries 2.4.4 and
2.4.8 also imply that given σjm as above, the manager chooses ∆0 if and only if
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shareholders induce the board to report ∆ˆj = ∆ˆ0 and award board compensa-
tion such that Cjb = u
j
b+d
j
b−2mjb ≤ 0. Now consider an alternative managerial
compensation contract σj
′
m = {ujm− djm, 0, 0}. It is apparent that the manage-
rial actions (e,∆) induced by σj
′
m equals the managerial actions induced by
σjm. Therefore, the board compensation contracts that replace σ
j
m with σ
j′
m
also satisfies the board’s monitoring incentive compatibility constraints while
it reduces the expected value of managerial compensation. Hence, sharehold-
ers would induce the board to offer the manager σj
′
m rather than σ
j
m. Similarly,
the managerial compensation plan such that ujm + d
j
m < 2m
j
m and/or d
j
m > 0
is dominated by an alternative compensation plan {ujm, u
j
m
2
, 0}.
Next, I prove the following lemma which characterizes the optimal form
of board compensation:
Lemma B.0.2. The optimal board compensation features that σhb = (u
h
b , 0, 0)
or (uhb ,
uhb
2
, 0) and σlb = (f
l
b, f
l
b, f
l
b).
Proof of Lemma B.0.2: Without loss of generality, I focus on the case in
which uhm ≥ ulm since otherwise shareholder do not induce the board to moni-
tor θ. I first show that wlb should be a fixed wage. Suppose that u
l
b > d
l
b.
Then, since θh ≥ θl, V h,lb (wb) > V l,lb (wb), where V i,jb (wb) is the informed
board’s expected compensation when the board observes θ = θi and reports
θbj (i, j ∈ {h, l}). Now suppose that shareholders alternately offer the board a
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fixed wage σlb = {f lb, f lb, f lb} such that f lb = V l,lb (wb). Then, when the board ob-
serves θ = θh and falsely reports to shareholders θ
b
l , its expected compensation
also corresponds to f lb. Since V
h,l
b (wb) > f
l
b, constraint (2.22) does not change
while (2.23) is relaxed. Therefore, shareholders can reduce the expected value
of the compensation awarded to the board who reports θbh. Next, I show that
σhb = (u
h
b , 0, 0) or (u
h
b ,
uhb
2
, 0). For the board compensation σhb = {uhb ,mhb , dhb}
such that dhb > 0, let us consider an alternative plan σ
h′
b = {uhb + k1dhb ,mhb , 0},
where k1 =
1
3
− θ
2
hu
h
m
γm
+∆h
1
3
+
θ2
h
uhm
γm
+∆h
. If shareholders replace whb with σ
h′
b , (2.22) is relaxed
while (2.23) does not change and, thus, shareholders can obtain higher ex-
pected pay-off. Now suppose that mhb >
uhb
2
and the board induces ∆h = ∆0.
Then, shareholders can offer σh
′
b = {uhb + k2, u
h
b+k2
2
, 0}, where k2 =
1
3
1
3
+
θ2
h
uhm
γm
and  =
2mhb−uhb
2+k2
. Then, (2.22) is relaxed while (2.23) does not change and,
thus, shareholders can obtain higher expected pay-off. Similarly, if the board
induces ∆h = ∆0 and m
h
b > 0, shareholders can obtain higher expected pay-off
by offering wh
′
b = {uhb + k3mhb , 0, 0}, where k3 =
1
3
−2∆s
1
3
+
θ2
h
uhm
γm
+∆s
.
By lemmas B.0.1 and B.0.2, I can prove proposition 2.4.10 by showing
that (i) σlm = (u
l
m, 0, 0) and (ii) the optimal compensation structure can fea-
ture either σhm = (u
h
m,
uhm
2
, 0) or σhb = (u
h
b ,
uhb
2
, 0) but not both. First, corollary
2.4.4 implies that the fixed board wage σlb = (f
l
b, f
l
b, f
l
b) provides the board
with incentives to induce the managerial choice ∆0 by truthfully reporting
to shareholders about the managerial choice of ∆. Therefore, the optimal
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compensation structure features σlm = (u
l
m, 0, 0) which induces the managerial
effort most efficiently. Next, corollary 2.4.4 also implies that to induce the
managerial choice of ∆s when the board reports θ
b
h, either C
h
m = 0 or C
h
b = 0.
If σhm = (u
h
m,
uhm
2
, 0) (i.e., Chm = 0) and induces the managerial choice of ∆0,
the optimal board compensation features σhb = (u
h
b , 0, 0) which induces the
board’s monitoring on θ most efficiently. On the other hand, σhb = (u
h
b ,
uhb
2
, 0)
(i.e., Chb = 0) which provides the board’s incentives to induce the managerial
choice of ∆0, the optimal managerial compensation features σ
h
m = (u
h
m, 0, 0)
which induces the managerial effort most efficiently.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.12: Since (2.26) and (2.25) are binding at the optimal
compensation, uhb and f
b
l of the optimal compensation structure correspond to
uhb =
γbγm
p(1− p)(θ2h − θ2l )uhm
(B.8)
f lb =

(1
3
+ ∆s +
θ2l u
h
m
γm
)uhb +
γb
1−p in speculation case
(1
2
+
θ2l u
h
m
γm
)uhb +
γb
1−p in disciplinary board case
(1
3
+
θ2l u
h
m
γm
)uhb +
γb
1−p in contracting board case
(B.9)
Therefore, by plugging the optimal forms of contracts stated in proposition
2.4.10,(B.8) and (B.9) into shareholders’ problems specified in (2.24)-(2.28), I
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obtain the following first order conditions with respect to uhm in each case:
SP:
pθ2h(r
u − rd)
γm
− p
[(
1
3
+ ∆s
)
+
2θ2hu
h
m,sp
γm
]
+
(
1
3
+ ∆s
)
γbγm
p(1− p)(θ2h − θ2l )(uhm,sp)2
= 0 (B.10)
DB:
pθ2h(r
u − rd)
γm
− p
[
1
3
+
2θ2hu
h
m,db
γm
]
+
γbγm
2p(1− p)(θ2h − θ2l )uhm,db2
= 0
(B.11)
CB:
pθ2h(r
u − rd)
γm
− p
[
1
2
+
2θ2hu
h
m,cb
γm
]
+
γbγm
3p(1− p)(θ2h − θ2l )uhm,cb2
= 0 (B.12)
and the first order condition with respect to ulm implies that the optimal com-
pensation features ulm =
ru−rd
2
− γm
6θ2l
Proof of Proposition 2.4.13: uhm,db > u
h
m,sp > u
h
m,cb is immediate from (B.10),
(B.11), and (B.12). ulm,db = u
l
m,sp = u
l
m,cb is demonstrated in proposition
2.4.12. uhb,cb > u
h
b,sp > u
h
b,db is immediate from the relation u
h
m,db > u
h
m,sp > u
h
m,cb
and (B.8). Finally, f lb,db > f
l
b,sp > f
l
b,cb is obtained from (B.9) and the first or-
der conditions, (B.10), (B.11), and (B.12).
Proof of Proposition 2.5.1: Shareholder values specified in (2.29)-(2.32) imply
that:
1. ∆s: Higher ∆s decreases shareholder value only in speculation case.
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Thus, higher ∆s either decreases shareholders value in informed board
cases relative to the uninformed board case (when speculation case is
the optimal among informed board cases) or does not affect shareholders
value (when speculation case is not optimal)
2. γb: Higher γb decreases shareholder value in all three informed board
cases while it does not affect shareholder value in uninformed board case
3. Dθ: Higher Dθ increases shareholder value in all three informed board
cases while it does not affect shareholder value in uninformed board case
4. ru − rd: By envelop theorem, the shadow price of ru − rd in each case is
as follows:
Uninformed board case:
Vθ
γm
(
ru − rd
2
− γm
6Vθ
)
Speculation case:
pθ2hu
h
m,s + (1− p)θ2l ulm,s
γm
Disciplinary board case:
pθ2hu
h
m,d + (1− p)θ2l ulm,d
γm
Contracting board case:
pθ2hu
h
m,c + (1− p)θ2l ulm,c
γm
The first order conditions (B.10)-(B.12) imply that uhm,d > u
h
m,s > u
h
m,c >
ru−rd
2
− γm
6θ2h
and proposition 2.4.12 states that ulm,d = u
l
m,s = u
l
m,c =
ru−rd
2
− γm
6θ2l
. Thus, the shadow price of ru−rd in the three informed board
cases is higher than that in uninformed board case. This implies that
higher ∆s increases shareholders value in informed board cases relative
to shareholder value in uninformed board case.
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Proof of Proposition 2.5.2: This is immediate from (2.30)-(2.32) which show
that ∆s does not affect shareholder value in disciplinary board and contracting
board cases while it decreases shareholder value in speculation case.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.3:
1. γb: By envelop theorem, the shadow price of γb in each case is as follows:
Speculation case: −
(
1
3
+ ∆s
)
2
Dθuhm,s
−
(
Vθ
γmDθ
+ 1
)
Disciplinary board case: − 1
Dθuhm,d
−
(
Vθ
γmDθ
+ 1
)
Contracting board case: − 2
3Dθuhm,c
−
(
Vθ
γmDθ
+ 1
)
As demonstrated in (2.30)-(2.32), shareholder value in disciplinary board case
is larger than those in other informed board cases if
− γb
Dθuhm,d
+
pθ2hu
h
m,d
2
γm
≥ −
(
1
3
+ ∆s
)
2γb
Dθuhm,s
+
pθ2hu
h
m,s
2
γm
(B.13)
and
− γb
Dθuhm,d
+
pθ2hu
h
m,d
2
γm
≥ − 2γb
3Dθuhm,c
+
pθ2hu
h
m,c
2
γm
(B.14)
As stated in proposition 2.4.13, uhm,d > u
h
m,s > u
h
m,c and therefore when share-
holders obtain the same value in all three cases,
1
Dθuhm,d
>
(
1
3
+ ∆s
)
2
Dθuhm,s
>
2
3Dθuhm,c
.
This implies that higher γb decreases shareholders value most in disciplinary
board case. Thus, the optimal compensation is more likely to belong to disci-
plinary board case as γb decreases. Thus, the result is proved.
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2. Dθ: omitted since it is very similar to the proof relative to γb.
3. ru − rd: By envelop theorem, the shadow price of ru − rd in each regime is
as follows.
Speculation case:
pθ2hu
h
m,s + (1− p)θ2l ulm
γm
Disciplinary board case:
pθ2hu
h
m,d + (1− p)θ2l ulm
γm
Contracting board case:
pθ2hu
h
m,c + (1− p)θ2l ulm
γm
Since uhm,d > u
h
m,s > u
h
m,c and u
l
m,d = u
l
m,s = u
l
m,c, higher ru − rd increases
shareholder value in disciplinary board case relative to other cases.
150
Bibliography
D. Aboody and B. Lev. Information asymmetry, R&D, and insider gains.
Journal of Finance, 55(6):2747–2766, December 2000.
T. R. Adam and C. S. Fernando. Hedging, speculation and shareholder value.
Journal of Financial Economics, 81(2):283–309, August 2006.
R. B. Adams and D. Ferreira. Do directors perform for pay? Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 46(1):154–171, September 2008.
R. B. Adams, B. E. Hermalin, and M. S. Weisbach. The role of boards of direc-
tors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Journal
of Economic Literature, 48(1):58–107, March 2010.
A. S. Ahmed, E. Kilic, and G. J. Lobo. Does recognition versus disclosure
matter? evidence from value-relevance of banks’ recognized and disclosed
derivative financial instruments. Accounting Review, 81(3):567–588, 2006.
A. Almazan and B. Suarez. Entrenchment and severance pay in optimal gov-
ernance structures. Journal of Finance, 58(2):519–548, April 2003.
M. Baker, J. C. Stein, and J. Wurgler. When does the market matter? stock
prices and the investment of equity-dependent firms. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 118(3):969–1005, August 2003.
151
S. Baliga and T. Sjo¨stro¨m. Decentralization and collusion. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 83(2):196–232, December 1998.
L. A. Bebchuk and J. M. Fried. Pay-without-Performance: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Executive Compensation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 2004.
N. K. Bergman and J. D. Employee sentiment and stock option compensation.
Journal of Financial Economics, 84(3):667–712, June 2007.
B. Bernanke. Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation
of the great depression. American Economic Review, 73(3):257–276, June
1983.
M. Bertrand, E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan. How much should we trust
differences-in-differences estimates? The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
119(1):249–275, February 2004.
G. W. Brown. Managing foreign exchange risk with derivatives. Journal of
Financial Economics, 60(2-3):401–448, May 2001.
S. Bryan, L. Hwang, and S. Lilien. CEO stock-based compensation: An empir-
ical analysis of incentive-intensity, relative mix, and economic determinants.
Journal of Business, 73(4):661–693, October 2000.
S. Chava and A. Purnanandam. CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate
policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 97(2):263–278, August 2010.
152
S. Cheng. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of
Financial Economics, 87(1):157–176, January 2008.
V. Chhaochharia and Y. Grinstein. CEO compensation and board structure.
Journal of Finance, 64(1):231–261, February 2009.
K. H. Chung, P. Wrightb, and B. Kedia. Corporate governance and market
valuation of capital and R&D investments. Review of Financial Economics,
12(2):161–172, 2003.
J. L. Coles, N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. Managerial incentives and risk-
taking. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2):431–468, February 2006.
J. E. Core and W. R. Guay. Stock option plans for non-executive employees.
Journal of Financial Economics, 61(2):253–287, August 2001.
P. M. DeMarzo and D. Duffie. Corporate incentives for hedging and hedge
accounting. Review of Financial Studies, 8(3):743–771, July 1995.
Y. Deutsch. The influence of outside directors’ stock-option compensation
on firms’ R&D. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(5):
816–827, September 2007.
J. Dlugosz, R. Fahlenbrach, P. Gompers, and A. Metrick. Large blocks of
stock: prevalence, size, and measurement. Journal of Corproate Finance,
12(3):594–618, June 2006.
153
E. Fama and M. Jensen. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law
and Economics, 26(2):301–325, June 1983.
A. Faure-Grimaud, J. J. Laffont, and D. Martimort. Collusion, delegation
and supervision with soft information. Review of Economic Studies, 70(2):
253–279, April 2003.
E. Fee and C. Hadlock. Raids, rewards, and reputations in the market for
managerial talent. Review of Financial Studies, 16(4):1315–1357, October
2003.
E. M. Fich and A. Shivdasani. The impact of stock-option compensation
for outside directors on firm value. Journal of Business, 78(6):2229–2254,
November 2005.
Financial Accounting Standard Board. Statement of Financial Accounting
Standard No. 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Ac-
tivities. Financial Accounting Standard Board, 1998.
C. Frydman and D. Jenter. CEO compensation. Annual Review of Financial
Economics, 2(1):75–102, December 2010.
C. C. Ge´czy, B. A. Minton, and C. M. Schrand. Taking a view: Corporate
speculation, governance, and compensation. Journal of Finance, 62(5):2405–
2443, October 2007.
154
T. A. Gormley, D. A. Matsa, and T. Milbourn. CEO compensation and corpo-
rate risk: Evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 56(2-3):79–101, December 2013.
S. J. Grossman and O. D. Hart. An analysis of the principal-agent problem.
Econometrica, 51(1):7–45, January 1983.
W. R. Guay. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the
magnitude and determinants. Journal of Financial Economics, 53(1):43–71,
July 1999a.
W. R. Guay. The impact of derivatives on firm risk: An empirical examination
of new derivative users. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 26(1-3):319–
351, January 1999b.
B. H. Hall and J. Lerner. The financing of R&D and innovation. In B. H. Hall
and N. Rosenberg, editors, Handbook of Economics of Technical Change.
Elsevier, New York, 2010.
J. C. Hartzell and L. T. Starks. Institutional investors and executive compen-
sation. Journal of Finance, 58(6):2351–2374, December 2003.
R. M. Hayes, M. Lemmon, and M. Qiu. Stock options and managerial in-
centives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123r. Journal of Financial
Economics, 105(1):174–190, July 2012.
155
Z. He and W. Xiong. Delegated asset management, investment mandates
and capital immobility. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(2):239–258,
February 2013.
T. Hellmann, K. Murdock, and J. Stiglitz. Liberalization, moral hazard in
banking and prodential regulation: are capital requirements enough? Amer-
ican Economic Review, 90(1):147–165, March 2000.
C. P. Himmelberg, R. G. Hubbard, and D. Palia. Understanding the de-
terminants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and
performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53(3):353–384, September
1999.
B. Ho¨lmstrom. Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, 10(1):74–91, 1979.
B. Ho¨lmstrom and P. Milgrom. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of
intertemporal incentives. Econometrica, 55(2):303–328, March 1987.
M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3
(4):305–360, October 1976.
M. C. Jensen and K. J. Murphy. Performance pay and top-manangement
incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2):225–264, April 1990.
J. X. Jiang, K. R. Petroni, and I. Y. Wang. Managing foreign exchange risk
with derivatives. Journal of Financial Economics, 96(3):513–526, June 2010.
156
O. Kadan and J. Swinkels. Stocks or options? moral hazard, firm viability,
and the design of compensation contracts. Review of Financial Studies, 21
(1):451–482, January 2008.
S. N. Kaplan and L. Zingales. Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide
useful measures of financing constraints. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
112(1):169–215, February 1997.
S. Kedia and S. Rajgopal. Neighborhood matters: The impact of location
on broad based stock option plans. Journal of Financial Economics, 92(1):
109–127, April 2009.
M. Keeley. Deposit insurance, risk and market power in banking. American
Economic Review, 80(5):1183–1200, December 1990.
S. P. Kothari, T. E. Laguerre, and A. J. Leone. Capitalization versus ex-
pensing: Evidence on the uncertainty of future earnings from capital expen-
ditures versus R&D outlays. Review of Accounting Studies, 7(4):355–382,
2002.
R. Kroszner and R. Rajan. Is the glass-steagall act justified? a study of the us
experience with universal banking before 1933. American Economic Review,
84(4):810–832, September 1994.
P. Kumar and K. Sivaramakrishnan. Who monitors the monitor? the effect
of board independence on executive compensation and firm value. Review
of Financial Studies, 21(3):1371–1401, May 2008.
157
L. Laeven and R. Levine. Bank governance, regulation and risk taking. Journal
of Financial Economics, 93(2):259–275, August 2009.
J. S. Linck, J. M. Netter, and Y. T. The determinants of board structure.
Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2):308–328, February 2008.
A. Low. Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation.
Journal of Financial Economics, 92(3):470–490, June 2009.
D. Mookherjee. Incentives in hierarchies. In R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, edi-
tors, The handbook of organizational economics. Princeton University Press,
New Jersey, 2012.
R. B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research,
6(1):58–73, February 1981.
R. B. Myerson. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-
agent problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10(1):67–81, June
1982.
R. B. Myerson. Bayesian equilibrium and incentive compatibility: An intro-
duction. In L. Hurwicz, editor, Social goals and social organization, pages
229–259. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.
S. Pathan. Strong boards, ceo power and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking
and Finance, 33(7):1340–1350, July 2009.
158
A. A. Rampini, A. Sufi, and S. Viswanathan. Dynamic risk management.
Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2):271–296, February 2014.
H. E. Ryan and R. A. Wiggins. The influence of firm-and manager-specific
characteristics on the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Cor-
porate Finance, 7(2):101–123, June 2001.
H. E. Ryan and R. A. Wiggins. The interactions between R&D investment de-
cisions and compensation policy. Financial Management, 31(1):5–29, 2002.
H. E. Ryan and R. A. Wiggins. Who is in whose pocket? director compensa-
tion, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of
Financial Economics, 73(3):497–524, September 2004.
J. Tirole. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organi-
zations. Journal of Law, Economics and organization, 2(2):181–214, Fall
1986.
P. Tufano. Who manages risk? an empirical examination of risk management
practices in the gold mining industry. The Journal of Finance, 51(4):1097–
1137, September 1996.
U. S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. The Role of the Board of Di-
rectors in Enron’s Collapse. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
2002.
159
B. Villalonga and R. Amit. How do family ownership, control and management
affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2):385–417, May
2006.
D. Yermack. Do corporations award ceo stock options effectively? Journal of
Financial Economics, 39(2-3):237–269, October-November 1995.
D. Yermack. Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside
directors. Journal of Finance, 59(5):2281–2308, October 2004.
H. Zhang. Effect of derivative accounting rules on corporate risk-management
behavior. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 47(3):244–264, June 2009.
160
Vita
Chang Mo Kang was born in Daejon, Republic of Korea. He received a
Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics from Seoul National University in 2005.
During his undergraduate study, he served for the Republic of Korea Air Force
from 2001 to 2004. He then received a Master of Science degree in Management
Engineering from Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology in 2008
and entered the doctoral program in Finance at the University of Texas at
Austin. Chang Mo married Bo Gyong in 2008. They have a son, Andrew.
Permanent address: 2501 Lake Austin Blvd. B106
Austin, Texas 78703
This dissertation was typeset with LATEX
† by the author.
†LATEX is a document preparation system developed by Leslie Lamport as a special
version of Donald Knuth’s TEX Program.
161
